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Abstract 
 
The improvement of water quality in the streams of the Glenelg Hopkins catchment is a priority 
of the Glenelg Hopkins regional strategy until 2009. A major source of water pollution in the 
region is associated with agricultural activities and the extensive use of fertilisers by local 
farmers. High nutrient levels are associated with blue-green algae (BGA) together with lowered 
water flows and raised water temperature. The incidence of blue-green algae in the Glenelg 
Hopkins region has the potential to increase, with the changes to land use that are occurring in 
South Western Victoria. Reduced rainfall, more frequent extreme rainfall events and higher 
temperatures associated with climate change are likely to exacerbate this trend.  
 
The 2001 audit of nutrient loads to Australian rivers and estuaries estimated that the total export 
of phosphorus is estimated at 1.9 times the natural export that occurred before European 
settlement. Water testing data of the Total Phosphorus (TP) levels in the Hopkins River and at 
other sites within the Hopkins Catchment also indicate increasing incidence of TP above the 
Environment Protection Authority’s target levels of 0.0325mg/l P for longer periods of each 
year.  
 
Earlier research indicated that phosphorus in runoff increases when pasture fertility increases 
and that fertiliser management practices should be considered as an element of preventative 
action for reducing nutrient pollution. During our research, a survey was undertaken in the 
Hopkins River catchment, to determine the current management of phosphorus (P) fertilisers on 
grazing and mixed enterprise farms, the attitude of farmers to natural resource management and 
their understanding of nutrient pollution. The survey also gathered information on the way 
farmers made fertiliser management decisions. If cooperation relating to phosphorus fertiliser 
application could be facilitated between groups of farmers, it may be possible to reduce nutrient 
runoff into the Hopkins waterways. 
 
Cooperative game theory has successfully been used worldwide in the resolution of 
environmental problems where there is an economic impact to the decision making process. In 
this project, the amount and the timing of phosphorus application were the parameters to be 
explored in the cooperative game theory model. However, in the final analysis the project was 
limited to the parameter ‘the amount of fertiliser applied on farm’ being used in the model. 
Dependent on the payoff function, the potential for cooperative action on phosphorus 
management by groups of farmers, is assessed in this work. 
 
   vii 
Analysis of the results of the survey included their use in game theoretic modelling, and the 
practicality of cooperative action based on the trade off between the economic cost of pollution 
to the region waterways and the economic production benefits to the individual. The outcome of 
this work will be individual optimal strategies for fertiliser application, allowing individual 
farmers to reduce the impact of agricultural production on the health of the catchment. 
 
Involving the farmer groups, while undertaking the project, raised awareness amongst the 
farming population of the regional nutrient pollution caused by runoff from agricultural land, 
and enlisted their assistance towards adopting a cooperative approach to the problem. This 
supports the programs developed by Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority 
(GHCMA) to reduce nutrients in streams, principally TP, over 20 years beginning in 2002. In 
addition, the results have been mapped using a Geographical Information System (GIS) for 
visual presentation and to demonstrate the use of this process in natural resource management 
with the farmer groups. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Outline of the Problem  
 
Water is the life of the country; it provides sustenance for the natural environment and is 
essential to the community and for the economies of industry. Past practices of land clearing, 
drainage and excessive water extraction have led to a decline in the health of the waterways, 
with a lowering of water quantity and quality. The Glenelg Hopkins regional strategy calls for 
actions leading to the improvement of water quality in the streams of the Glenelg-Hopkins 
catchment as a major priority (Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, 2003). 
While there is not a serious problem with blue-green algae outbreaks currently, there are 
indications of nutrient load problems within the waterways which potentially may lead to an 
increase in the number of blue-green algae (BGA) blooms within the catchment.   
 
A major source of water nutrient pollution in the region is associated with agricultural activities 
and the extensive use of fertilisers by local farmers, which raises the levels of soil nutrients and 
increases the potential for nutrient pollution of waterways due to runoff and erosion. Prior to the 
local ‘agricultural revolution’ in the 1960s when super phosphate began to be added to the soils, 
together with the introduction of ‘improved’ pasture species, the properties in south west 
Victoria were based on low input, native pastures which did not require high soil phosphorus 
levels and ran only 1to 4 sheep/ha. Economic pressures dictated a move to higher output from 
the same area: changing land practices to high input grazing (prime lamb mostly), cropping and 
forestry were accompanied by an increase in fertiliser application.  
 
This research focuses on the mitigation strategies to prevent rising phosphorus loads within the 
Hopkins River catchment which have the potential to increase the number of BGA outbreaks 
occurring. The phosphorus load in the streams of the Hopkins catchment may be influenced by 
different managerial strategies of the farmers within the region. An effective way of reducing 
the nutrient pollution therefore may be obtained through a community of farmers coordinating 
their fertiliser application schedules in a way that satisfies both the Catchment Management 
Authority (CMA) targets for pollution reduction in the region, and the fertiliser demands of 
crops or pasture. This led to the initial research question: 
 
‘Is it possible to develop cooperative strategies for fertiliser applications amongst a 
community of farmers to minimise nutrient pollution of waterways in the region?’  
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For this project data collected from farmers was used to develop a Game Theory model which 
incorporated production economics and the cost to the environment. Dependent on the payoff 
(utility) function, the potential for cooperative action on phosphorus management by groups of 
farmers is assessed. Game theory has been used successfully in resolution of environmental 
problems worldwide. Where there is an economic impact on the decision making process, it 
offers the development of a cooperative approach to problem solving in resource management 
rather than a competitive approach to natural resource use. The outcome is the recommendation 
of an optimal amount and timing regime of fertiliser application for each individual farmer, 
allowing the farmer to reduce the impact of his agricultural production on the health of the 
catchment. Due to difficulty with obtaining precise ‘timing’ data on fertiliser application it was 
felt that initially the ‘amount’ of fertiliser would be used in the model described in this work. 
 
Economics and the environment are inextricably connected, with natural resources becoming 
increasingly scarce and the impact on them by human activity often detrimental. Current 
economic accounting rarely includes the ‘cost to the environment’ in the final 
figures(Mahendrarajah and Warr, 1993). The project seeks to address this in relation to 
phosphorus management on mixed farming properties. 
1.2 Aim of the Research  
 
The aim of this research is to produce information on decision making in relation to fertiliser 
use. This information can be used in the Game Theory model to calculate optimal strategies on 
phosphorus fertiliser application amounts for the individuals within the group. If the results 
indicate a benefit to the individual and the community as a whole, and are seen as practical, then 
on a catchment wide basis this should lead to changes in management practices that will 
minimise phosphorus pollution of the Hopkins River catchment’s waterways. 
 
To model current fertiliser (phosphorus) application practices on a variety of properties with 
differing acreage, soil types, rainfall, land uses, nutrient loads and farmer attitudes to natural 
resource management several farmer groups in the catchment were consulted. The decision 
making process was examined and the potential for farmers to participate in cooperative action 
on nutrient pollution was assessed.  A Game Theory approach was employed to model farmer 
behaviour in a competitive situation (Nash Equilibrium Profile) in comparison to a cooperative 
situation (Pareto Optimum), in order to assess the possible economic benefits of cooperative 
behaviour with reference to varying the amount of phosphorus application. 
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An Arcview™ Geographic Information System (GIS) has been developed to convey a visual 
representation of survey data and the Game Theory Modelling results. This will complement the 
research that has been undertaken and will add to the knowledge within the local region through 
greater awareness of tools available to the community for environmental and agricultural 
problem solving. 
 
The work was undertaken to determine if it is possible to urge a local community of farmers to 
work together to bring about a change to a regional environmental problem where there are 
benefits for the greater community. If this can be demonstrated, then the benefits to the greater 
community through cooperative behavior at the individual level would impact on the approach 
to environmental problem solving. Community environmental problems impact on the 
economics of rural families and businesses, therefore cooperative community actions that assist 
in solving the problem, have both an economic benefit and a community benefit. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis presents the use of Game Theory modelling as a means of cost benefit analysis for 
the application of phosphorus in a rural catchment and to develop recommendations on fertiliser 
application decision making. Data collected directly from farmers in the Hopkins River 
catchment was used for calculations. Below is a description of this thesis by chapter. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1 presents a brief description of the background to the problem, the aims and scope of 
the research and an outline of the chapters. 
 
Chapter 2: Description of Hopkins Catchment 
Chapter 2 describes the biophysical and economic characteristics of the Hopkins River 
catchment in the context of the research which provides an idea of the land use, hydrological 
systems and economy driving the sustainability of the catchment. A description of the 
topography, geology and soils and climate which impact on the formulation of the Game Theory 
model are also given. 
 
Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Chapter 3 presents a literature review of the existing research into phosphorus pollution and the 
use of Game Theory in solving environmental problems. The chapter touches on current 
research regarding farmer attitudes to change of management practices that are required for 
sustainable farming.  
Introduction 
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Chapter 4: Background Documentation 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Federal, State and Industry documents supporting 
reduction in nutrient pollution. The chapter explains the targets of the Glenelg Hopkins 
Catchment Management Authority (CMA), the fertiliser industry ‘Codes of Practice’, the 
Department of Primary Industries (DPI) recommendations and industry based recommendations 
on fertiliser use.  
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 set the scene for the thesis, providing a description of the location, 
supporting documents and literary review of current research into the problem. 
 
Chapter 5: Survey Descriptions  
Chapter 5 presents a description of the data collection from three surveys and several workshops 
undertaken during the research and will describe the collation of mapping data used to support 
the project. This survey is a necessary part of the overall project, without it further practical 
implementation of the model is not possible. 
 
Chapter 6: Survey Results and Discussion 
The results of the surveys will be presented in Chapter 6 with a discussion of their use in the 
Game Theory model. A discussion of the response of the farmers to the Game Theory model 
recommendations completes the chapter.  
 
Chapter 7: Game Theory Model Design  
Chapter 7 describes the development of the Game Theory model. The use of data collected in 
the surveys and taken from other research documents, are coupled with the parameters selected 
for the model.  
 
Chapter 8: Game Theory Model Results and Discussion 
Results from the Game Theory model will be given in Chapter 8 with the GIS visual 
presentation. A discussion of the limitations and potential benefits of the Game Theory model 
are also given. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
Chapter 9 includes the concluding remarks on the survey results, the Game Theory model and 
the possible future directions for the research project. Potential conflict areas in natural resource 
management (NRM) and agriculture, where Game Theory modelling has an application in 
partnership with farmers, are also presented.  
 
Appendices 
Appendices 1, 2 and 3 contain the original Surveys 1, 2 and 3 with questions in full. Appendix 4 
has the Game Theory formulation for phosphorus pollution of waterways.  
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Chapter 2: Hopkins River Catchment Profile 
 
2.1 Introduction 
   
The Hopkins River catchment was chosen as the study area, as representative of a rural 
catchment with environmental problems. As part of the research, which was conducted in 
conjunction with the Hamilton campus of RMIT University, and the Glenelg Hopkins 
Catchment Management Authority, which funded the study, a detailed survey of the region was 
undertaken. It was important to understand the biophysical attributes of the catchment as they 
contribute to the vulnerability of the catchment to future potential problems. 
 
This section details a description of the Hopkins River catchment with reference to factors that 
impact on the parameters used in the Game Theory model and on the decision making that is 
undertaken by farmers in their annual nutrient management. 
2.2 Biophysical Description of the Hopkins River 
Catchment 
2.2.1 Location 
 
The Hopkins River Catchment is found in the south west of Victoria, Australia. It  “covers an 
area of 10,096 km² and extends approximately 160 km from its northern boundary to the 
Southern Ocean and is approximately 60 km wide” (Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management 
Authority, 2004). The Great Dividing Range forms the northern slopes of the catchment. The 
catchment lies between latitudes 37º 20' and 38º 50’S and longitude 142º 30’ and 143º75’E. 
Maps of Australia and Victoria with the Hopkins River catchment indicated are shown in Figure 
2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Maps of Australia and Victoria with the Hopkins River catchment marked 
2.2.1.1 Towns 
 
The main towns within the catchment are: Ararat (population 11,000) in the north, 
Warrnambool (population 32,000) in the south and Ballarat (population 85,000) in the east, 
although only a section of Ballarat falls within the Hopkins catchment. The region has 
numerous small rural towns ranging in population from 150 to 1,100. These can be seen at the 
conjunction of roads as shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 The Hopkins River catchment roads and towns 
2.2.1.2 Water supplies 
 
Water quality within the catchment is marginal to poor (see Figure 2.10) so the towns within the 
catchment are supplied with drinking water piped in from the Grampians range (to the north- 
west of the catchment) and the Otway Ranges (to the south-east of the catchment). Rural 
properties collect rainwater for domestic supplies and stock water is supplied by dams, bores or 
from unfenced access to the river and its tributaries. The water quality varies throughout the 
year, depending on the rainfall and subsequent flow rate; often high salt levels (3500-15000+ 
Electrical Conductivity (EC) units) are present, particularly in the summer months (much of the 
groundwater throughout the catchment also suffers from high salinity levels). Irrigation water 
for dairy and horticulture is accessed from the Otways and occasionally from groundwater if the 
quality is high enough. Groundwater monitoring is undertaken throughout the catchment with 
the main emphasis on salinity rather than nutrients. 
 
 
 
 
Ararat 
Ballarat 
Warrnambool 
Hopkins River Catchment Profile 
  24 
2.2.2 Climate 
 
The climate of western Victoria is considered to be Mediterranean, with cold wet winters and 
hot dry summers. It is characterised by winter temperatures of 3-7ºC and summer temperatures 
of 23-26ºC. Frosts occur frequently inland from April to September. The past ten years have 
shown a distinct drying pattern with average rainfall dropping by up to 10% and an increase in 
longer dry autumns and winter following summer thunderstorms. This is consistent with the 
predicted climate change data and will exacerbate any future potential BGA problems. The 
coastal plains do not show the variation in temperature and rainfall that is apparent inland due to 
moisture coming in off the ocean with the southwesterly weather patterns. Rainfall, as shown in 
Figure 2.3 varies in range from 550mm to 1100mm with an average of 700mm.  The area of 
lower rainfall is consistent with the effect of a rain-shadow produced by the Grampians range, 
on the northwest edge of the catchment.  
 
In calculating the Game Theory model, total annual rainfall was used for the animal (sheep and 
beef) enterprises and a proportion based on the crop growing period was used for the crop 
enterprises. 
 
Legend
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Figure 2.3 The Hopkins River catchment average precipitation map 
 
Bureau of Meteorology rainfall intensity charts give a ‘return rate’ (i.e. the frequency in years)  
of  intense rainfall events but  do not indicate at which time of the year it is likely for intense 
Hopkins River Catchment Profile 
  25 
rainfall events to occur. Rainfall intensity is relevant to the likelihood of nutrient runoff within 
four days of fertiliser application. 
2.2.3 Topography 
   
The Hopkins River catchment begins in the north on the southern slopes of the range which runs 
through the middle of Victoria. The highest point in the catchment rises to an elevation of 
910metres and slopes southward to the Victorian volcanic plains (VVP) and finally to the 
Warrnambool coastal plain. The contour and digital elevation maps shown in Figures 2.4 and 
2.5 indicate areas of steep hills and valleys in the north, west and a small area in the east. These 
areas are prone to erosion due to the slope and the underlying soil types, many of which have 
sodic B horizon characteristics.  These areas also correspond to different vegetation bioregions. 
        
 
 
Figure 2.4: The Hopkins River catchment with elevation contour lines 
 
The volcanic plains area of the river catchment is well punctuated with low areas that form 
wetlands. These may be permanent or ephemeral, and are often saline, with plant communities 
tolerant to salinity and water logging. Nutrient runoff from exposed paddocks is likely to 
concentrate in these low areas, many of which have been drained previously for cropping and 
grazing. Scoria cones, remnants of the volcanoes that formed the plains, are scattered across the 
region and the streams form deep creek beds cutting down into the easily eroded sub-soils. 
Removal of streamside vegetation, in-stream logs and the constant presence of stock have 
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accelerated up the process of erosion, thereby exacerbating the problems with nutrient pollution, 
through release of nutrients from stream banks and sediments into the water.  
 
The digital elevation map shown in Figure 2.5 gives an indication of the various aspect of slopes 
found within the catchment area. When calculating the proximity factor ( ijβ ) in the Game 
Theory model, elevation and slope together with position of the property in relation to wetlands 
and waterways will be used for future calculations.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Digital Elevation Map  
          (Alizadeh Shabani et al, 2007) 
2.2.4 Geology and Soils 
 
The underlying geology of the catchment is shown in Figure 2.6.  There is a mixture of parent 
geology from granite intrusions to sedimentary siltstones and sandstone and some alluvial 
deposition. Basalt from the volcanic period covers a large percentage of the region and was laid 
down during the Tertiary and Quaternary periods as were the coastal sedimentary soils and 
areas of marl. The sedimentary and granitic soils south of Glenthompson are older, from the 
Cambrian period, as are the sandstones of the Great Dividing Range near Beaufort. These older 
soils are prone to erosion particularly when adequate groundcover is not maintained. The area 
described as Glenthompson Duricrust has a high percentage of sand and sandy loams formed in 
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the Cainozoic period. These soils are prone to wind erosion and are less likely to retain 
phosphorus, increasing the likelihood of ‘runoff’.  
 
  
 
Figure 2.6 Soils Map  
(Department of Primary Industries, 2004) 
 
Most soils in the region are considered to be arable, hence the high percentage of land use for 
agriculture, although there are areas prone to erosion based on slope and soil type. Surface soils 
of the participating farms range from granite sands, sandy loam, loam and clay loam through to 
medium clays. The latter are often found in association with water-logging and salinity in low 
lying areas. Figure 2.7 shows the surface soil descriptions which can be corroborated with the 
landholders own observations. The basalt soils have a greater level of clay component which 
reduces the potential for erosion and nutrient runoff. The sedimentary soils generally have a 
higher sand component and as a result are freer draining and therefore may be prone to nutrients 
leaching into the groundwater. 
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Figure 2.7 Soils – Surface Texture 
(Department of Primary Industries, 2004) 
2.2.5 Hydrology 
 
‘The mean annual flow of the Catchment is approximately 400,000ML, almost 2% 
 of the state of Victoria’s total discharge’ (Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management 
 Authority, 2004) 
 
The Hopkins River begins near Ararat (in the north) and flows south to enter the ocean at 
Warrnambool, after travelling 259 km. Its major tributaries are Mt Emu Creek – flowing from 
the north-east near Ballarat, and Fiery Creek which flows from the north into Lake Bolac and 
continues its journey south as Salt Creek to join the Hopkins River just south of Hexham. The 
Merri River is an independent river within the Hopkins catchment. It starts near Penshurst and 
flows in a south-easterly direction to join the ocean near Warrnambool. Figure 2.8 shows the 
hydrology of the catchment with the main tributaries labelled. 
 
The wetlands scattered throughout the volcanic plains are a feature of the region. Many of these 
have high salinity readings and are closed systems hence phosphorus runoff will concentrate in 
these areas. Many of the original wetlands have been drained for agricultural pursuits. 
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Figure 2.8 The Hopkins River catchment streams and wetlands 
 
2.2.5.1 Monitoring Sites 
  
Surface water monitoring has been undertaken at ten sites within the catchment, however 
regular monitoring of phosphorus has only been undertaken at seven sites, indicated in Figure 
2.9. Groundwater testing is undertaken at numerous bores within the region, but does not 
include for Phosphorus. Readings from these sites are discussed in Section 2.2.5.2. 
 
This lack of consistent monitoring throughout the catchment makes it difficult to assess the 
results of changes to management on farms over a short period of time and within specific sub-
catchments. The increased interest in the environment and environmental auditing by State and 
Federal government departments should lead to more monitoring being undertaken in the future. 
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Figure 2.9 The Hopkins River catchment surface water quality monitoring sites 
 
2.2.5.2 Environmental Condition of the Hopkins Catchment 
 
The water quality of the Hopkins River catchment is generally poor. Naturally high salinity 
levels and clearing along the waterways since European settlement has led to increased erosion 
and high turbidity of the water. Removal of logs and snags from the river has exacerbated the 
erosion and hastened the loss of riparian vegetation. Although salinity has been a part of the 
system historically, levels are thought to have risen due to land clearing practices. 
 
‘Landcare’, a community approach to land restoration, has had an impact on the region within 
the past 25 years with many farmers becoming involved in the planting of native vegetation 
along streams. This vegetation provides stock with shelter and at the same time adds to 
biodiversity and increases the level of perennial vegetation in the catchment. Water quality 
generally improves when the speed at which the water flows through a catchment is reduced and 
allowed to filter through vegetation. The Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority 
(GHCMA) has encouraged the fencing off of waterways and planting of native vegetation 
within the area, to address the problems of erosion and lack of biodiversity, with the aim of 
improving water quality. Figure 2.10 shows the current water quality ranking of the rivers and 
tributaries of the Hopkins River catchment. 
      
Hopkins River Catchment Profile 
  31 
 
Figure 2.10 Water quality assessment of the Hopkins River catchment  
(Victorian Water Data Warehouse, 2006) 
 
In the Hopkins region, the Environment Protection Agency’s (EPA) Total Phosphorus (TP) 
target levels are 25-40µg/L, depending on the nutrient region (see Section 3.2.3). Water 
phosphorus levels taken at the monitoring sites in the Hopkins River catchment, and available 
on the Victorian Water Data Warehouse website, are shown in Figures 2.11(a –g). The figures 
indicate that the TP levels in the Hopkins River and its tributaries are increasingly above the 
EPA target levels. Figure 2.11(h) shows the declining water flows experienced from 1996 to 
2006.   
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Figure 2.11 (a) Total Phosphorus levels.  Burrumbeet Creek at Lake Burrumbeet 
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Mount Emu Creek at Skipton - Phospohrus 1990-1998
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Figure 2.11(b) Total Phosphorus levels.  Mount Emu Creek at Skipton 
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Figure 2.11(c) Total Phosphorus levels. Brucknell Creek at Cudgee 
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Figure 2.11 (d) Total Phosphorus levels. Mount Emu Creek (EPA readings) 
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 Figure 2.11 (e) Total Phosphorus levels. Merri River at Woodford 
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Figure 2.11 (f) Total Phosphorus levels. Hopkins River at Wickliffe 
 
           
Hopkins River at Hopkins Falls
 Total Phosphorus 1978-2006
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Figure 2.11 (g) Total Phosphorus levels. Hopkins River at Hopkins Falls 
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Hopkins River at Hopkins Falls Discharge 1976-2006
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Figure 2.11 (h) Discharge of Hopkins River at Hopkins Falls 
 
Figures 2.11 (a) to (g) indicate fluctuations in TP levels at numerous sites within the Hopkins 
River basin. The theory that phosphorus is stored in the stream sediments and released by water 
disturbance during high water flow events is supported by the high TP levels recorded during 
spring and/or autumn rainfall events (Baldwin, 2002).   
2.2.5.3 Occurrence of blue-green algae outbreaks in the Hopkins 
catchment 
 
There have been documented occurrences of blue-green algae outbreaks in the Hopkins River 
catchment in the period from 1920 - 2000; however it is unknown how many small outbreaks 
may have not been documented because they have occurred on private property that have not 
impacted beyond the boundaries of the property.  Table 2.2 gives the location and the species of 
BGA present in each outbreak, with the response or treatment undertaken to deal with the 
problem. Figure 2.12 shows the position in the catchment of the recorded BGA outbreaks.  
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 Table 2.1: Occurrence of blue-green algae outbreaks in the Hopkins catchment  1920 - 
2000  
(Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, 2002) 
   
Figure 2.12: Occurrence of blue-green algae outbreaks in the Hopkins catchment 1920 - 2000  
(Department of Primary Industries, 2006c) 
 
 
Drainage 
Catchment 
Location Algae Comments and 
action 
Hopkins Alexander Lake Anabaena and 
Microcystis 
 
 
Caramut Reservior Chroococcus Ongoing monitoring 
 
Caramut Water Supply Ulothrix and 
Euglena 
Ongoing monitoring 
 
Deep Lake Microcystis Warning signs in place 
 
Green Hill Lake, Ararat Microcystis Drinking, recreation 
facilities banned 
 
Hopkins River, 
Boonerah 
Unicellular green Ongoing monitoring 
 
Lake Burrumbeet Microcystis and 
Oscillatoria 
Closed to recreation 
 
Lake Cartcarrong Anabaena  
 
Lake Gellie Oscillatoria Warning signs in place 
 
Lake Gillear Anabaena Warning signs in place 
 
Lake Terrinallum Oscillatoria Warning signs in place 
 
Mt Ewen Reservoir Anabaena CuSO4 treatment 
 
Tank Hill Reservoir Struastrum CuSO4 treatment 
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2.2.6 Remnant Native Vegetation 
 
The Hopkins catchment supports a wide range of agriculture from cropping and grazing in the 
north to dairy and horticulture in the south. The remaining natural vegetation remnants only 
occur in any measure, in the north of the catchment along the southern side of the Great 
Dividing Range and infrequently in pockets throughout the rest of the catchment, generally in 
association with the waterways or as remnants along the road system. Native grasslands, which 
once dominated the plains, have been decimated and less than 1% remains. Figure 2.13 shows 
the areas of larger remnant vegetation such as forest and woodlands. The map does not indicate 
native grasslands as many occur as pockets on private property, along roadsides and rivers. 
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Figure 2.13: Map of remnant vegetation cover in the Hopkins catchment 
 
2.3 Description of Farming Community 
2.3.1 Landuse 
 
As indicated previously, 94.8 % of the Hopkins River catchment supports a wide range of 
agriculture practices including cropping, prime lamb, wool, beef, dairy and horticulture 
(generally potato growing). There are approximately 1350 farming properties within the 
Hopkins River catchment and average farm size is 976ha (D Borg, DPI, personal 
communication). 
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According to Read et al, 1999 the predominant agricultural activity in the Glenelg Hopkins 
catchment in 1999 was dryland grazing, accounting for 755,029ha (68.2%), and cropping 
accounting for 58,982ha (5%). Since the 1990s there has been a swing away from dryland 
grazing into cropping and other activities. Recent research indicates a swing of 13.06% across 
the Glenelg Hopkins region away from dryland grazing (Ierodiaconou et al, 2004) and a 6.88% 
increase in acreage of grain crops. There has also been a marked increase in bluegum 
plantations for wood chip production, which occurs predominantly in the Glenelg and Portland 
catchments due to more suitable rainfall and soil types. However, this industry is now moving 
into the lower and eastern Hopkins region. 
 
Horticulture, predominantly potato growing, accounts for 891ha is undertaken near Koroit in the 
south and near Ballarat in the east, with the use of groundwater for irrigation. Dairying is 
undertaken in the higher rainfall region in the south on the Warrnambool Plains and accounts 
for 225,789ha, 20.4% of all agricultural land (Read et al, 1999). These activities are supported 
with irrigation water from the Otway Ranges.  
   
Figure 2.14 Landuse 
(Ierodiaconou et al, 2004) 
 
The Hopkins catchment also supports an eel industry, which is concentrated on the Salt Creek 
system with Lake Bolac as an important habitat refuge. However, as a result of the past ten 
years of dry climate, Lake Bolac has been suffering lower water levels and the industry has been 
substantially reduced. 
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2.3.2 Economic Information 
 
It is difficult to establish the actual population of the Hopkins River catchment, as the statistics 
do not fit neatly into the area. The Bureau of Statistics indicates that the population of the 
Hopkins region is 33,122 (2004), however the city of Warrnambool is quoted as 32,000 and 
Ararat as 11,000. Terang has a population of 1,100 and Mortlake, Skipton and Beaufort each 
have 200 to 400 in population and there are other smaller towns besides. The northern section of 
Ballarat falls into the Hopkins catchment but it is not possible to estimate the number of people 
that live within that specific egion, as separate from the total population of Ballarat. 
 
Statistics indicate that approximately 4,728 people in the region are employed in the agricultural 
sector. This equates to 36.5% of the total population (12,025) of the Hopkins region in 
employment in 2006 (Bureau of Statistics, 2006).  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2.3 Value of agricultural production 2001 
(Bureau of Statistics, 2006). 
2.4 Farmer Groups 
 
Department of Primary Industries (DPI) extension services have operated within the Hopkins 
region for many years and in the 1980s there was an effort to improve on-going professional 
development of the farming community. As a result, a number of farmer groups that are active 
in supporting the community with research, education and awareness of new technology have 
been established. 
 
The South West Farm Monitor Project (SWFMP) group is a benchmarking program that began 
in the 1970s. Farmers are able to anonymously compare their financial data with other farmers 
with similar enterprises. In any one year, 30 to 40 properties are involved, filling in a 
standardised form with their financial information.  A report is generated which enables the 
farmer to compare his inputs, production figures, gross margins, profitability and return on 
assets with other properties. The properties can run a mixture of enterprises and can compare 
each enterprise individually. Farm 500 is a similar organisation of groups that focus on the 
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION – 
Hopkins Region (year ended 30 June 2001) 
 
 
Value of crops $m 111.9 
Value of livestock slaughtering and other disposals $m 197.7 
Value of livestock products $m 507.1 
Total value of agriculture $m 816.7 
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financial data of the farming operations, although it is usually locally based and the members 
meet to share financial data therefore the data does not remain anonymous within the group. 
 
The Bestwool / Best Lamb groups were formed under the umbrella of the DPI and the Victorian 
Farmers Federation (VFF) with the aim of improving the productivity of wool and meat sheep 
properties. Each group is able to choose its facilitator and the topics that are investigated. For 
example, in the Glenthompson region the group originally ran a ‘Paired Paddock Program’ 
(Triple P), which enabled farmers to make changes on paired paddocks and follow the changes 
in production through the group. This has led to a range of further programs, including 
addressing social issues such as succession planning, change of enterprise issues, research (e.g. 
into lambing problems), professional development and ongoing education (Bestwool/Bestlamb, 
2008). 
 
Southern Farming Systems (SFS) arose out of a need for farmer-initiated on-ground research 
into cropping practices in higher rainfall regions. The organisation commissions practical 
research to be undertaken on farm land within the regions. Research into cropping and grazing 
has been initiated and issupported by industry groups such as the Meat and Livestock 
Association (MLA), Australian Wool Innovation, Grains Research and Development 
Corporation, and the government through research grants (Southern Farming Systems, 2008). 
 
The Landcare movement began at St Arnaud, just north of the Hopkins catchment and the 
concept spread south through the region throughout the 1990s. The community - based groups 
developed to address environmental degradation within a local area; each group focusing on  
local problems and undertaking measures to resolve them themselves. Technical support is 
provided by the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE), the Department of 
Primary Industries (DPI), Greening Australia (GA) and Landcare Australia. Financial help in 
the way of government grants is now administered by the Catchment Management Authority 
(CMA) in each region. Although not official education groups, they also have a role in 
disseminating information regardingtechniques for effective tree planting, pest and weed control 
and environmental best practice.  In this region the Environmental Best Management Practices 
(EBMP) Program was initiated by the DPI and trialled with the Landcare groups in 2002 and 
2003. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This project set out initially to assess the decision-making process adopted by the farm managers of 
one catchment area in regard to fertiliser usage (specifically phosphorus fertilisers). Applying Game 
Theory modelling to this information, optimal strategies on the amount of phosphorus fertiliser to be 
applied could be calculated. If the result of the modelling were both beneficial and practical for the 
individual and the community as a whole, a change in management practices could be expected, 
thus minimising phosphorus pollution of the waterways. 
 
Figure 3.1 Thesis overview 
 
Figure 3.1 represents the research diagrammatically,namely, the interaction of the ‘problem to 
be solved’, the ‘means of achieving it’ and the ‘economic impact on production’.  The research 
is concerned with modelling this interaction (the hatched section) so that recommendations can 
be made to farm managers that are economically sound in terms of production, but also take into 
account minimising the physical impact on the environment. 
 
Cooperative game theory has successfully been used in resolution of environmental problems 
worldwide where there is an economic impact to the decision-making process. Most 
environmental problems present as a variation of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. The 
metaphorical account of individually using public common land for their stock, and not realising 
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the effect of adding ‘just one more of their own stock’ until the impact of each in the group 
adding ‘just one more’ leads to overgrazing of the common land as a whole and ultimately the 
breakdown of the system, with the individual suffering economically and the environment 
destroyed.  The conflict between the individual usage and the impact on a ‘public resource’ is 
thus described. 
 “In economic jargon, the costs are externalized. Individually rational behaviour 
deteriorates into collective ruin”(Ridley and Low, 1993). 
 
Environmental conflicts tends to arise through‘resource sharing and overuse’ or ‘pollution 
produced by one group impacting on others’. In the case of the Hopkins catchment, each farmer 
is contributing to the impact of nutrient pollution of the rivers in the region through actions that 
benefit his/her own production. 
 
The literature review begins with the background to the problem of phosphorus enrichment of 
waterways from non-point sources. The principles of Game Theory as applied to natural 
resource management are then outlined. Research into attitude’s of the farming community to 
changing management practices necessary for the good of the environment will be described 
with a view to identifying the likely uptake of new management techniques as recommended by 
the research results.  
3.2 Background to Phosphorus as a Potential Pollutant to the 
Environment 
 
Phosphorus is an essential nutrient in biological systems, being critical for the replication of 
cells. In agriculture, it is cycled through the soil plant system and is removed through products 
leaving the farm. Australian soils are very old and usually low in phosphorus, hence the need 
for farmers to add phosphorus to agricultural soils for improving production. Department of 
Primary Industry soil tests in the 1970s on un-fertilised soils indicated Colwell P levels of 3-
11mg P/kg (Department of Agriculture, 1975). To avoid depleting the agricultural system of 
phosphorus, it must be replaced artificially, with food additives for animals, or chemical 
fertilisers and/or manures added to the soil. Generally this occurs annually. The addition of 
nutrients inappropriately may lead to excess runoff into catchment water systems, resulting in 
lowered water quality and a detrimental effect on environmental habitats. In extreme cases, this 
may promote the growth of undesirable algae and cause toxic algal blooms leading to 
widespread undesirable economic and environmental impact. 
 
Testing of soil phosphorus is commonly used by farmers as the basis for assessing the amount 
of phosphorus to be applied as fertiliser. Soil type, crop requirements and climatic conditions 
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govern the critical soil value for optimum crop yields (Leinweber et al., 2002). There are more 
than ten different soil tests available for calculating soil phosphorus (P), although in Australia 
the common tests used in agriculture are the ‘Olsen P’ and ‘Colwell P’. The Phosphorus Buffer 
Index (PBI) is also reported in soil test results (Burkitt et al, 2002). The PBI gives an indication 
of the soil’s ability to tie up phosphorus, ie make it unavailable for plant use. Soils with high 
aluminum, iron and manganese have a high PBI as sorption of phosphorus occurs making it 
unavailable for plant use. Sands tend to have a low PBI. Sandy soils with low phosphorus 
sorption capacities will demonstrate greater phosphorus movement and therefore are more 
susceptible to P loss (McDowell et al., 2002). Farm soil testing for P levels is not a good 
indicator of likely phosphorus runoff, due to the depth at which testing occurs, namely at 10 cm 
where it is more relevant for production yield than for runoff, which occurs from the top 2.5 cm. 
3.2.1 Movement of P from soil to water 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Movement of phosphorus through the plant soil system 
 
The transfer of phosphorus from soil to water is described in general terms in Figure 3.2. It is 
complex and is influenced by many factors including:    
• the form of phosphorus 
• mechanism of release from soil 
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• transport processes (erosion, surface water runoff and subsurface water) 
• soil type (sorption capacity) 
• soil management – influencing erosion (vegetative cover) 
• type of input (chemical or organic) (Haygarth and Jarvis, 1999, Leinweber et al, 
2002, McDowell et al., 2002, Drewry et al, 2006). 
 
TP in soils is made up of reactive phosphorus (RP) and unreactive phosphorus (UP). It is also 
defined by the size of the fractionation ie < 0.45µm or > 0.45µm. Generally speaking, dissolved 
phosphorus (DP) found in runoff is < 0.45µm and is readily available to aquatic organisms 
(Robertson and Nash, 2007). As much of the phosphorus found in runoff is in the dissolved 
form, it is unlikely that buffer areas along waterways will substantially reduce phosphorus 
entering the waterway, particularly as runoff occurs most when soils are saturated (Nash and 
Murdoch, 1997, McDowell et al, 2004). Drewry et al, (2006) suggest that riparian vegetation 
may have limited long term use in removal of nutrients and may eventually become a source of 
nutrient runoff from nutrient build up over time.  Particulate phosphorus (PP), which is 
phosphorus attached to clay soil particles, is > 0.45µm and this becomes available over a longer 
period as de-sorption of the phosphorus from the clay particles needs to occur. Leinweber et al., 
(2002) describe the factors that affect de-sorption as pH, temperature, ionic strength, the rate of 
water movement through the soil and the equilibrium phosphorus concentration. 
 
The chemical composition of the sediments dictates number and type of P sorption 
sites…. Brinkman (1993) suggests that the most important sites for anion adsorption 
are surface coatings of Fe3+ and Al oxides and oxyhydroxides….the extent of 
binding will depend in part on the pH of the solution, the number of exchangeable 
hydroxyl groups per unit of area of sediment and the specific surface area of the 
sediment (Baldwin et al, 2002). 
 
Phosphorus moves from farmland to waterways via several routes. It can travel overland in 
runoff when intense rainfall occurs within four days of fertiliser application; it can travel as PP 
due to soil erosion; as DP in surface water; and it can move through subsurface pathways into 
the groundwater (minimal). The amounts of phosphorus lost in runoff from farming depends on 
release and transport factors such as slope, vegetative cover, rainfall, rainfall timing in relation 
to fertiliser application (the half life of phosphate fertilisers in relation to export is four days), 
and soil type (see Section 3.2 ‘sorption capacity’). Most phosphorus available for export by 
overland flow is in the top 25mm of soil only (Nash, 2007, Nash, 2004). Fertilisers that have 
been applied in previous years are found to supply the bulk of the phosphorus used by crops and 
much of the nutrient runoff flow is the result of increased systemic P built up in the soil from 
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past fertiliser applications (Robertson and Nash, 2007). Indeed, systemic P soil levels are 
already at a height which makes the EPA target levels in the waterways difficult to achieve 
(Nash, 2007). The DPI data from 1975 supports this view (see Section 3.2). The amounts of 
phosphorus exported from the paddock varies considerably from year to year depending on 
management ( e.g. grazing pressure, vegetative cover, crop management) and seasonal 
conditions (Nash, 2004). 
 
Poorly timed agricultural processes contribute to lossof soil from paddocks due to rill and gully 
erosion thereby increasing phosphorus loss from the paddock. An increase in the time a paddock 
is bare, due to cropping, may exacerbate the likelihood of erosion since periods of maximum 
rainfall can occur at the time of sowing and before the crop is established. A no-till cropping 
system reduces the potential for P loss because vegetative cover reduces overland water flow, 
and the addition of gypsum to soils improves drainage and has been shown to reduce P 
solubility without significantly reducing plant-available P (McDowell et al., 2002). Water 
logging during the winter period, when the crop uptake is small, may also increase soil to water 
P transfer. Artificial drainage has an overall effect of reducing P transfer from the land, by as 
much as 30% compared with undrained plots (Leinweber et al., 2002), however it may 
contribute to increases of P leaching into the groundwater. 
 
Research into the impact of raised bed cropping on nutrient runoff is currently being undertaken 
in south west Victoria due to the drainage implications in the region and the likelihood of 
increased nutrient runoff due to reduced infiltration. There has been a major shift to this form of 
agriculture away from grazing. The changes to land use, mapped using satellite data from 1980 
to 2002, show a 16% alteration to traditional farming practices (Ierodiaconou et al, 2004). 
Estimates of increased nutrient loading have been given for each sub-catchment. These are 
shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. 
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Figure 3.3 Phosphorus load changes in the Hopkins Catchment estimated to occur from 
1980/2002  
(Ierodiaconou et al, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Future phosphorus load predictions for Glenelg Hopkins region 
(Ierodiaconou et al, 2004) 
  
The speed with which P loss occurs through groundwater is also dependent on soil type and 
structure (movement of P through the soil is via macropores), the source of P, soil typeand 
grazing management (Drewry et al, 2006). It appears that there is a ‘change point’ 
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concentration, different for different types of soils, where the P concentration appearing in 
drainage rises dramatically. This may be due to different energy adsorption sites (Nash, 2004). 
 
Stream banks are vulnerable to erosion due to the movement of water arriving at and within the 
watercourse. This contributes P to water through de-sorption from the clay particles. Livestock 
exacerbate erosion through trampling of the banks and add P directly to the water through their 
manure; hence catchment authorities have encouraged the protection of streams with funding 
for fencing and revegetation of buffer zones. The relative amount of surface soil and subsoil 
derived sediment in streams depends on the age of the stream channel network (i.e. how 
recently erosion has occurred).  
 
The source of P used in the agricultural enterprise will influence its availability for immediate 
use by plants and algae e.g. manure products take longer to release P into the environment 
compared to artificial fertilisers and rock phosphate requires acidic soils to release its phosphate 
for plant use. 
3.2.2 Phosphorus in Waterways  
 
Phosphorus in the aquatic environment normally resides in one of the following four pools: 
• dissolved in the water column  
• associated with suspended sediments 
• deposited in bed sediments 
• incorporated into the biota (Baldwin et al, 2002). 
  
Phosphorus may arrive already dissolved in water that runs into the waterway system, making it 
readily available for immediate use or it may dissolve out of the suspended sediment and stream 
bed deposition depending on pH of the water, temperature of the water, ionic strength of the 
water, the rate of water movement and the phosphorus equilibrium concentration of the stream, 
thus sediment deposition is a means of removing P from the water column (Baldwin et al, 
2002). On the other hand, sediment re-suspension and transport may be an important instrument 
for the movement of phosphorus through the aquatic environment. Increased water movement 
through a catchment is likely to stir up sediments releasing phosphorus into the water column. 
Thus we observe increased TP levels in streams during spring when rainfall events flush the 
system and in streams that have been cleared of in-channel logs where water flow is increased 
causing turbulence in the water column.  
 
Sediments are often thought of as inert mixtures of minerals and recalcitrant organic matter. 
However, sediments contain a rich mixture of living organisms, which may include 
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macrofauna such as tube worms and other burrowing invertebrates, macro and micro algae 
and most importantly microorganisms, particularly bacteria. Therefore a substantial 
proportion of available sediment P may be bound in bacterial biomass (Baldwin et al, 2002). 
 
Plant material in association with a catchment is also thought to have an impact on seasonally 
fluctuating P levels in waterways as plants grow and decay, releasing nutrients into runoff and 
streams (McDowell et al, 2002). 
3.2.3 Setting Targets for Nutrients in Waterways 
 
Eutrophication, whereby aquatic systems have become enriched with high nutrient levels can 
lead to increased growth of lgae and other microscopic plants impacting on whole ecosystems. 
TP levels above 50 µg P /l in streams are understood to be caused by human activity (Leinweber 
et al, 2002).  
 
In Australia the fundamental sources of standards for monitoring and collecting data on water 
quality are the Australian Guidelines for Water Quality Monitoring and Reporting and the 
Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for Fresh and Marine Water Quality. These guidelines 
use a risk based assessment approach, giving ‘alert’ threshold levels that require action and 
further monitoring. The target levels for upland rivers, fresh water lakes and reservoirs is 10µg 
P/l.; lowland river 50 µg P/l; estuaries 30µg P/l; and marine water 25µg P/l (Australian 
Government, 2008). Methods for determining turbidity and suspended solids are described in 
Standard Methods for the Examination of Water and Wastewater (Land and Water, 2008).  
 
The Victorian Environment Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for establishing maximum 
acceptable levels of potential contaminants in air, land and water in Victoria. In 2003 the agency 
released the Nutrient Objectives for Rivers and Streams with specific targets of nutrient levels 
for streams in seven regions of Victoria (Victorian Environment Protection Agency, 2003). A 
more recent approach is to present targets based on ecological goals, designed to protect the 
existing aquatic environment if the stream is healthy and to provide goals if a stream is 
impacted. 
 
Victoria is divided into nutrient regions and objectives are set for each region based on the 75th 
percentile of past data. 
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Figure 3.5 Nutrient regions of Victoria with the Hopkins Catchment overlaid (grey) 
 (Victorian Environment Protection Agency, 2003) 
The Hopkins River catchment covers an area that falls over a section of the Western Plains (N6) 
and the Cleared Hills (N4). This is indicated by the grey section in Figure 3.5. The 75 th 
percentile objectives for phosphorus and nitrogen in the Western Plains Nutrient Region are: 
• total phosphorus 40 µg/ l and total nitrogen 900 µg / l 
In the Cleared Hills Nutrient Region the 75th percentile targets are:- 
• total phosphorus 25 µg/ l and total Nitrogen 600 µg /l. 
The average of these two levels is 32.5 µg P/l.   
 
Nash, (2007) argues that the systemic soil levels (Olsen P levels of 1-5 mg P/kg) are 
contributing to runoff into streams, bringing the steam levels above the targets without the 
contribution of additional nutrients from non-point sources. 
3.3 Effect of Phosphorus on the environment 
 
Phosphorus, when present in excessive amounts, can affect the environment, in a number of 
ways. It can lead to excessive opportunistic plant growth in waterways, clogging the system, 
leading to a reduction in light availability for other plants and animals which ultimately results 
in a reduction in biodiversity. Subsequent decreases in available oxygen can kill aquatic animals 
and create unpleasant odours. Fish migration can be impeded by the extra plant growth and 
recreational fishing affected by a reduced supply of fish and disagreeable conditions. Finally, 
conditions can arise that stimulate algal growth to the extent that toxic blooms occur. These are 
poisonous to livestock and pose a serious risk to human health. This leads to restricting the use 
of these waters for recreation, fishing and drinking water. Blooms cause the depletion of oxygen 
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in the water which  results in further loss of desirable plants and animals thus depleting the 
habitat further (Victorian Environment Protection Agency, 2006). 
3.3.1 Blue-green algae  
 
Blue-green algae are primitive photosynthesizing micro-organisms able to reproduce asexually 
in a matter of days when the conditions are beneficial. Some species are able to adjust their 
position in the water column through collapsing their internal pockets of gas, enabling them to 
take advantage of light and nutrient levels. Others are able to fix nitrogen and store phosphorus 
until the conditions are favourable for growth (Smith, 1999 in(Glenelg Hopkins Catchment 
Management Authority, 2002). Algae play an important role in the ecosystem but if conditions 
arise that lead to an algal bloom,  some BGA produce toxins that cause acute poisoning to 
animals, skin and eye irritations and at worst liver damage, tumour growth and paralysis leading 
to death (Flett and Thoms, 1994). Outbreaks of algal blooms in Australia have been recorded as 
far back as 1878. 
 
Four species of BGA produce toxins, namely: Anabaena (present in lakes and slow moving 
rivers), Microcystis and Cylindrospermopsis (generally in lakes and dams), and Nodularia (in 
brackish waters). 
The four main types of toxins produced by blue-green algae are:  
Hepatotoxins produced by species of Microcystis, Nodularia, and Anabaena 
and can cause liver damage and gastrointestinal symptoms. 
Neurotoxins produced by species of Anabaena and have been observed to cause 
muscle tremor, staggering, paralysis and respiratory arrest in animals. The 
neurotoxins produced by Anabaena circinalis in South East Australia have recently 
been shown to be the same compounds as those produced by dinoflagellates in 
the marine environment and are responsible for paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP). 
Cytotoxins produced by species of Cylindrospermopsis and can cause kidney 
damage. Cylindrospermopsis is more prevalent in tropical waters. 
Endotoxins contact irritants produced by most species of blue-green algae and 
can cause skin rashes, eye irritation, allergic reactions and gastroenteritis. The toxins are 
released into the water following the death of blue-green algal cells and can remain potent 
for a period of several weeks after the algae have disappeared (Glenelg Hopkins 
Catchment Management Authority, 2002). 
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3.3.2 Conditions Appropriate for Algal Blooms 
 
The key factors that encourage blooms are:  
• increased  nutrients  (phosphorus and nitrogen)  
• low river flow and calm conditions, more likely in summer and autumn and will 
increase with climate change if river flows decline as are predicted. 
• high water temperatures  
• light availability moderate turbidity favours blue-green algae 
• disturbed ecosystems which are more likely to have conditions that promote BGA 
growth 
3.3.3 Best Management Practices to Minimise Nutrient Pollution 
 
Current best management practice (BMP) for the management of nutrients on farms encourages 
the farmer to: 
• undertake soil and tissue testing to understand better the nutrient requirements for 
production  
• use accurate calibrated spreaders for application of fertilisers 
• use  20metre vegetative buffer strips along waterways to reduce nutrient runoff into 
streams 
• undertake appropriate placement of nutrients on paddocks away from waterways  
• undertake appropriate timing of fertiliser application to minimise the likelihood of 
nutrient loss due to rainfall events (ie not within four days of expected rain) 
(Department of Primary Industries, 2006a). 
 
Chapter 4 gives a more detailed description of Federal, State and Local government documents 
produced in relation to reducing the potential for algal blooms. 
 
3.4 Game Theory  
3.4.1 Introduction  
 
Game Theory modelling is used with games of strategy where the preferred outcome is known 
and can be defined clearly. It is used to determine optimal solutions that can be employed in 
negotiation of conflict situations, of course assuming rational behaviour and that the parties will 
act in their own best interests. Game Theory is a mathematical theory that analyses independent 
and interdependent decision making. Assuming two or more rational players, the basic 
assumption of the ‘game’ is that each player has an understanding of the expected rational 
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behaviour of the other and will act accordingly in pursuit of their own goal.  The players can be 
individuals or a group of individuals that act as a whole. 
 
Game Theory and Game Theory modelling has been used in many disciplines including 
economics, psychology, philosophy, evolutionary biology and recently natural resource 
management to analyse situations of conflict and behaviour and to model solutions (Kelly, 
2003).  
 
Games can be defined as either:  
•  Cooperative where the players interact with one another to signal their purpose to the 
other players. The objective of each player is the same. Players are able to form coalitions 
and utilities (payoffs) are transferable (shared) between members of these coalitions.  The 
main objective here is to understand how cooperation could lead to better distribution of 
benefits to all players. 
• Zero sum non-cooperative (competitive) where each player or group of players is 
totally antagonistic, ie in a conflict situation, to each other. The main objective of non-
cooperative games is to find the optimal strategies which players can use to optimise one or 
more utility (payoff) functions.  
• Mixed motive games (variable sum games) where both players objectives are partly 
opposed and partly in agreement. In these games the sum of the utilities (payoffs) differs 
from strategy to strategy.  
 
Figure 3.6 shows a diagram with the taxonomy of games as described by Kelly 2003. From the 
taxonomy schedule, this research is best described by the ‘prisoner’s dilemma game’ which falls 
into the category of two player, mixed motive: both players objectives are partly opposed and 
partly in agreement, with no optimal equilibrium point (the Nash strategy is dominant at the one 
and only equilibrium point) but this payoff is worse for both players than the alternative strategy 
(martyrdom). 
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Figure 3.6 Taxonomy of Games 
(Kelly, 2003) 
 
3.4.2 Brief History of Game Theory 
 
Game Theory was first conceived in the seventeenth century by mathematicians attempting to 
solve gambling problems (two person zero sum games). It was examined by Zermelo in 1913 
who proved that every competitive two person game has a ‘best strategy for both players’. 
Game Theory was further developed by Borel in 1921 and in 1926 John von Neumann proved 
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the minimax theorem ie there exists a strategy for each player in a competitive game, such that 
none of the players regret their choice of strategy when the game is over. In the 1940s Oskar 
Morgenstern worked with von Neumann to produce the work Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour, which brought the discipline into the sphere of economics (Kelly, 2003).  
 
The prisoner’s dilemma game which represents a socio-political scenario in which everyone 
suffers by acting selfishly, though rationally, was unveiled in a lecture by A W Tucker in 1950 
(Kelly, 2003). The prisoner’s dilemma game is shown in Figure 3.8. In 1951 John Nash 
succeeded in generalising the minimax theorem by proving that every competitive game 
possesses at least one equilibrium point in both mixed and pure strategies. In the prisoner’s 
dilemma game, the Nash Equilibrium is the decision where the player does the best given what 
its competitors are doing. 1957 saw Games and Decisions published by Duncan Luce & 
Howard Raiffa. This book brought Game Theory into the general arena of decision making. In 
1967 John Harsanyi extended the theory to include games of incomplete information (Kelly, 
2003).  
 
Post 1960 Game Theory turned from the military arena to the socio-political arena and has since 
been used in other disciplines, as suggested in Section 3.4.1. including management theory, 
environmental negotiation and natural resource management (Kelly, 2003). 
 
    
The Nash equilibrium is stable, i.e. if both players deviate from it they do so to the benefit of 
the other as much as themselves.  
 
Figure 3.7: Prisoners Dilemma in economics: Illustration of Nash Equilibrium and Pareto 
Optimisations positions. 
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3.4.4 Reviewing the use of Game Theory in Solving Natural 
Resource Problems 
 
Natural resource problems which have an economic impact are able to be modelled using Game 
Theory. These problems tend to be one of two types: two or more parties depleting a resource, 
e.g. fisheries or water, or two or more parties being impacted upon by pollution created 
externally which impacts on their natural resource bank, e.g. greenhouse gases or acid rain. In 
either case there is an issue of ‘externality’. These problems may occur between countries, 
regions within one country, local neighbourhoods or different segments of society (e.g. city 
dwellers and farmers). In many instances the problem has an impact on the perpetrator as well 
as on the external party, creating a ‘mixed motive game’ situation, ie both parties will benefit 
from the action undertaken. 
 
Game Theory has been used for analysing environmental problems and for modelling possible 
situations and solutions. It provides parties on opposite sides of the negotiation table with the 
benefit of models which have the potential to give the best case scenario with an outcome 
beneficial to all parties.  
 
The cooperative outcome in the resource problem is the outcome that maximises the sum 
of individual agents’ net benefits. In this outcome each agent maximises its net benefits, 
internalizing the adverse effects of its action (strategy) on its own welfare and on the 
welfare of all other agents in the system (Pham Do, 2003).  
 
When there are more than two parties involved in negotiation, it is possible that a variety of 
coalitions could form and these may do so under guidance of the scenarios represented by Game 
Theory models. 
  
Generally, in modelling natural resource predicaments, the cooperative pareto optima is adopted 
from a non-cooperative game rather than from a cooperative game perspective, because the 
situation of ‘externality’ exists with the problem. The difference between the cooperative and 
non-cooperative outcomes is the gain to be had from collaborating. However, in a multiparty 
situation, some parties are likely to become ‘freeloaders’ on the system allowing others to carry 
the burden, even when understanding the benefit to the whole community. It can therefore be 
valuable to have some form of reinforcement in the way of taxes or laws as a disincentive to be 
a freeloader. This may work if the problem exists within one country but reinforcement is more 
difficult in an international sphere where taxes and laws do not apply and social pressure has 
less of an impact across boundaries. 
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 Thurow (1998) found that lack of communication rather than lack of economic incentive 
influences community cooperation or non cooperation. He was supported by Zara et al (2006) 
who suggested that a lack of communication between parties is one of the main causes of non-
cooperation at the international level but is less of a problem at the local level where networks 
are better established. 
 
A large amount of research has been directed over the past 20 years towards common pool 
resources. The main environmental areas where Game Theory has been employed for the 
benefit of problem analysis and conflict negotiation are international fisheries (Pham Do, 2003; 
Zara et al, 2006), grazing rights (Gamini, 2006), forestry (Zara et al, 2006) and water resources 
(Lund and Palmer,1997; Dinar, 2004; Hermans, 2004; Gamini, 2006). Game Theory has more 
recently been employed in assisting the protection of endangered species. (Prato, 2005; Gamini, 
2006). 
 
An extensive review into the use of game theoretic models when negotiating cross boundary 
resources is presented by Zara et al (2006). The work concentrates on world fisheries but also 
includesGame Theory use in resolving other cross boundary problems such as acid rain, 
forestry, the placement of pipelines and noxious manufacturing plants. The use of Game Theory 
to resolve problems associated with pollution expelled from one country and impacting on other 
countries is also discussed (Zara et al 2006). Pham Do (2003) also reviews the use of Game 
Theory modelling in negotiation of regional fisheries agreements.  
 
Many early applications of Game Theory modelling were in regard to the sustainability of water 
allocations and strategies to improve negotiation over water resource use by multiple parties.  
New demands for water, such as demand for recreation purposes, waste assimilation and 
environmental flows in addition to the traditional needs foragricultural, urban, flood control and 
power generation, have created further difficulties in water allocation and increased the need for 
negotiation.  
Lund and Palmer (1997) put forward sound reasons for using the tools of Game theory to  
resolve conflict arising from management of water resources using the tools of Game Theory. 
They observed that Game Theory modelling has several potential roles:   
• facilitate further understanding of the problem, including the development of computer 
models of water resource systems 
• formalisation of performance objectives 
• developing the promising alternatives 
• evaluation of alternative strategies 
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• providing confidence in solutions 
• providing a forum for negotiation (Lund and Palmer, 1997) 
Lund and Palmer looked in more detail at various means of achieving desirable outcomes 
including a shared vision model where the stakeholders work together to develop the model. It 
was suggested in this work that in spite of the limitations, Game Theory modelling is likely to 
be more cost effective than other means of resolving conflicts (Lund and Palmer, 1997). 
Supalla (2000) used Game Theory concepts to analyse the failure of earlier efforts to negotiate  
the allocation of water from the River Platte in the USA, with the aim of facilitating ‘the 
resolution of this continuing water allocation problem’. Supalla concluded that the likelihood of 
success was greater through employment of Game Theory modelling because the players can 
assess the possible solutions simultaneously. The models are produced independently of the 
players themselves and they may return possible solutions not envisaged by the original people. 
Modelling also encourages players to consider incentives and strategic behaviour in bargaining.  
 
Dinar (2004) evaluated the effectiveness of cooperation in managing trans-boundary water 
resources after more than ten years of research in the field. In the same year Hermans (2004) 
discussed the limitations and successes of employing a Game Theory approach to water 
resource management using different experiences in water management, citing examples from  
a range of countries.  
 
Basaran and Bolen (2005) undertook research on the ‘preferences and attitudes of different 
players taking part in the Nilüfer watershed’ in Turkey. The work examined strategies of 
environmental protection and industrial development using a non-cooperative two-player game 
scenario. Environmental problems such as trans-frontier pollution (air or water) arising from 
industrial development are often multilateral and they affect all the agents in the economies of 
countries. 
 
Research in the past two decades has also been directed at trans-boundary pollution where 
pollution produced by one party impacts on an external party. Game Theory has been used to 
model solutions to acid rain pollution, greenhouse gas emissions and non-point source pollution. 
Carraro and Filar (1995) brought together papers by a range of authors, discussing greenhouse 
warming, exogenous pollution and the use of Game Theory models to establish equitable 
outcomes.  
 
Filar and Gaertner, (1996) demonstrated that co-operative Game Theory can be used to 
establish the equitable share of costs and benefits in modelling reductions in greenhouse gas 
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emissions.  The work considers different regions of the world, classified according to their 
production of CO 2 , as players in a cooperative game and arrived at a fair allocation of emission 
reductions for each country, which would achieve an overall reduction in world atmospheric 
concentration of CO 2 .  
 
Romstad (2003) discussed the use of financial incentives (tradable permits) and disincentives 
(taxes or regulations) to change management practices on farms as a means of controlling non-
point source (NPS) pollution. Tax is considered a blunt instrument, and slow to produce a 
noticeable change in NPS pollution, therefore Romstad proposed a team approach to reduce 
ambient NPS pollution using the principles of Game Theory to decide team ‘contracts’. 
 
Cochard et al (2005) also examined the use of taxes and compared the efficiency of tax 
instruments to regulate NPS pollution. Input based tax, ambient tax/subsidy, ambient tax and 
group fine were assessed. Using Game Theory to model the four scenarios, they concluded that 
the input tax and ambient tax (on its own) are very efficient at regulating pollution, the group 
fine is fairly efficient and all improved pollution outcomes. Ambient tax/subsidy combined, 
however, decreases social welfare and is not very effective in reducing pollution. Game Theory 
has also been employed in natural resource management when examining decision making in 
regard to species protection. Prato, (2005) found that the minimax regret criterion selects the 
delisting decision that minimises the maximum loss likely to occur under alternative ecosystem 
states. When the cost of making a correct decision is less than the cost of making an incorrect 
decision, the minimax regret criteria indicate that delisting is the optimal decision. 
 
Gamini (2006) provideda general overview of Game Theory applications to natural resource 
management including examples such as assessment of land privatisation and grazing rights, 
water allocation, safe minimum standards as applied to ecological problems. Species protection 
decisions were also discussed. 
 
In conclusion, Game Theory provides a means to analyse natural resource management 
problems and to model various situations and solutions objectively. Models enable a cost 
effective method of comparing different scenarios and facilitates identification of the ‘best case 
scenario’ with an outcome beneficial to all parties.    
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3.5 Farmer Attitudes to Change and Natural Resource 
Management 
 
Using Game Theory to resolve natural resource management problems initiates change of 
behaviour in the participants (individuals) to improve the benefits to all parties (the 
community). To gauge the likely uptake of the Pareto Optima result calculated by the model, 
background is given here to the attitude of rural populations change and natural resource 
management. 
 
Change in rural regions is continual, with adaptation to changing markets, soil conditions, 
economic circumstances and climate an annual reality. At the individual level, psychologists 
have studied the decision-making process for many years and as in all societies the response to 
change in the rural community can be portrayed by a normal distribution with a small 
proportion of the farmers as early adopters, followed by a group of relatively early adopters who 
allow the early adopters to take the main risk and wait to see the results. These are the seond tier 
adopters followed by the ‘majority’, then the more ‘conservative group’ and lastly, if at all, ‘the 
laggards’. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.9. The farmers that were approached to participate in 
this project are likely to be skewed towards the right half of the graph by virtue of already being 
associates of farming groups. 
   
Figure 3.8: Distribution of adaptation to change 
 
Research in a region of the Hopkins River catchment established that facilitated learning had a 
significant effect on knowledge, attitudes, skills and aspirations and led to increased production, 
environmental activities and social benefits. There was a corresponding increase in farmer 
satisfaction and a greater likelihood that farms would pass to the next generation. Much of the 
facilitated learning was production based, with opportunities to explore mainstream alternative 
enterprises. It appears that there is a flow on effect of groups of individuals getting together to 
learn and that facilitated learning in one arena opens the door to further opportunities and 
economic improvement which can lead to change in other areas such as the environment 
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(Trompf and Sale, 2006). The study also reported a higher landholder participation in Landcare 
groups within the research group than the non-participating group. These findings were 
supported by earlier research, indicating the importance of participation in learning and training 
groups for the individual to extend his own capacity for change (Lockie et al, 2002). 
 
Curtis et al (2001), however found that the decision to adopt changes in land management 
practices to resolve an environmental problem is not solely related to awareness of the problem 
and the required solution (here the learning was narrowed down to the specific problem). It is 
more complicated, involving individual responsibility for the costs of work undertaken for the 
public good, lifestyle constraints (budget, time, age of landholder),  and the economic 
sustainability of the land and the enterprises undertaken. There is a general saying in rural 
Landcare circles ‘You can’t be green if you are in the red’. 
 
Lockie et al (2002) developed a discrete list of indicators which could be used as a model for 
judging capacity for change. They discussed ‘capacity for change’ from a regional perspective 
with key findings indicating the importance of social capital in the region. The study found that 
a diverse, vital, inclusive and supportive community, where communication between sections of 
the society is based on trust, sharing of resources, conflict resolution and acceptance of 
differences, leads to successful economic and cultural change. 
 
In their discussion on the impact of land use change in South West Victoria, Petherham et al 
(2000) and Melland et al (2005) also emphasised the importance of trust and communication in 
acceptance of changes in a region. For example, the entry of corporate farming (Bluegums 
initially, and large corporate dairies subsequently) to the South-west region of Victoria has 
created some uncomfortable feelings, particularly amongst the farming fraternity. Good 
communication between the corporations and the community was not emphasized initially and 
the subsequent lack of trust created a negative image that has not yet been dispelled by the 
creation of jobs and economic wealth. Thurow (1998) stated that it is lack of communication 
rather than lack of economic incentive which drives community cooperation. The swing away 
from wool sheep to cropping does not appear to have created the same feelings due to the lower 
impact of cropping on the visual landscape compared with that of bluegum plantations. 
  
The dairy industry has looked closely at farmers’ attitudes to change in reference to natural 
resource management, in order to understand the social drivers that promote change and how 
the industry can best support it. They identified five interconnected factors:  
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1. A farmer’s frame of reference, which determines what a farmer believes to be true 
about a particular issue, practice or intervention. 
2. Aspirations, in terms of economics, technical, relational, cultural, emotional, moral and 
aesthetic properties. 
3. Identity in a given situation, which informs the farmer’s aspirations and his frame of 
reference. 
4. Capacity for change including access to financial, physical and natural capital; learning 
capacity, perceptions of self efficacy and state of mind. 
5. Social capital including networks and relationships, institutional support and trust in 
support organisations (Boxelaar and Paine, 2005). 
 
On-farm change is best supported through a participatory approach ie where all the stake-
holders are involved with the planning, goal setting and action for improvement (Boxelaar and 
Paine, 2005, Trompf and Sale, 2006).   
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Chapter 4: Water Quality Management and Nutrient 
Application - Supporting policy documents 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The factors that influence decision making in relation to phosphorus management by farmers 
are shown in Figure 4.1. Management practices have the potential to impact the waterways of 
the Hopkins catchment, as increased nutrient flows may lead to algal blooms. 
 
Figure 4.1 Factors that influence decision making in the management of phosphorus. 
 
The Government legislation regulates and guides action on nutrient pollution and the industry 
bodies educate userson these guidelines.  The farmer, meanwhile, is affected by social pressures 
from the community and regional economic factors. Within his/her own sphere of control he/she 
is influenced by the economics of his/her own production, the sense of well being about the 
environment, and time and labour management factors. Also, within the farmer, is the level of 
‘willingness to change’ and the ability to change. All these factors can influence management 
actions. Game Theory modelling can be used to analyse the ‘game of decision making’ in such a 
situation and to contribute to the education of the individuals in the community by presenting 
optimal recommendations that enable a ‘sustainable’ solution to the problem. 
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The general design of Figure 4.1 is supported by Beegle et al (2002) who discussed the factors 
impacting fertiliser decisions, dividing them into economic, social and biological. Su XF et al 
(2005) also stated that the factors impacting decision making in relation to land use change 
include biophysical, economic and social factors. Biophysical factorsinclude: loss of 
biodiversity, soil degradation leading to changes in production (due to soil fertility factors), soil 
erosion and a decline in the health of the remaining vegetation and ecosystem.  
 
A brief explanation of the authorities and their policy documents supporting the protection of 
environmentally sensitive natural heritage from nutrient pollution follows. Each level of 
government has legislation or policy documents targeting nutrient pollution in some form, 
although some local councils have placed greater emphasis on this than others.  
4.2 Federal Legislation and Authorities  
 
The role of the Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts is to provide 
‘policy advice and program management which protects or promotes the protection of the 
environment and Australia's heritage’ (Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the 
Arts, 2008). 
 
Under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, the department manages 
and protects the principal national and internationally important ecological sites. It has 
developed a response to climate change and represents the Australian Government in 
international environmental agreements relating to the environment and Antarctica. Through the 
Water Act 2007, the department oversees the management of the Murray Darling catchment and 
other areas of national interest relating to water (Department of Environment, Water, Heritage 
and the Arts, 2007b). 
 
The Department’s principal objective under the ‘National Water Quality Management Strategy’, 
is to achieve sustainable ‘use of the nation's water resources by protecting and enhancing their 
quality while maintaining economic and social development.  It has developed guidelines for 
water quality management and benchmarks, ground water management, sewerage systems, 
effluent management and water recycling. The major environment and heritage programs are 
implemented through the National Heritage Trust’s $3 billion trust fund. 
 
At a Federal level, concern with agriculture and water quality is also dealth with by the  
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) which oversees:  
 
• National Land and Water Resource Audit (monitoring section) 
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• Land and Water ( research section) 
• Funding opportunities through the Landcare Program, Envirofund, National Action Plan 
for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) and National Heritage Trust (NHT) to provide 
support for improvement to waterways 
• Three databases: Australian Water Data Infrastructure Project; Australian Spatial 
Database; and Australian Natural Resources Library. 
4.2.1 National Land and Water Resource Audit 
A comprehensive National Land and Water Resources Audit was undertaken in 2001 to collate 
natural resource data across Australia and develop a framework for consistent collection of data 
on a regular basis. ‘The National NRM Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (National M & 
E Framework) called for the identification of key topics or “matters for target”. Each matter for 
target has a set of “indicators” that will be used to monitor and report on the topic’ (Land and 
Water, 2008). 
The key targets (bold) and the indicators used for monitoring are: 
• nutrients in the aquatic environment nitrogen and phosphorus levels in flow leaving 
sub or whole catchment 
• turbidity and suspended surface water solids turbidity or total suspended solids 
(TSS) plus flow 
• surface water salinity in freshwater aquatic environments total dissolved solids 
(TDS) plus flow or electrical conductivity (EC) plus flow 
The source of standards for monitoring and data collection of water quality is discussed in 
Section 3.2.3. 
The 2001 Audit of Nutrient Loads to Australian Rivers and Estuaries found that the ‘Vic West’ 
region, described as including ‘the river catchments in an area of Victoria west of Melbourne 
which flow into the ocean and river catchments in South East of South Australia, which flow 
into the ocean’, exported TP at 1.9 times the estimated natural levels. 
 
Region  Hill 
slope  
(PP)  
Gully  
(PP)  
Bank  
(PP)  
Point 
source  
(DP)  
Run-
off  
(DP)  
Floodplain  
sediment-
ation  
(PP)  
Reservoir  
sediment- 
ation  
(PP)  
Export  
(TP)  
Export  
% 
Times  
natural  
Vic 
West  
41  213  174  0  144  285  17  269  1  1.9  
Table 4.1 Total phosphorus budgets (t/yr) Vic West region 
(Land and Water, 2008) 
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In Table 4.1 the ‘Export percent’ is the region’s export as a percentage of the assessment area 
total and ‘Times natural’ is the average increase in multiples of the pre-European TP load.  This 
means that the runoff is almost twice the natural runoff of TP. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Map of Australia showing the average annual Total Phosphorus (TP) exported  
from the Hopkins River catchment (circled). 
 
The total Australian annual export of TP is 1,894t P/an. As shown on the map the Hopkins 
region exports between 50-100 t P/an (Department of Environment Water Heritage and the Arts, 
2007a). This is less than the figure used by Read et al in 1999 (144t P/an). 
 
An assessment of the Hopkins River catchment found it to be substantially modified, 
particularly with reference to the nutrient and suspended load index. Mean annual runoff is 
405,600ML/an with total surface water use of 13,570ML/an (with urban and industrial 
accounting for 53% and irrigation 46%) and storage volume of 205ML. It is fully developed 
with respect to water allocation, mainly due to the high salinity content of its waters 
(Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, 2007b). 
4.2.2 Land and Water Australia 
 
Land and Water Australia is the research arm of DAFF. It collaborates with community, 
industry and government on many research programs aimed at sustainable agriculture often at 
the interface with environmental sustainability. Past research has produced guidelines on 
minimising the impact of agriculture on rivers and streams, looked at sustainable grazing 
systems, the management of algal blooms in the environment (see Section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3) and 
management of wetlands and riverine environments on private land. Collaboration with 
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Australian Wool Innovation has produced a series of practical tools to help wool growers 
manage natural resources sustainably. Grain and Graze is a project targeting sustainable grain 
production in collaboration with Grains Research and Development Corporation. The 
organisation also has a division investigating the impact of climate change on agricultural 
sustainability. 
4.2.3 National Eutrophication Management Program 
The National Eutrophication Management Program, which finished in 2001, led to an 
understanding of the processes that cause algal blooms, techniques available to minimise the 
frequency of them occurring and raised awareness about the conditions that exacerbate the 
problem. 
‘Some of the management techniques developed through the Program included:  
• Managing flows to reduce the stratification in the water column that promotes blue-
green algal blooms.  
• Managing light penetration within water bodies to control blue-green algal growth.  
• Using bio-manipulation to directly control concentrations and growth of blue-green 
algae.  
• Managing sediments in rivers, storages and estuaries so that the anoxic conditions 
favouring  blue-green algae growth are avoided.    
• Managing nutrients so that they are not entering river systems in 'pulses' and 
promoting algal growth.   
• Controlling nitrogen to better manage algal blooms (Land and Water, 2001). 
     4.3 State Legislation and Authorities 
The 1970 Environment Protection Act established the Environment Protection Authority in 
Victoria. ‘Its purpose is to protect, care for and improve the environment.’ (Department of 
Sustainability and Environment, 2007). It does this by administering the laws on air, land 
protection, waste, water, noise pollution and greenhouse gases. The Victorian Conservation 
Trust Act 1972 established a process that enabled landholders to protect land of high 
conservation value on their title. It also enabled the government to purchase high conservation 
value land for preservation (particularly areas adjacent to waterways which still retained 
biodiversity value). 
The State Water Act 1989 established the responsibility of all parties in relation to water 
resources. It provided for integrated management of water resources for the environment and 
consumer. A significant State Act the Catchment and Land Protection Act 1994 (CALP), 
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established ten Catchment Management Authorities across the State to provide ‘integrated 
management and protection of catchments, and the process to encourage and support 
community participation in the management of land and water resources’ (Department of 
Sustainability and Environment, 2007).   
An additional two other acts enable State and Federal government agencies to integrate 
management of nationally significant locations and develop environmentally sustainable 
policies. The Acts also require reports to be made on the environment and implementation of 
environmental management systems (EMS). 
 
The State government published the ‘Nutrient Management Strategy for Victorian Inland 
Waters’ in 1995. The report provided for assessment of regional nutrient problems and the 
development of regional nutrient management plans. These wereundertaken by the Catchment 
Management Authorities in each region. Other linked strategies are the National Water Quality 
Management Strategy (NWQMS) and the State Environmental Protection Policy - Waters of 
Victoria (SEPP-WoV). The SEPP's goal is to attain and maintain levels of water quality that are 
sufficient to protect the beneficial uses of the surface waters of the policy area. Water quality 
targets relate to marine, estuarine and freshwater areas in conjunction withwith the beneficial 
use to which the waters are used (Department of Primary Industries, 2006).  
 
4.3.1 Victorian Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 
Victorian EPA programs that relate to waterways can be categorised into four sections: 
1. Biological monitoring and assessment  
2. River health/environmental condition reports  
3. Environmental quality objectives  
4. Lakes program.  
Biological monitoring and assessment is now coordinated with monitoring undertaken by the 
CMAs and DSE. Results are recorded in a central database that is accessible to the public online 
at the Victorian Water Resources Data Warehouse (see Section 4.3.4) (Victorian Environment 
Protection Agency, 2006). Environmental condition reports are generated using the monitoring 
results and are collated for input into the Federal Governments ‘National Land and Water 
Resources Audit’ One additional task of the EPA is to develop targets for maximum levels of 
potential contaminants in air, land and water as discussed in Section 3.2.3.  
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4.3.2 Department of Primary Industries (DPI) and Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (DSE) 
  
 
The DPI primarily develops extension programs promoting sustainable farming. Although there 
is a heavy emphasis on production efficiency in the animal, pasture and cropping sections, the 
Department promotes the Whole Farm Planning (WFP) and Environmental Best Management 
Programs (EBMP) and awareness of environmental issues through funding for Salinity 
remediation. 
 
The role of DSE in the protection of water quality is in extension, education and management of 
water, forests, ecosystems and public land. It works closely with the DPI in rural regions to raise 
awareness of the links between environmental and agricultural sustainability. 
4.3.2.1 South West Farm Monitor Project Data 
 
The DPI has been collecting production and financial data from farmers in South West Victoria 
for 36 years through the South West Farm Monitor Project. It is a voluntary benchmarking 
project in which farmers input data and in return receive, anonymous financial information of 
farms with similar enterprises within the same region.  
 
Farms vary in size from 120 to 3179 ha, and undertake prime lamb, wool, beef and/or cropping 
production. Traditionally, there was less cropping than other enterprises represented, however 
this is changing. Fertiliser costs per grazed ha are $42 (for the top 20% of farmers these costs 
are $56). The South West Farm Monitor Project has enabled an in-depth register of farming 
enterprise financial and production data to be used for research and by government departments. 
Table 4.2 shows data extracted from the 2005-2006 financial year when this project was 
undertaken. The data collected from the farmers in this project can be compared to that of the 
South West Farm Monitor Project for verification and to determine where in the commodity 
cycle each commodity lies. This impacts on the results from the Game Theory calculations and 
may explain why the use of phosphorus on particular enterprises is seen as more beneficial for 
any given year. The figures used in the Game Theory model were average application of 
fertiliser/ha; fertiliser cost/ha; output of commodity/ha; $/kg commodity and $/ha/100mm 
rainfall. 
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Table 4.2 Data extracted from South West Farm Monitor Project 2005-2006  
(Department of Primary Industries, 2006b) 
4.3.2.2 Long Term Phosphorus Experiment 
 
For the past 25 years phosphorus the Hamilton long term phosphorus experiment has operated 
on the basalt plains. This project was set up to demonstrate the potential of improved pasture 
with adequate phosphorus for growth. Measurements of wool quality, and quantity, stocking 
rates and soil and pasture attributes have been recorded. The main findings are: 
• applying more phosphorus and running more stock per hectare can dramatically 
increase profitability 
• pasture composition, nutritive value and pasture growth all improved with increased 
fertiliser application. 
• to profit from using extra fertiliser, animal production systems must utilise the 
additional fertiliser 
• running more stock /ha does not increase animal health problems provided livestock 
weights and condition scores are not allowed to drop below normal targets. 
• to maintain soil P, fertiliser needs to be applied at a rate of 10-20 kgP/ha annually, 
depending on current soil tests 
• at the Hamilton site (basalt soils) 80-90% of the P is still in the topsoil 
• soil sustainability indicators suggest no major environmental problems with this P level 
on basalt soils. 
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3.01 
2.96 
Lamb 95 
Wool 34 
Wool 618 14.9 8.86 8.5 236 117 119 227 269  7.78 Wool 
30.3 
Beef 658 15.2 13.46 12.1 515 336 179 513 188 1.70 400 
Wheat 592 n/a 16.7 No 
data 
622 289 333 No 
data 
No 
data 
0.16 3700 
Canola 582 n/a 19.5 No 
data 
641 601 40 No 
data 
No 
data 
0.29 1400 
Oats 584 n/a 15.0 No 
data 
659 379 280 No 
data 
No 
data 
0.15 3400 
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• at Hamilton, the amount of P required for maximum profit varies with the stocking rate. 
About 1 kg of P per ewe (~0.8 kg P/dry sheep equivalent (dse)) is needed in this 
environment) 
• on this soil type the level of P applied does not affect the surface soil pH 
• set stocking at high rates can lead to deterioration of botanical composition (Department 
of Primary Industries, 2003) 
   
Figure 4.3 Graph of the soil Phosphorus levels required to maximise pasture production 
(Department of Primary Industries, 2007) 
 
Figure 4.3 indicates the amount of soil P levels required to maximise pasture production which 
flows through to maximizing animal production given no other limiting factors.  
Profitability is linked to productivity and the DPI has graphed the gross margins for different 
stocking rates based on the phosphorus input. These are shown in Figure 4.4.  
 
 
Supporting Policy Documents 
70 
 
Figure 4.4 Gross margins estimated for sheep production relative to phosphorus inputs 
(Department of Primary Industries, 2003) 
 
A further determinant of productivity relates to the breeding management of the stock by the 
farmer and his/her management of pastures which enables the farmer to take advantage of the 
carrying capacity of the land. 
On an animal production farm, neither crop production nor fertiliser use is directly 
connected to the output of such farms. Farm performance depends on the animal 
husbandry skills of the farmer (Beegle et al., 2002). 
 
DPI recommendations on fertiliser use for grazing properties 
 
The DPI has calculated the factors associated with thephosphorus requirements of sheep and 
beef cattle enterprises, according to the soil type, terrain and grazing management. Using these 
factors, a table has been created for easy estimation of phosphorus requirements (kg) based on a 
dry sheep equivalent (dse). Table 4.3 takes into account soil loss factors, animal loss factors, 
pasture and rainfall. A landholder is able to estimate the phosphorus requirements per hectare if 
the carrying capacity of the area is known. 
 
Soil loss factors (See column 1 of Table 4.3) 
1. Recent alluvial soils and loam soils in a low rainfall region are designated a low soil 
loss factor  
2. Podzols, clay-loam and redzinas have a medium soil loss factor  
3. Acid sands, krasnozems and other clays and organic soils display a high soil loss factor. 
Animal management loss factors (based on management factors and slope, see column 2 of 
Table 4.3) 
 
1. Under an intensive rotational grazing management on flat rolling country the  loss 
factors are very low; intensive rotational grazing management on easy hills rate as low; 
and intensive rotational grazing management on steep hills rate as medium. 
Supporting Policy Documents 
71 
2. Under set stocking management on flat rolling country the loss factors are low; set 
stocking management on easy hills rates as medium; and set stocking management on 
steep hills rates as high 
 
Calculating how much phosphorus fertiliser is needed per hectare for a particular paddock is 
achieved by selecting the appropriate kg P/dse from Table 4.4 and calculating the amount from 
the equation shown. 
 
  Fertiliser/ha = 100 x P/d.s.e x Stocking Rate 
       Phosphorus Content % 
 
       Poor pasture  Rainfall         Improved Pasture Rainfall  
Soil 
Loss 
factor 
Animal Loss 
factor 
400mm  600mm 800mm 400mm 600mm 800mm 
Very low 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.48 
Low 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.62 
Medium 0.60 0.64 0.70 0.62 0.68 0.76 
Low 
High 0.72 0.76 0.82 0.72 0.82 0.90 
Very Low 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.58 0.64 0.70 
Low 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.68 0.76 0.84 
Medium 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.80 0.88 0.98 
Med 
High 0.88 0.94 1.00 0.92 1.02 1.12 
Very Low 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.76 0.84 0.92 
Low 0.84 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.96 1.06 
Medium 0.94 1.00 1.08 0.98 1.08 1.20 
High 1.06 1.14 1.20 1.08 1.20 1.32 
High 
       
Table 4.3 Predicted kg P/dse for maximum profit for a range of conditions 
 (Department of Primary Industries, 2001) 
   
Using Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and Figures 4.5 and 4.6, the future soil Olsen P levels can be predicted 
when the current Olsen P levels and the amount to be applied are known. This differs according 
to soil type. From these Tables landholders can calculate the amount required to maintain soil P 
levels or increase them to a desired level for maximising production.   
     Basalt Soils – clay loam 
                                Phosphorus applied in fertiliser (kg/ha) 
Current 
Olsen P 
mg/kg ↓ 0 5 10 20 40 80 
25 21 21 22 23 25 29 
20 17 17 18 19 21 25 
15 13 13 14 15 17 21 
10 9 9 10 11 13 17 
5 5 5 6 7 9 13 
3 3 3 4 5 7 11 
Table 4.4 Basalt Soils predicted Olsen P for given amounts of applied P 
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Figure 4.5 Basalt Soils predicted Olsen P for given amounts of applied P 
 
   Dundas Tablelands- duplex loam derived from rhyolite 
                                Phosphorus applied in fertiliser (kg/ha) 
Current 
Olsen P 
mg/kg ↓ 0 5 10 20 40 80 
25 20 21 22 23 27 33 
20 16 17 18 19 23 29 
15 12 13 14 15 19 25 
10 8 9 10 11 15 21 
5 4 5 6 7 11 17 
3 3 3 4 6 9 15 
1 1 2 3 4 7 14 
Table 4.5 Dundas Tablelands - predicted Olsen P for given amounts of P applied 
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Figure 4.6 Predicted Olsen P after different amounts of fertiliser were applied  
 (Department of Primary Industries, 2001) 
 
If the soil has a current level of 15mg P/kg, and the farmer applies 40kg P/ha according toTable 
4.4 the soil P level will rise to 17kg P/kg. To maintain the soil at 15 kgP/kg the farmer would 
need to apply 15-20 kg P/ha. The information gained from such research was delivered to the 
farmer population via extension programs and decision support tools such as ‘Making Sensible 
Supporting Policy Documents 
73 
Fertiliser Decisions’, which advises farmers on the appropriate fertiliser application rates for 
particular soil types, rainfall and stocking rates. ‘The Farmer Nutrient Loss Index’ (see Section 
4.3.2.3) has been developed more recently, building on the Long Term Phosphorus Experiment 
and recent research (Melland et al, 2007). 
4.3.2.3 Farm Nutrient Loss Index (FNLI) 
 
A group of scientists from the DPI with the support of the fertiliser industry (FIFA) and State 
and Federal government departments has spent the last four years developing the Farm Nutrient 
Loss Index (FNLI). It is an index which:  
 
draws together current knowledge on how nutrient loss occurs in a simple to use computer 
program… The FNLI identifies the average annual risk of N and P loss from paddocks 
within a pasture based grazing system to waterways, groundwater and the atmosphere. 
(Melland et al, 2007) 
 
Factors identified in the FNLI are divided into two parts and weights are given to each factor to 
identify an overall risk ranking for the paddock. Using this information together with soil testing 
data and nutrient budgeting, landholders are able to identify suitable management options for 
individual paddocks. The factors are as follows: 
Source factors soil P; fertiliser  amount; timing of application; pasture type; ground 
cover; stocking rate; effluent rate and timing; Phosphorus Buffering Index (PBI) and 
nutrient hotspots. 
Transport factors surplus water and storm likelihood; soil profile type; slope; land 
shape; water logging; groundcover; pasture type; groundwater depth; proximity to 
waterway and runoff modifying features (Melland et al, 2007). 
4.3.2.4 Cropping phosphorous decision making   
 
The DPI has developed a series of booklets relating to management of environmental issues, 
including Phosphorous Loss Management on Farms which relates to removal of phosphorus in 
product. Figure 4.7, reproduced from this booklet, calculates the amount (kg) of P removed in 
plant products, and therefore needing to be replaced annually by fertilisers or manure. This table 
can also be used to calculate relative risk to the environment from phosphorus application. The 
fertiliser companies also have similar tables of crop nutrient usage. 
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 Figure 4.7 Table used to calculate the amount of Phosphorus required to replace 
phosphorus removed in product 
(Department of Primary Industries, 2005) 
 
The average targets for crop yields in the mid Hopkins region are: 
• Wheat 5t/ha (P requirement from Figure 4.7 would be 15 kg P/ha) 
• Barley 5t/ha (P requirement from Figure 4.7 would be 12.5 kg P/ha) 
• Canola 2.5t/ha (P requirement from Figure 4.7 would be 15 kg P/ha)(D McInnes, 
personal communication). 
4.3.2.5 Dairy Extension Centre 
 
The DPI’s online service, the Dairy Extension Centre has produced a number of resource 
manuals including the Fertilising Dairy Pastures Manual (Department of Primary Industries, 
2005). It provides the current research information on nutrient management, interpretation of 
soil and tissue tests, how to budget nutrient use, use of effluent on paddocks and advice on 
timing of fertiliser application. 
4.3.2.6 Environment Best Management and DairySAT Programs   
   
By 2000 the Australian Federal government was encouraging the Departments of Primary 
Industry in all states to develop Environmental Management Systems (EMS) for agricultural 
production. The systems were to be based on the International Standards Organisation’s ruling 
ISO 14001 with several stages to be developed to facilitate achievement of full accreditation.   
In response the Victorian Government encouraged farmers to assess their farms from the 
environmental perspective, as the first level of an EMS. Called ‘Environmental Best 
Management Practices project (EBMP)’, the self assessment program proceeds through a 
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number of questions relating to eleven major management areas with environmental impacts on 
the property, thereby raising awareness of best management practices in regard to management 
of water, soil, vegetation, chemicals, pest weeds, pest animals, effluent, farm waste, nutrients, 
green house gas and property planning. The program is delivered as a one to one extension 
program and links to wider information resources and extension officers.. 
 
DairySAT is a similar program aimed at Dairy farmers, and covers effluent, soils, chemicals, 
nutrients, biodiversity, pests and weeds, irrigation and drainage, farm waste, air and energy. The 
tool allows farmers to audit themselves on these environmental issues, set targets for 
improvement and provides links to begin to address the higher priority issues through the 
Department’s extension officers. 
 
4.3.3 Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority 
 
The plans and strategies of the Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority (GHCMA) 
covered in this section include:  
• Regional Catchment Management Strategy 2003/2007 
• River Health Strategy 2004/2009 
• Nutrient Management Plan  
• Other Plans and Strategies 
• Benefits and Costs of Nutrient Management in the GHCMA Region (Read and Sturgess 
Report). 
  
4.3.3.1 Regional Catchment Management Strategy 
 
The Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Strategy has six key areas of regional focus: 
• regional sustainability  
• biodiversity 
• water health and water quality  
• soil decline and salinity 
• pest plants and animals  
• coastal areas. 
 Within each focus area the CMA has developed targets for improvement based on the key 
indicators.  
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In the area of water health and water quality the objective is to ‘maintain and enhance the 
ecological health of the region’s water resources and waterways while maintaining economic 
and social development’(Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, 2003). 
This includes protecting fresh water quality, restoring river and wetland health, managing 
groundwater, drainage, floodplains and wastewater and sharing water equitably. The GHCMA 
also considers important its role in developing strategies and plans, supporting research, raising 
awareness and supporting on ground works through administering Federal and State funding. In 
addition, the GHCMA monitors, evaluates and reports on various programs.  
4.3.3.2     River Health Strategy 
 
There are three Catchments in the Glenelg Hopkins Region: 
• Glenelg River catchment 
• Hopkins River catchment 
• Portland Coastal catchment. 
 
The River Health Strategy is concerned with the current state of the rivers in the Glenelg 
Hopkins Catchment Management region and the threats to river health. Risk assessments are 
undertaken on a catchment and a sub catchment basis, priorities set and actions planned to 
alleviate threats. Threats described include degradation of vegetation, pest plants and animals, 
loss of in-stream habitat, bank and bed instability, poor water quality, algal blooms and flow 
deviation. The actions described include re-vegetation, control of pest plants and animals, 
placement of in-stream habitat and adopting the nutrient management plan (NMP) (see Section 
4.3.3.3) to prevent high nutrient inputs leading to algal blooms. 
4.3.3.3  Nutrient Management Plan 
 
The Glenelg Hopkins Nutrient Management Plan provides a ‘strategic framework for nutrient 
management across the region. The actions identified will assist in reducing nutrient loads 
entering the region’s waterways’.  
 
Objectives of this plan are to:   
• to reduce the risk of blue-green algal blooms, nutrient concentrations and sediment 
loads in the waterways  
• to maintain and improve the quality of waters (surface and ground) and riverine 
environments 
• to develop a greater understanding of the movement of nutrients in the catchment and 
availability of nutrients to algal growth 
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• to foster regional development by ensuring supplies of high quality water for industries 
and communities (Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, 2002). 
 
The annual cost of toxic algae blooms to the environment in the Hopkins River Catchment is 
estimated at $1,014,032 by Read et al (1999). This will be discussed in section 4.3.3.5   
Nutrient Reduction Targets 
 
The GHCMA has developed targets for nutrient reduction in streams, principally TP, over the 
20 years beginning 2002. A number of programs are being developed to enable this to occur. 
For dry-land agriculture the targets for a reduction in TP are as follows:  
• TP entering waterways through gully protection    22% 
• TP entering waterways through streambank protection     11% 
• TP entering waterways from adoption of Best Management Practice  12% 
• TP entering waterways through effective effluent systems being adopted  2.5% 
 
Within the whole catchment a reduction target of 54% is set, including sources from forestry 
and urban areas. 
 
On-ground activities are chosen based on the environmental values to be protected and 
minimising the risks to priority areas. The priority areas have high nutrient concentrations, 
active erosion, poor water quality, past multiple algal blooms and/or high salinity. Actions that 
deliver the greatest benefit to cost ratio and programs that complement current on-ground works 
are given precedence. Programs in place, funded by the Federal government through the 
National Heritage Trust (NHT), involve fencing and revegetating river and creek banks, and 
support of the EBMP. As a result of these programs, awareness of nutrient runoff has been 
raised and management of dairy effluent, storm water and public road drainage has been 
improved. 
 
The greatest benefit to cost ratio is in the urban areas, followed by forestry and public lands. As 
the region is 98% agricultural however, activity in these areas has limited impact on the whole 
catchment water quality. Within the dryland agriculture sector, the greatest benefit to cost is in 
farm nutrient management (0.36) followed by gully erosion control (0.25) and streambank 
stabilisation (0.14). 
4.3.3.4 Other Policy Documents 
 
The GHCMA has developed a number of other strategies and plans that interact with the NMP, 
with actions taken on behalf of one strategy being likely to improve outcomes for other issues. 
The Salinity Strategy ‘discusses interception and re-direction of surface water as a potential 
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method for controlling salinity. It recommends the development of a drainage policy that, 
amongst other things, establishes standards for drainage water disposal and identifies methods 
for protecting wetlands and other environments that may be affected by drainage’ (Glenelg 
Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, 2003). Actions that aid reduction of salinity, such 
as fencing out and revegetating, are likely to also reduce erosion and intercept nutrient flow.  
 
 The Drainage Strategy deals with management of regional rural drains with the aim of 
achieving a ‘sustainable balance between land-use and the environment’. This encompasses 
downstream environmental impacts of the drainage waters which may carry high nutrient runoff 
from agricultural land. The Floodplain and Waterway Management Strategy and the 
Regional Wetland Strategy both deal with management of wetlands, swamps and floodplains. 
The region has 44% of Victoria’s wetlands, 90% of which are on private land.  Protection of 
wetlands and swamps through fencing off and rehabilitation of habitat will improve the health 
of the wetlands which act as filters for the catchment. Re-instatement of wetlands which have 
been drained for agricultural reasons would have a beneficial impact on the whole catchment 
health, however this is unlikely due to the drying climate and increased use of raised bed 
cropping techniques within the region (Glenelg Hopkins Catchment Management Authority, 
2003).  
4.3.3.5 Benefits and Costs of Nutrient Management in the GHCMA Region 
 
Read et al (1999) were commissioned to produce the report Benefits and Costs of Nutrient 
Management in the GHCMA Region  prior to the development of the Nutrient Management Plan 
by the GHCMA. The estimated future frequency of algal blooms was to be considered as 
potential only. The report estimates the potential financial impact of algal blooms on human 
activity associated with waterways but does not account for the cost to native animals and native 
habitat.   
 
Based on the past thirty years, if no strategy for water improvement is developed, the expected 
number of weeks over the next 30 years that lakes in the Hopkins catchment will be affected is 
84 (major blooms) and 273 (minor blooms). Streams in the Hopkins catchment will be affected 
for 18 weeks (major blooms) and 48 weeks (minor blooms). For farm dams the figure is 6132 
weeks for major blooms and 9198 weeks for minor blooms. Algal cell counts above 15000 cells 
imply that water should not be used for drinking or animal use (Read et al, 1999). 
 
The cost of these blooms in the Hopkins catchment in 1999 was predicted to be $67,990 (6.7%) 
for stream impact, $469,211(46.3%) for impact onlakes and $476,831 (47.0%) for impact on 
dams. In total $1,014,032, which is $0.92/ha based on GHCMA’s estimate of 1,096,000 ha in 
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the Catchment (or $1.08/ha based on Read et al, 1999.  figure of 940,000 ha). According to area, 
the percentage impact is: 
• Farm dams    55% 
• Eel production   16% 
• Urban water supplies  9% 
• Amenity of foreshore residents 8% 
• Recreation and tourism  7% 
• Management agencies  3% 
• Irrigation water supplies  2% 
 
In 1999 the main contribution to nutrient loads in the catchment was thought to be dryland farming 
(69%), due to the high percentage of catchment land use for this purpose, intensive industries 
(10%), stormwater (20%) in urban areas, and runoff from roads and logging in forested areas (1%). 
Read et al (1999) estimated phosphorus loads in the Hopkins catchment as 144,214 kg/annum. This 
equates to 0.146 kg P/ha/an.  
 
Read also calculated the benefits and costs for each potential nutrient reduction activity within the 
catchment. In its Nutrient Management Plan (NMP), the GHCMA has adopted the report’s 
recommendations in regard to which area to focus on for greatest impact on the catchment as a 
whole (see Section 4.3.3.3).  
 
4.3.4 Water Data Warehouse Data on Total Phosphorus in water 
monitoring  
 
The ‘Water Data Warehouse’ was initiated by the EPA as a central database to hold biological 
monitoring and assessment data collected by the EPA, CMAs, State departments and other research 
bodies. Within the Hopkins River catchment there are 11 locations where data has been collected in 
the past. Of these, seven have data on TP levels. Graphs of the TP readings are found in Section 
2.2.5.2. 
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Figure 4.8 Total phosphorus monitoring points within the Hopkins River catchment 
  
4.4 Local Councils and Policy Documents 
 
The Hopkins River Catchment crosses four shire boundaries: Moyne, Ararat, Corangamite and 
Ballarat. Each Shire has its own strategies, plans and targets for dealing with environmentally 
sensitive problems.  
4.4.1 Moyne  
Moyne has an environmental sustainability strategy plan which provides a reference point for 
‘the protection and management of all key environmental assets within the Shire’. Within this 
strategy targets  have been set to improve: 
 
1. water quality and conservation 
2.  soil quality and conservation 
3.  level of greenhouse gas emissions 
4.  waste management practices 
5.  Biodiversity management 
6.  Education and awareness (Moyne Shire Council). 
 
As part of the Environmental Sustainability Strategy, a Priority Action Plan was developed to be 
reviewed and updated every two years. The Moyne Shire also works in collaboration with the 
DPI and GHCMA to support the Environmental Best Management Practices program to raise 
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awareness of best water management practices on farms. A storm water management plan to 
improve the quality of urban storm water discharge into local waterways covers three towns in 
the Hopkins catchment. 
4.4.2 Ararat Rural City Council 
 
In 2007 the Ararat Rural City Council developed Environment Local Law 2007 which in 
principle provides a safe and healthy environment for the residents of the district. A section of 
this law is targeted at water courses, where activities which are detrimental to the water quality 
or water course are prohibited. An urban storm water management plan is also in place for the 
city of Ararat (Ararat Rural City, 2007). 
4.4.3 Ballarat City Council 
 
The Ballarat City Council adopted an Environment Sustainability Strategy and the LiveSmart 
Ballarat Policy in October 2007. The Environment Sustainability Strategy provides for over 100 
actions and initiatives orientated around the following themes: 
• biodiversity (flora and fauna)  
• water quality and quantity  
• energy  
• waste recycling and re-use  
• air quality  
The key objectives of the strategy are to: 
• provide a clear direction to the City of Ballarat and its community regarding 
sustainability as well as the protection and enhancement of the natural environment.  
• develop a focus on sustainability across the organisation and achieve best practice 
environmental management in respect to council’s operation.  
• continue to raise awareness and increase the community’s participation and partnership 
in environmental issues (Ballarat City Council, 2007). 
4.4.4 Corangamite Shire Council 
The Corangamite Shire Council has a waste water policy in reference to sewered and un-
sewered properties. An environmental strategy has not been developed as yet.  
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4.5 Fertiliser Industry Codes of Practice  
  
The Fertiliser Industry Federation of Australia (FIFA) board endorsed an eco-efficiency 
agreement with Environment Australia (EA) in 2002, with the aim of achieving better 
environmental outcomes, reduced costs and increased competitiveness through: 
• increased implementation of environmental management systems consistent with ISO 
14001 
• increased promotion and policy involvement with environmental management issues 
• development of environmental standards in the form of an environment code of 
practice for the industry and benchmarking environmental inputs and outputs (Fertiliser 
Industry Federation of Australia Inc, 2005).  
 
The industry is encouraging members employed in the fertiliser service industries to undertake 
FERTCARE modules which instruct participants about product knowledge and employing best 
practice in transport, storage and spreading. In addition, members are encouraged to have their 
spreading machines accredited under ACCUSPREAD. A program for the testing of fertiliser 
spreading machines to ensure that they are accurate in spreading fertiliser evenly across a 
paddock. 
 
Codes of Practice (Australian Fertiliser Services Association) 
 
Storage 
• Fertiliser products will be confined within the storage perimeter and there will be 
minimisation of drift of dust, spillage and runoff outside the storage area. 
• Storage dumps on farms can be located to prevent runoff into environmentally sensitive 
sites. 
• Each specified fertiliser product will be kept in a separate storage area.  
• Contact between fertiliser products, people and animals will be minimised.  
• Equipment to be used within established safety limits and principles of sound practice 
observed. 
Transport 
• Fertiliser product will be free of contamination, contained within the tray or bin (no 
spillage).  
• Appropriate OH&S standards observed. 
• Sound practice observed with minimised environmental impact.  
• Driver will advise customer as to the suitability of any proposed farm fertiliser dump to 
minimise the likelihood of fertilisers being blown or washed from the site. 
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Spreading 
• Fertiliser products will be spread only on the land that has been contracted to, operator 
will ask owner if it is acceptable to spread if there is visible drift.  
• Operator will not begin spreading when rain is imminent and soil tracking off the area 
being spread is unacceptable. 
• Fertiliser products will be contained on the land area contracted and will not breach 
State department guidelines on what buffer zones are set to allow minimal fertiliser 
runoff into waterways, dams and drains. Groundcover and slope will be taken into 
consideration. 
• The operator will be familiar with the range of fertiliser rates common in a district and 
query the customer if it is above the rate, to avoid leaching into groundwater. 
• Machinery will be clean on and clean off the property. 
• High OH& S standards and sound practice will be observed to minimise adverse 
environmental impact. 
Product knowledge 
• All members will understand the basic principles concerned with the products being 
marketed and the uses of the products within the industry. 
• All members will explain to clients where they may be able to give advice and 
demonstrate that they are qualified to do so. 
4.6 Industry Papers 
 
The main agricultural peak bodies have been working towards encouraging farmers to factor 
environmental sustainability into their enterprises. These are outlined in the following 
subsections. 
4.6.1 Meat and Livestock Association (MLA) 
 
The Meat and Livestock Association (MLA) has produced a number of fact sheets advising 
growers on the best practice in natural resource management. These include Managing 
groundcover to reduce runoff and water loss which addresses appropriate fertiliser application 
timing to reduce runoff and erosion, and management of groundcover. Other fact sheets deal 
with increasing biodiversity, retaining native vegetation, improving pasture management and 
reducing weeds (Meat and Livestock Association, 2008). 
 
4.6.2 Australian Wool Innovation (AWI) 
Australian Wool Innovation (AWI) has undertaken a trial survey with the MLA on 
environmental and livestock management practices. The aim is to collate data on current 
producer management practices and compare this to ‘best practice’. The AWI has also 
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collaborated with Land and Water in their program ‘Land, Water and Wool’. This program 
gives practical advice on managing waterways and gullies to improve water quality through 
reducing sediment and nutrient runoff (Australian Wool Innovation, 2008). 
4.6.3 Dairy Australia 

Dairy Australia has been working with researchers at The University of Melbourne and the DPI 
to encourage dairy farmers to utilise fertilisers in a sustainable, efficient manner that will 
minimise runoff and leaching into waterways. A number of research papers have been produced 
aimed at improving water quality and increasing biodiversity under the banner of ‘Dairying for 
Tomorrow’. They are pro-active in extension services promoting sustainable dairying and are 
endorsing better effluent management to reduce nutrient pollution and improve the image of 
dairying. 
 
Economic data for the dairy properties was obtained from a 2004/2005 report of a survey and 
analysis of data undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
into the financial performance of Australian dairy farms. The results shown in Table 4.6 are an 
average over 3 years from 2001 to 2004. This data will be used in the future when the Game 
Theory model is applied to a dairy enterprise. 
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Dairy 700-900 
mm 
17.6 $ 574.71 8607 1.77 
Table 4.6 Dairy Production data extracted from Dairy Australia 
(ABARE and Dairy Australia, 2005) 
4.6.4 Grains Research and Development Corporation 
 
The Grains Research and Development Corporation supports an educational program called 
‘Fertiliser decisions: Show me the money’ aimed at helping growers make informed decisions 
on nutrient use. In August 2007 the corporation produced a supplement in the Groundcover 
magazine detailing information gained through its nutrient research projects (Grains Research 
and Development Corporation, 2007).
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Chapter 5: Project Survey Description 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Survey data on the actual amount of fertiliser applied to properties and the decision making 
process had not been collected throughout a whole catchment region prior to this research.  Five 
groups of farmers in the Hopkins River catchment were invited to participate in a survey 
collecting data on the use of fertilisers in the region. Presentations were given to two of the 
groups and 210 surveys were distributed to all the members in all groups. In total 39 surveys 
were returned, however four were rejected due to being outside the Catchment or contained 
unusable information.
  
Figure 5.1 Farmer Groups targeted in the Hopkins River Catchment 
 
The returned surveys were from individual farmers scattered throughout the catchment although 
primarily they were in the north (see Figure5.1).  Farmers in a dairy discussion group were 
approached initially but were unwilling to participate. Contacts in the DPI’s Environmental Best 
Management Project (EBMP) led to a second group being approached with some success in the 
second year. This area is outside the local region in which the researcher is known and may 
explain why there was some reluctance to participate. Ten dairy properties were approached and 
Five returned their surveys. 
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5.1.1 Selection of Groups of Farmers in the Hopkins River 
Catchment. 
 
The five groups of farmers in the Hopkins River catchment approached were the Glenthompson 
Bestwool/Bestlamb Group, the Streatham Branch of Southern Farming Systems, Mustons Creek 
Landcare Group, Bushy Creek Landcare Group and the South Eckland Dairy Discussion Group. 
The participants in the Bushy Creek Landcare Group that chose to participate were also 
members of the Southern Farming Systems Group or the Glenthompson Bestwool/Best Lamb 
group hence they were reclassified into the other groups. 
5.1.2 Getting the Groups Together 
 
Initial considerations 
- Should the whole Glenelg Hopkins catchment region be used or just part of it? 
- Initial contact was made with several farmers when the project was proposed -who and 
 where are these people in the catchment?  
- Should the existing farmer groups be used or a general mail out (letter drop)? 
- How do we get farmers interested in the project? Will it only be those interested in 
 conservation? 
- From the above will there be a problem with skewed data? 
- What is the time frame for the first survey? 
- What is a workable group size? 
- Total number of participants for statistical use of information? 
- Different enterprises, soil types, region of catchment, rainfall? 
 
Possible groups to target 
- Landcare groups – Muston’s, Woodhouse Nareeb, Bushy Creek, Chatsworth, Woorndoo 
and Mortlake. 
- Environmental Best Management Project groups – would involvement of these groups 
produce some bias? 
- Bestwool/Bestlamb group 
- Dairy discussion groups  
- Topcrop group 
- Personal networks  
- Landcare facilitators at the CMA 
- People originally contacted when project was proposed. 
 
The possibility of mailinga ‘letter to the farmer’ was considered as it would make contact with a 
broad spectrum of farmers but the question was ‘would they complete the survey’ when the 
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researcher was unknown and the survey appeared out of context. This method would also be 
costly. Initial approaches were made with local group facilitators to arrange a 15 to 20 minutes 
to talk to the local Bestwool and Landcare groups. To increase the return rate of the survey a 
reward was offered for completing the survey in the form of a cash payment to a local 
organisation/ business. The Country Fire Association (CFA) was selected as the recipient 
organisation as most farmers belong to it and it is apolitical. The chairman of Southern Farming 
Systems facilitated the use of their database of 167 members in the Hopkins catchment area in 
sending out the surveys. The secretary sent out initial letters so that the privacy laws were not 
breached. In light of this the research area was confined to the Hopkins River Catchment. 
Surveys were sent out to Muston’s Creek and Bushy Creek Landcare groups, Glenthompson 
Bestwool / Bestlamb group and the Southern Farming Systems Group in August 2006, and were 
returned by the end of September 2006.  
 
Discussions with contacts in the dairy industry led to a meeting and presentation to the dairy 
discussion group. However, the reception was defensive as the group felt that dairy farmers 
were always being targeted in regard to their fertiliser application management. There were no 
returned surveys from this group. After failing with the first dairy group an approach was made 
to contacts in the EBMP Project who work within the dairy region. Through them, ten dairy 
farmers were contacted in June 2007 and invited to be involved in the project. A survey 
incorporating both the first and second survey questionnaires (refer to appendicies 1 and 2) was 
sent out and five surveys were returned. 
5.2 Survey Design Overview 
 
The initial survey was designed to collect data on property size, type of enterprise, position 
within the catchment and information on fertiliser use, knowledge of nutrient runoff and 
attitudes to nutrient pollution. The surveys were sent out in August and collected over two 
months in August/September 2006. A second survey was sent out in June 2007 to the initial 
participants to clarify some questions. The delay was due to the drought of 2006/2007 as it was 
felt inappropriate to impose on people under stress. The second group of dairy farmers was 
surveyed in June 2007 (incorporating questions from the second survey sent out to the initial 
farmers). A third survey was conducted by interview in May/June 2008 to gauge a response to 
the recommended phosphorus amounts as calculated by the Game Theory model. Full copies of 
the survey questions are found in the appendicies 1, 2 and 3.  
 
The data were collated in an Excel spreadsheet with private information removed, once the 
position of properties within the Hopkins catchment had been determined. The numerical data 
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was analysed using Minitab™ and Excel data analysis. ArcGIS™ wasused to produce maps of 
enterprise analysis, phosphorus use and Game Theory results.  
5.2.1 Survey 1 
The aim of survey 1 was to gather information for the Game Theory equations and to understand 
how farmers make decisions about how much and when fertiliser is applied. An additional 
objective the aim was to gain an understanding of the farmer’s attitude to changing those 
practices that contribute to environmental degradation. Primary information enabled the 
identification of farmer clusters for use in the cooperative Game Theory model. The survey was 
structured as follows. 
 
Primary Information  
 
Name and contact details. 
Farm size; Type of farm enterprises and breakdown of each enterprise by percentage; 
Soil types; Average annual rainfall; Pasture type and coverage and the presence of waterways. 
 
Fertiliser Application Questions 
 
What type of fertilisers are used? Specify what they are used on and how frequently they are 
used? How much is applied and when is it applied? Does the type and amount vary from year to 
year? Are granular or liquid fertilisers used? Is a contractor used to spread the fertiliser? 
(important when considering altering the timing of fertiliser application) Do you follow the 
recommendations of the ‘Codes of practice’ for the fertiliser industry? How do you decide the 
amount applied? Do you use soil tests or tissue tests to determine how much fertiliser to spread 
on pastures or crops?  If a heavy rain occurs immediately after fertilizing the farm, are fertilisers 
reapplied? What margin would you put on the benefit you get by applying fertiliser? What is the 
cost of fertiliser expressed as a percentage of your annual farm costs?  
 
Nutrient Pollution Questions 
 
What is your understanding of nutrient pollution of waterways?   How does this affect you and 
your region?  Are you concerned with the long term effect of nutrient pollution on the wider 
catchment?   What monetary value do you place on the benefits of a healthy catchment?    What 
agricultural activities contribute to nutrient pollution?   What percentage of your waterways and 
wetlands have been fenced and revegetated to at least 10m from the edge of the water?  Is it 
possible for you to contribute to solving the problem of excess nutrient pollution in waterways?  
What frustrates you most in discussions of environmental issues and agriculture? Why? 
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5.2.2 Survey 2 
The aim of this survey was to investigate the current fertiliser targets (which influence fertiliser 
management decisions) that the landholders have and to clarify questions from the first survey. 
This survey was structured as follows. 
 
Questions 
    
What is your soil P target? What percentage of your production areas are at or near this target? 
Does the amount that you are using reflect where you are aiming for in soil P target? 
Was the amount indicative of what was applied over the whole farm? Was it specific to certain 
paddocks with the aim of raising soil P? If so what percentage of the farm was this? 
Indicate in which month/s you apply Phosphorus fertiliser. C-Crop and P- Pasture 
At what distance from the waterway are the fences? Have you observed an improvement in 
water quality in streams? Would you allow this to be mapped on a GIS for the purposes of the 
project? What are the local attitudes on fencing waterways and wetlands? Do you use land class 
fencing to manage low lying areas of your farm? Are you an active member of a landcare 
group? 
5.2.3 Survey 3 
The aim of the final survey was to obtain the response of the farmers to the recommendations 
from the Game Theory calculations and what was the farmer’s response to the doubling and 
tripling in price of fertiliser products in 2008? This survey was structured as follows. 
 
Does knowing that there is a problem with rising phosphorus levels in the Hopkins River alter 
your decision making with regard to phosphorus fertiliser application? What do you predict 
would be the production response in 3to 5 years if you raised/ lowered the amount of P (kg/ha) 
according to the recommendation arising from the research? Are you likely to follow the 
recommendations? 
 
What impact has the doubling in cost of fertiliser had on your decision making this year?  
Did this alter the timing of fertiliser application? Has this altered the amount of fertiliser 
applied? Has this altered the mix of enterprises that you are planning to produce? Has this 
altered the mix of crops that you are planting this year? How? 
 
5.3 Workshops Methodology 
 
During the project several workshops were conducted. The first workshop was a presentation to 
the groups to discuss the project and participants were invited to be involved. The second round 
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of workshops included presentations of the results from the first survey and the initial findings 
from the literature research. A final presentation was made to the GHCMA on the completion of 
the project. 
5.3.1 Workshop 1: Presentation of Proposed Project 
A power point presentation was made to the Glenthompson Bestwool/Bestlamb, the Bushy 
Creek Landcare and the South Eckland Dairy Discussion Groups separately, inviting the 
members to participate in the proposed research project.  The group facilitator/secretary was 
contacted and a presentation time allotted at the next meeting to be held. This coincided with the 
time frame of the project. The Bestwool/Bestlamb presentation was delivered at Cuming’s wool 
shed on 4 May 2006 to a group of twelve farmers. The presentation to the South Eckland Dairy 
Discussion Group was held at Mac’s dairy on 8 August 2006 to a group of 35 farmers and the 
presentation to the Bushy Creek Landcare Group was held at the McInnes property on 23 
August 2006 with twelve people in attendance.  
5.3.2 Workshop 2: Feedback of Survey 1 Results  
A poster presentation was delivered to Southern Farming Systems displaying the preliminary 
results of the project at their annual research workshop held at a property south of Beaufort on 
the 3/4th November 2006.  
 
Preliminary results were presented to the Glenthompson Bestwool/Bestlamb group at the 
Glenthompson Fire shed on 15 June 2007.  The timing coincided with a scheduled meeting and 
with sending out the second survey. There was some delay in the process due to the drought that 
had a major impact on the region.  Discussion took place concerning current research on the 
impact of phosphorus on the catchment, the cost benefit analysis being undertaken and the 
practicality of the Game Theory calculation. 
  
5.3.3 Workshop 3: Presentation of Game Theory Recommendations 
 
Initially it was intended to run a workshop for each of the farmer groups to discuss the results of 
the Game Theory model. However, due to problems with a delay in the final numbers it was felt 
more appropriate to interview a smaller group of individual farmers to gain their response on the 
results. During the past twelve months the price for commodities changed due to the drought, 
and the cost of fertiliser rose between 100/300% (at the end of the drought). A corresponding 
rise in the price received for commodities has not yet been realized and the questionnaire was 
given to gauge how farmers react to sudden cost rises. The drought and rising fuel costs have 
altered the market dynamics compared to the original year of the project, a factor that would be 
reflected in the Game Theory model results if they were re-calculated at present. 
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The final presentation was made to members of the GHCMA, with some DPI researchers in 
attendance.  A discussion was had of the practical lessons learned that  were of value to the 
GHCMA.   
5.4 Collating Material for Maps 
 
Interest in modelling environmental systems has greatly increased in the past decade. At the 
same time appropriate techniques, computer resources, and data of suitable quality have become 
widely available, so that the gap between the desirable and feasible in environmental modelling 
keeps decreasing. Geographic Information Systems (GIS), with their power to integrate diverse 
databases, undoubtedly play a key role in this development and have become the core 
technology of environmental research. 
 
In this study, where the cooperation of farmers in decreasing the effects of nutrients on surface 
waters was investigated, various GIS data sets from different sources wereused. The outcome 
will assist in visually expressing the recommended changes to quantities of fertiliser to be used. 
This section will present the data that has been collected and used to create maps required for 
information in the study area. The necessary conversions and modification of each layer has 
been made as required. 
5.4.2 Material and Methods 
 
The underlying mapping was collated by Afshin Alizadeh (RMIT University) using different 
GIS packages based on the nature of the data and/or their conversions. The main software used 
to produce the final maps was ESRI® ArcGIS™ (version 9.1) due to its high capability with 
vector based layers.  
 
Global Mapper (version 6.08) was used to view, convert, and extract raster-based layers such as 
Digital Elevation Models (DEM) and satellite images. In addition, it was used to re-project 
those layers which had differing geographical projections to the main data layers. 
DIVA GIS (version 5.2.0.2) was employed to import the rainfall and elevation data, which was 
then converted to GIS files to be used in ArcGIS™.  
5.4.2.1 GIS Base Data Layers  
Raster data 
 
Raster data are demonstrated in the form of grid cells, in which the information is stored. In 
other words, each cell contains information about the area that the cell covers. The 9 second 
Digital Elevation Model layer is derived from RMIT’s School of Mathematics and Geospatial 
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Science data library. Its resolution is 9” x 9” cells (latitude/longitude) ~250m, vertical accuracy 
~25m, derived from 1: 100,000 spot heights with enhancements. 
 
The average yearly precipitation was extracted from the DIVA Bioclimatic Database. Individual 
data was also collected from the property owners participating in the research. 
 
Vector data 
 
The vector data layers are made of polygons, lines, or points. Most of the spatial data used to 
produce the maps were vector data. The data layers are briefly described below.  
The Hopkins River catchment polygon covers the extent of the study area and it was extracted 
from the Victorian Catchments’ layer. This polygon was mainly used to clip the essential data 
from other layers, and to adjust the geographical projection among different layers. 
 
The rivers and surface water data comes in the form of lines and polygons. Each feature 
contains information about the length, type (water course, canal, wetland), and name. This layer 
is especially useful to visualise the position of the properties in relation to the surface water.The 
elevation contour lines layer contains intervals of twenty metres. Along with the DEM layer, 
different aspects and slopes of the region can be calculated to find out the transportation rate of 
fertilisers within the area (Alizadeh Shabani et al., 2007).  
5.4.2.2 Development of the maps from collated farmer data for visual 
presentation 
 
Using the base maps as a guide, two vector data layers were produced with information 
collected from the property owners and the Game Theory model.  
 
Property Layer 
 
The attributes for the property layer include property size, owner code, enterprise, 
phosphorus amount applied to pasture, phosphorus amount applied to crops, use of soil 
testing and use of contractors.    
 
Game Theory Modelling Layers 
 
The Game Theory model layer has attributes indicating the data from the Nash equilibrium and 
Pareto Optima calculations for each property and for three enterprises namely prime lambs, 
wool and crops (see Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3). 
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A second layer has the data giving the difference between the Nash equilibrium and Pareto 
Optima calculations providing visual presentation of the benefit of undertaking cooperative 
decision making compared to competitive decision making (see Figures 8.4 (a) – (f)). 
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Chapter 6: Survey Results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Actual data from properties throughout a catchment was collected for use in the Game Theory 
model to enable the provision of realistic figures for the model and to understand the process of 
managing fertilisers on those farms, which have multiple enterprises. These decision processes 
could later be factored into the model as necessary. 
 
The DPI reports that the number of farm properties in the Glenelg Hopkins catchment region is 
3850 (D Borg, Personal Communication). There is no data on actual farm numbers in the 
Hopkins catchment alone however, as the Hopkins catchment is approximately 40% of the 
Glenelg Hopkins region, a reasonable estimate of the number of properties in the Hopkins 
catchment is 1540. Of these 35 property owners were surveyed, which equates to 2.2%. The 
area of the properties we have surveyed is 25770ha (Cropping 9969 ha, Grazing 15344 ha) 
which is 2.5% of the Hopkins catchment area.  
 
The average size of the properties in the projectwais 736 ha, whereas the average property in the 
catchment was 640 ha. The difference is attributed to the small number of dairy properties 
represented in the project. 
6.2 Survey 1 
 
The aim of the first survey was to gather primary information on the farmers in the group and 
material to be used directly in the Game Theory model. We used the data to identify farmer 
clusters for use in the cooperative Game Theory model.  
 
The survey data collected and shown in Table 6.1 indicates that most farms have mixed 
enterprises, except for the dairy landholders who exclusively run dairy cattle. Approximately 
39% of the region is under crop; 60% is pastured for some form of animal production (milk, 
meat or wool) and 1% is used for other activities (forestry, fodder production).  
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6.2.1 Primary Information 
 Enterprise %                   Area     
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1 70 30           300 300     
2 20 10   70       2446 733.8 1712.2   
3 50     50       1200 600 600   
4 40 40   20       800 640 160   
5   50   50       970 485 485   
6 60     40       1400 840 560   
7 20 20   60       400 160 240   
8       100       400 0 400   
9 35     65       1400 490 910   
10 20 15   65       440 154 286   
11 25 25   50       1100 550 550   
12   25   60 15     788 197 580 12 
13 30 6 4 60       1200 480 720   
14 33 34   33       1040 686.4 343.2   
15 33     67       96 31.68 63.36   
16 30 20 50         200 200     
17 97     3       1350 1309.5 40.5   
18   100          240 240 0   
19 30 60     10     234 209   25 
20 60 40           250 250     
21 50 15 15   5 15   1500 1200   300 
22 100             325 325 0   
23   33   67       2000 660 1320   
24 55 10 10 25       950 712.5 237.5   
25 100             425 425 0   
26 10 35 35 20       800 640 160   
27 95 4 1         413 413 0   
28 74 5   21       387 305.73 81.27   
29   40 20 40       1300 780 520   
30 70       30     297 207.9   89.1 
31             100 280 280     
32             100 300 300     
33             100 159 159     
34             100 212 212     
35             100 168 168     
       Totals 25770 15345 9969 426.1 
   
Table 6.1 Area and Enterprises of the Farmer Group 
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Figure 6.1 Positions of Properties in Project by Enterprise 
 
Figure 6.1shows that the dairy properties are located in the south of the catchment which 
equates to the higher rainfall region (see Figure 2.3). The mixed enterprise properties 
undertaking cropping and prime lamb or wool tend to be found in the north of the catchment in 
the lower rainfall region and in the region of moderate slope. The grazing only enterprises are 
found in the area with average rainfall, and the region with steep slopes where continuous 
cropping may present soil erosion problems.                   
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Figure 6.2 Statistics of acreage distribution 
 
The histogram in Figure 6.2 indicates a skew towards the 
smaller holdings in the project group; this is a productive region with a range of rainfall patterns, 
with a greater number of smaller farms in the high rainfall, high land value areas.  
Area 
  
Mean 736.2857 
Standard Error 97.862 
Median 425 
Mode 300 
Standard Deviation 578.9594 
Sample Variance 335194 
Kurtosis 0.826935 
Skewness 1.097916 
Range 2350 
Minimum 96 
Maximum 2446 
Sum 25770 
Count 35 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 198.8795 
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Figure 6.3 Properties by Size 
In a region with even climate and soil types this would not be as apparent. The largest properties 
are in the mid to northern section of the catchment as indicated in Figure 6.3. 
   
Figure 6.4 Position of Properties within the Hopkins Catchment  
 
Initially the proximity factor (β) in the model, which is described in Chapter 7, has been 
calculated as the distance between neighbouring properties. Figure 6.4 gives the relative 
position of the properties to each other and their position in the catchment. Information from 
this map will be used in future calculations when the β value is calculated using distance to 
waterways and property position in relation to elevation and slope rather than distance from 
closest participating property. This is discussed in Section 8.3.2.2.  
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  Pasture Type    Soil Type Rainfall Elevation 
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1 5 95 0 100 90 SL 600 150 
2 5 95 0 100 5 SL-CL 525 200 
3 10 90 100 0 0 gr-L-C 500 250 
4 5 95 20 80 100 BA 575 350 
5 5 95 30 70 0 L, B/S 600 250 
6 10 90 50 40 2  590 300 
7   20 80 50 B/S Br L 550 300 
8     100 BA 625 100 
9 5 95 50 50 40 BA 500 250 
10 80 20 20 80 2 gr-L -C 630 250 
11 50 50 25 75 50 CL 625 350 
12 10 90 20 80 0 gr-L 500 300 
13  100 0 100 25 gr-C red-L 600 200 
14  100 30 70 10 gr-L red-br E 600 150 
15  100 100 0 50 CL 580 250 
16  100 50 50 90 B-L 640 200 
17 5 95 60 40 50 B-L 630 200 
18  100 30 70 70 B-L 700 200 
19  100 20 80 0 HB 675 250 
20  100 30 70 100 B-CL 680 200 
21 20 80 30 70  SL 700 200 
22 8 92 0 100 100 SL 590 300 
23  100 0 100 60 SL 514 200 
24 3 97 15 15 45 SL 550 200 
25 10 90 70 30 90 S-SL 600 200 
26 5 95 50 50 90 SL 650 300 
27 4 96 4 96 100 S 700 300 
28 8 92 20 80 90 gr-SL 635 300 
29 0 100   90 SL 600 300 
30 0 100 30 70 100 Granite SL/SL 578 250 
31 0 100 0 100 100 B S/R 750 250 
32 10 90 20 80  B S/R 800 100 
33 50 50 25 75 100 CL 750 100 
34 1 99 10 90    L 750 100 
35 1 99     SL 750 100 
Ave 6.939 87.61 28.15 66.39 64.25  624 50 
 Key:  SL – Sandy Loam; CL - Clay Loam; BA – Basalt; C – Clay; B/S – Buckshot; 
    S/R –Stoney Rises; gr – grey; br – brown 
Table 6.2 Pasture Type, Soil, Rainfall and Elevation 
 
Table 6.2 indicates a high level use of introduced pastures as would be expected in a region that 
has been cleared for agriculture for over 150 years. Only one property indicated a greater 
proportion of native pasture than introduced pasture. Most also indicated a high level of 
perennial to annual pasture, which is consistent with DPI  figures for farms involved with 
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agricultural extension groups (Trompf, 2000). Four properties indicated more than 50% annual 
to perennial pasture. Table 6.2 also presents the owner’s information on soil types, rainfall and 
the elevation calculated from Figure 6.4.  
6.2.2 Fertiliser Application Results 
 
Fertilisers used in the district vary from property to property. The range includes Single Super, 
MAP, DAP, Urea, SOA, Lime, Gypsum, Dolomite, Trace Elements Cu Mo Zn B, Potash, Pig 
manure, Hay booster, Emfert, Goldphos blends and High analysis pasture fertiliser (triple 
super). 
 
Generally the phosphate fertilisers, lime, potash, gypsum and trace elements (if required) are 
applied in the late summer to early winter period, with the cropping fertilisers drilled in at 
sowing. The nitrogen fertilisers are customarily applied to crops, hay and fodder crops in early 
spring, or maybe applied in a split application. One dairy property applied fertiliser once a year 
in spring, the rest followed the above practices. Crop and pasture fertilisers (phosphorus, 
nitrogen) are applied annually with potash, lime and dolomite applied every three to five years 
and trace elements every five to ten years as required. Farmers indicated that they apply 
fertilisers on grain crops (65.776%), pasture (80%), hay crops (48.5%) and other (2.8%). The 
results are greater than 100% due to multiple enterprises being run by many properties.  
 
The statistics for phosphorus (kg /ha) applied to pastures and crops are shown in Table 6.3. 
There is a statistically significant difference between the amount applied to crops and the 
amount applied to pastures. The cropping properties had higher average use of phosphorus per 
hectare as shown in Table 6.3 
 
        Pasture (all enterprises) Crop 
Minimum 4.55 Minimum 7.0 
Maximum 23.1 Maximum 31.28 
Mean 12.93 Mean 19.7 
 
Table 6.3: Statistics for Phosphorus Application 
 
. 
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Total Total 
Prime Lamb 
growers Wool growers Beef   
 
pasture crop Pasture Crop Pasture Crop Pasture Crop 
1 17.05   17.05   17.05      
2 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9     
3 9.1 21.9     9.1 21.9     
4 10.50 21.9 10.50 21.9 10.50 21.9     
5 15.3 18.1 15.3 18.1         
6 13 31.28     13 31.28     
7 11.375 27.38 11.375 27.375 11.375 27.375     
8   13.14             
9 15 20     15 20     
10 5.16 11.93 5.16 11.93 5.16 11.93     
11 17.91 17.91 17.91 17.91 17.91 17.91     
12     19.45 19.45     19.45 19.45         
13 14.76 30.27 14.76 30.27 14.76 30.27 14.76 30.27 
14 13.25 19.06 13.25 19.06 13.25 19.06     
15 4.55 10.9     4.55 10.9     
16 15.11   15.11   15.11   15.11   
17 7.76       7.76       
18 18.96   18.96           
19 13.96   13.96   13.96       
20 18.2   18.2   18.2       
21 10.7   10.7   10.7   10.7   
22 13.65       13.65       
23 18.2 21 18.2 21         
24 13.65 27.38 13.65 27.375 13.65 27.375 13.65 27.38 
25 10       10       
26 9.1 21.8 9.1 21.8 9.1 21.8 9.1 21.8 
27 16.22   16.22   16.22   16.22   
28 7.75 20.01 7.75 20.01 7.75 20.01     
29 7 7 7 7     7 7 
30 11.85       11.85       
31 5               
32 15               
33 23.1               
34 10.8               
35 22               
 Ave 12.996 19.7 13.40 19.79 12.23 21.12 12.36 21.61 
 
Table 6.4 Phosphorus Application in kg P/ha 
 
Table 6.4 presents the individual application rates for the farms based on the enterprises in 
production. A comparison of histograms of P use on grazing and cropping properties (Figures 
6.5 and 6.6) indicates that cropping properties show a greater standard deviation (SD) compared 
with the grazing properties. The lowest value for a grazing property was for a small farm of 96 
ha which maybe considered a ‘hobby farm’ and not representative of a commercial situation. 
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Figure 6.6 Average Crop kg P/ha 
 
    
Figure 6.7 The Hopkins Catchment with Charts of Average Pasture and Crop P (kg/ha) 
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Figure 6.7 presents a comparison of the average P kg/ha applied to pasture and crops for each 
property. The height of the bars gives an indication of the quantity of P applied per ha. When 
examined in relation to proximity to water courses and elevation, it also gives some indication 
of the risk of phosphorus runoff. 
 
Factors influencing the decision regarding the amount of fertiliser to be used includebased on 
advice by agronomists (66.6%), DPI (20%), previous farming experience (30%), tradition, ie 
handed down through the family (13%), the season, soil tests and other factors (13.3%) and the 
budget (10%). The use of agronomists has increased in the past 20 years as the terms of trade 
have declined and landholders are turning to specialists for advice. 
 
The farmers indicated that any variation in fertiliser use from year to year is primarily due to 
climate (43.3%), budget (33.3%), soil tests (20%) and the stocking rate (d.s.e./ ha) or the area to 
be committed to cropping (16.6%).  The climate has the largest impact as it influences the 
stocking rate or crop species that are grown.  
 
Thirty percent of the farmers were willing to look at alternative types of fertiliser from those 
that are currently used eg foliar sprays and/or ‘organic’ as opposed to chemical fertilisers. This 
became apparent in the third survey after fertiliser price rises. 
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Figure 6.8 Representation of ‘Who Spreads’ the Fertiliser 
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The survey indicated that 76.6% of the spreading of phosphorus fertilisers is undertaken by 
contractors with only 20% of farmers still applying their own, as indicated in Figure 6.8. The 
reasons for this include time constraint and cost of equipment. These percentages align with the 
breakdown into granular and foliar application. Foliar application is undertaken with a sprayer, 
which is more common on individual farms than machinery required for super spreading, 
although it is too great an assumption to say that foliar spraying is not contracted out. Foliar 
sprays are often used to adjust nutrient demands during the growing of the crops.  Of the total 
48% of landholders either were not aware of the fertiliser industries ‘codes of practice’ (COP) 
or they relied on the spreading contractor to know them. The COP have been described in 
Section 4.5. 
 
It was established that 85% of the participating farmers use either soil tests or tissue tests to 
determine how much fertiliser to spread on pastures or crops. Cropping properties in particular 
use tissue tests to monitor crops through the growing season and no farmers re-apply fertiliser 
after rain, due to the high cost of fertiliser.  
 
A range of estimates (1.75 to 8) were given to the question on the margin of benefit gained by 
applying fertiliser. The cost of fertiliser expressed as a percentage of the annual farm costs 
varied from 10 to 30% with 10% of property owners not having calculated the cost as a 
percentage of their total costs. These results could indicate a lack of detailed business 
knowledge or a lack of wishing to share detailed knowledge with outsiders. 
6.2.3 Nutrient Pollution Questions 
 
A range of answers was given to the nutrient pollution questions however; they indicated that 
76% of the participants have an acceptable understanding of nutrient pollution and the 
agricultural practices that contribute to it. 18.5% of participants had observed the detrimental 
effects of nutrient pollution (10% if dairy farmers are not included in the project). Dairy 
properties are in the lower reaches of the Hopkins catchment and are more likely to encounter 
the results of nutrient pollution within the total catchment. In keeping with this, 80% of 
participants did not view nutrient pollution as relevant to them and their community 
nevertheless, 60% were concerned with the possible long term effect of nutrient pollution.  
 
The answers given in relation to how landholders could contribute to solving the problem of 
nutrient pollution supported the above evidence ie that they have a good knowledge of practices 
that contribute to reducing nutrient pollution and many are already fencing creeks and wetlands 
according to government advice. The survey indicated that 28.5% of participants put a high 
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monetary value on a healthy catchment yet this may not reflect the true value of the catchment 
to the participants as 57% found the question difficult to answer. Only 10% of the participants 
gave little value to a healthy catchment. The survey indicated that 17.3% of the property owners 
have all of their waterways fenced and revegetated to at least 10 m from the edge of the water, 
17.3% have no waterways fenced, and 32% have somewhere between 5 and 90% of their 
waterways fenced.  
    
There were various responses to ’what frustrates you most in discussions of environmental 
issues and agriculture?’ that loosely fell into a number of areas:  
 
• city/rural divide in attitudes and responsibility 
• perception that the time frames needed to repair environmental degradation are unrealistic 
• environmental/agricultural research divide where not enough information is shared between 
the two 
• over allocation of water from our rivers and groundwater 
• too many regulations imposing on farming management 
• unfair division of environmental cost placed on the farmer 
• ignorance of the issues, problems and solutions by all sides 
• long term use of herbicides 
• unrealistic view of farming organisation leaders representing farmers as  conservationists 
when it is not necessarily so  
• contribution of soils, pasture and trees on farms not being accounted for in carbon 
 calculations of greenhouse gas inputs and outputs from farms. 
6.2.4 Survey 1 Discussion 
 
One of the main tasks of the initial survey was to identify farmer clusters for use in the 
cooperative Game Theory model. Clusters are important because they identify groups within the 
catchment, with similar traits and objectives, which form the separate ‘players’ that will possibly 
form coalitions for cooperation.  In this project there was no spatial basis for forming clusters 
therefore the clusters have been chosen on the basis of enterprise ie wool, prime lamb or crop. 
Adding complexity to this project is that the majority of landholders undertake mixed agriculture 
and some may practice all three enterprises. At this stage calculations for beef, agroforestry and 
dairy as separate enterprises have not been carried out. Detailed information on dairy production 
per ha per 100mm rainfall was not immediately available for the research project. 
 
Two properties indicate 50%:50% native to introduced pasture which may be likely in one of 
the properties but less likely in the dairy property. Dairy properties are usually more developed 
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than other enterprise properties due to the high value of the land. Past experience indicated that 
it is common for farmers to mistake degraded annual pasture as native pasture and the dairy 
property indicates a high use of phosphorus (in kg/ha) which would be detrimental to any native 
pasture as it is adapted to low phosphorus. In this case it is more likely to be 50% degraded 
pasture and 50% improved pasture. The property that indicated 80% native pasture indicated an 
appropriately low phosphorus use per hectare. The relevance of this in relation to the Game 
Theory model will be discussed in Section 8.3.2.2. 
 
There were nine properties that indicated less than 10kg P/ha applied per annum. Of these 
44.4% had >50% annual pasture but 56% have a higher proportion of perennial introduced 
pasture. Therefore, there appears to be no direct correlation between type of pasture and the 
amount of P applied except for the property owner with a large proportion of native perennial 
pasture which required a low P soil level. Soil P targets may have a greater role than the direct 
measure of pasture production. This factor was explored further in Survey 2. 
 
There was an unexpectedly wide range of fertiliser amounts applied to pastures and crops. 
Information on participants in further education groups led us to expect a higher level of ‘high 
production’ landholders (Trompf, 2000) which may have skewed the results but there appears to 
be a relatively normal distribution of amount spread, refer to Figures 6.5 and 6.6.  
 
Table 6.5 Phosphorus Application in kg P/ha for Each Enterprise Group 
 
Table 6.5 shows the break-down of phosphorus use (kg/ha) according to properties that have 
prime lamb and crops, wool and crops or beef and crops. There is no statistical difference 
between amounts of phosphorus applied to prime lamb pastures or wool pastures or between 
phosphorus applied to crops on prime lamb properties, and wool properties. There were not 
sufficient numbers of beef properties to make a statistical comparison with prime lamb and 
wool properties, nor a sufficient sample for comparison between cropping properties and 
pasture properties. 
 
Information extracted from the SWFMP Group (refer to Section 4.3.2.1) puts the average 
fertiliser amount applied to pastures and crops on those farms as: 
 
Wool 8.86 kg/ha Prime Lambs 10.31 kg/ha Beef 13.46 kg/ha 
Cereal Crops 15.85 kg/ha   Oil Crops 19.5 kg/ha 
Total 
Ave 
Pasture 
Total 
Ave 
Crop 
Prime 
Lamb-
Pasture 
Prime 
Lamb- 
Crop 
Wool-
Pasture 
Wool-
crop 
Beef-
Pasture 
Beef-
Crop 
12.996 19.7 13.40 19.79 12.23 21.12 12.36 21.61 
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These values are lower for each enterprise compared to that of the participants in this project, 
suggesting that the research may strive to perform higher than the ‘average’ district farmer.  
L Beattie (Personal Communication) who has worked for the SWFMP, suggests that the 
landholders that participate in the project also perform above the average farmer. The surprising 
factor in this is that many property soil tests and application amounts are relatively low 
compared to other countries (Haygarth and Jarvis, 2002). In the model the production figures 
were based on the gross margins of the average SWFMP, therefore if the higher production 
levels of the top 20% of farmers were used the figures in the model would reflect a different 
result. 
 
The high use of agronomists (66%) and DPI information (20%) for advice to aid in farm 
management decision making, together with past experience, indicates an awareness of seeking 
outside educational and extension services.  These landholders showed openness to new and 
alternative ideas. The uptake of soil and tissue testing is also a positive indication of adopting 
new ideas.  
 
The high use of contractors to spread phosphorus fertilisers (76.6%) will impact on the 
application of the game theory model results in practice. Initial plans were to examine varying 
the timing of fertiliser application throughout the year to minimise runoff potential. This is only 
practical if the contractors are involved in the planning as the DPI has done with the fertiliser 
industry and when calculating the Farm Nutrient Loss Index (FNLI).  
 
The question on the margin of benefit gained by applying fertiliser produced results that 
indicated the farmers found it difficult to estimate the direct benefit. The wide range of 
estimates (1.75 to 8) suggested that landholders have not considered the cost of applying 
fertiliser on the gross margin and have concentrated on other factors in their business when 
reducing costs. Through its extension services, the DPI has promoted high inputs of fertiliser to 
improve production and profit. Considering the low P levels of Australian soils prior to the 
1980s it has been important for continual production growth. As indicated in Survey 2 the soil P 
levels would still be considered low by European standards (Haygarth and Jarvis, 2002) and in 
many cases the soil tests have not yet reached the DPI recommendations for maximum profit. 
Soil targets for maximum production drives the amount of fertiliser used on many farms 
together with the budget and the season. 
 
The SWFMP results indicate a margin of benefit of 2.99 to 8.07, ie for every dollar spent on 
fertiliser there is a gain in income of $2.99 to $8.07, however this calculation is very dependent 
on where in the economic cycle the commodity is. For 2006, when the data were obtained, the 
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commodities of wool, prime lamb, beef and cropping were all down on average. This data will 
be discussed in Section 8.3.3.  
 
The answers given to the nutrient pollution questions in Survey 1 indicate that farmers have a 
good awareness of nutrient pollution and its causes. Many landholders have taken the 
recommended steps to reduce nutrient runoff (fencing of waterways and better placement of 
fertilisers), due to concern regarding the effect on the environment and the potential waste of a 
cost to production. Most landholders were concerned by the factual information on the high 
levels of P in the waterways such as that provided by Leinweber et al (2002), who demonstrated 
the benefits of buffer zones, using figures from Kämppaet et al (2000) it was shown that TP 
concentrations decreased by 27 to 97% with the use of buffer zones, depending on their width. 
More recent information from the DPI research indicating that the size of particles in the runoff 
was too small to be trapped by buffers, had not yet reached the landholders and the high levels 
of phosphorus in the local rivers was also unknown prior to this project. Few landholders were 
able to ‘value’ a healthy catchment. This was a very subjective question and the results should 
not be taken critically.  
 
The final set of answers indicates the spread of issues that create frustration amongst 
landholders in relation to discussions about the environment. They are not specific to the rural 
population but do indicate obstacles for environmental researchers working in a rural 
environment.  
 
To establish successful management options for reducing P losses to watercourses, it is 
necessary that farmers, other stakeholders and politicians are aware of the problem and 
accept that improper P use in agriculture is a main reason for surface water pollution with P 
(Leinweber et al, 2002). 
6.3 Survey 2 Results 
 
The aim of the second survey was to investigate the current soil phosphorus targets and assess 
whether they influence fertiliser management decision making. Survey 2 was designed to obtain 
more accurate data on timing of fertiliser application and landcare action.  
 
Table 6.6 presents the data gathered from Survey 2. It shows the soil P levels targeted by the 
participants in the research, indicates what percentage of the farm is at these target levels and if 
the application amount reflects the aim to achieve the soil target.  In summary, the average soil 
P targets were: 
• Crop: 17.1 mg P/kg   Range: 15 to 30mg P/kg 
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• Sheep and beef pastures: 16.35mg P/kg Range:7 to 23 mg P/kg 
• Dairy pastures: 25.8 mg P/kg  Range:20 to 35 mg P/kg 
• Overall Range 7 to 35mg P/kg 
 
Information on the precise month of fertiliser application was also collected but with mixed 
results. Some landholders indicated specific months but others either had the fertiliser spread 
during several months or at some stage during autumn or winter. The cropping landholders were 
able to be more precise about timing because the fertiliser is applied with the crop.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 Soil Test Targets and Month of Application 
 
 
Target 
Soil  
Olsen P 
% at 
target Month of application 
Application reflects 
target 
1 15 0 P - Feb to May   Hay - Oct Yes 
2   85 P- Feb to May C – Apr to Jun maintenance 
3      Autumn   
4 12 to 15 75 P - April C - May to Jul maintenance 
5         
6       No. spread lime also 
7     C – Apr to Jun   
8 16-20 100 C - Jun Yes 
9       Yes 
10         
11         
12         
13 12 to 15 35 P – Apr to May, C – May to Jun Yes 
14 20 80 C – May to Jun Yes 
15     Autumn   
16 15 75 P - Apr Fodder C -Sept maintenance 
17 15 80 P-Mar  C-May No 
18 12 80 P - Mar and Aug Yes 
19 18 100 P - Mar C- May and Sept Yes 
20 14 to18 20 P- Mar Yes 
21     P - Autumn Hay - Spring   
22 15-18 100 P - Autumn   
23 15-18 80 P – Autumn C-Apr to Jun Yes 
24 20-30 80 
 P and Hay – Autumn  
C –Apr to Jun Yes 
25 15-20 0 P - April Yes 
26 15 0 P - April and Sept  C - May No 
27 20 80 P- Mar to Apr Yes 
28     Autumn, Winter Spring   
29 22   Autumn Yes 
30 7 to 15 100 P Mar C-Apr Yes 
31 25-30 35 P - May to June Yes 
32 23 100 P - Sept Oct Nov Y -maintenance 
33 >20 80 P - March Yes 
34 25-35 100 P – Feb to Apr C - Aug to Sept No 
35 20-35 80 P-Mar C-Aug Yes 
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The term ‘maintenance’ implies that the landholder is applying the amount of phosphorus that is 
removed from the paddock through production, thus maintaining the soil phosphorus levels. 
A summary of the months in which fertiliser is spread is shown in Table 6.7. 
Month Pasture Crop 
February 2  
March 11  
April 19 3 
May 13 12 
June 3 11 
July  2 
August 1 3 
September 3 4 
October 2  
November 1  
Table 6.7 Summary of Fertiliser Application Months (Number of Landholders) 
 
Survey results indicated that 15% of landholders had fenced up to 25% of their waterways, 15% 
of landholders had fenced between 25 and 50% of their waterways, 20% of landholders had 
fenced 50 to 75% of their waterways, 25% of landholders had fenced  75 to 99% of their 
waterways, and  25% of landholders had creeks fenced 100% of their waterways. 
 
The survey indicated that 25% of landholders had waterways fenced at a distance of  <10m 
from the water; 50% had waterways fenced at a distance of 10-20m from the water; 10% had 
waterways fenced at a distance of 21-50m from the water and 5% of landholders had waterways 
fenced at a distance of more than 50m from the water. 35% felt that there had been an 
improvement in water quality whereas 47% had not observed an improvement in water quality.  
 
Landholders indicated that local attitudes to environmental work were 35% positive while 45% 
had a varied response, mainly due to share of cost, time and responsibility. Land class 
management, where land of different soil types and vulnerability to erosion has been fenced 
separately for management purposes, has been undertaken by 60% of landholders. Although the 
farmers indicate a high level of environmentally sensitive farm management, 54% of were not 
currently in a Landcare group. 
6.3.1 Survey 2 Discussion 
 
The soil test targets for most enterprises undertaken by the participants are the same as those 
suggested by the DPI: 
• Cereal Crops: 13.5-15.5 kg P/ha 
• Canola Crop: 17.5 kg P/ha (this is dependent on tons/ha targeted to be harvested), 
•  Pastures: 10-20 kg P/ha (this is dependent on the d.s.e.).  
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The range 7-35 kg/ha goes higher than would be recommended by the DPI for pasture (plant) 
production targets (Figure 4.3) particularly for dairy. From this it may be concluded that the DPI 
information on a levelling out of gross margins in relation to ever increasing P input is not 
necessarily being adopted by the farmers, ie some landholders are still targeting soil P levels at a 
higher rate than is necessary. Dairy producers tended to have a higher level range. (Refer to 
Sections 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.3 for an explanation of the basis of DPI recommendations). The 
landholders indicated that 70.25% of soils were at target. However, only six of the 23 
responding properties (26%) had their soil P at the required level; the other properties are still 
working towards their target. 
 
Most farmers did not vary the fertiliser amount from paddock to paddock.  However, on some 
farms individual paddocks were targeted for a higher rate if the pastures were of better quality 
and likely to produce more, and some paddocks were targeted to increase baseline P levels to 
bring production up to increase economic viability. Many cropping properties adjusted fertiliser 
according to leaf analysis during the growing season. 
 
Timing of fertiliser application was based primarily on climate factors, then according to 
availability of contractor and budget. Pastures were predominantly fertilised in March to May 
and crops in May and June, at the time of sowing, fertiliser being applied in the conjunction 
with the seed. Rainfall averages per month for a property in the middle of the catchment (Figure 
6.9) show January to March as relatively dry with >50 mm rainfall per month from April to 
November. When compared to the months in which fertiliser is spread there is significant 
overlap in these higher rainfall months.                  
              
     
Figure 6.9 Average Rainfall at ‘Goodwood’ Caramut 
 
Crops are fertilised at sowing (using a combine machine) hence fertiliser application occurs 
after the autumn break from April to September, the specific time depending on the acreage 
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being sown, time management and crop selection. This will impact on the flexibility of 
adjusting fertiliser application timing for cropping enterprises. 
 
Responses to the questions regarding fencing of creeks, land class fencing and membership in a 
Landcare group all indicated active participation in activities leading to improved environmental 
outcomes. There was considerable variation in answers, with 70% of participants having half  
their waterways already fenced, yet only 15% are fenced at the distance at which the GHCMA 
would prefer.  The desired outcome, ie improved water quality was apparent to only 37% of 
those that responded (although this is most likely a visual appraisal and not scientifically tested). 
Membership of landcare is not necessarily a sound parameter when judging likely 
environmental action as the dynamics of landcare groups have changed in the 15 years since 
their inception and environmental funding is not tied to membership as it was in the 1990s. 
Results showed a 55% indication of a positive attitude towards environmental action and land 
class management had been undertaken by more than half the participants. 
6.4 Survey 3 results 
 
The objective of Survey 3 was to collate responses from the farmers regarding the 
recommendations calculated by the Game Theory model for their individual farm and the 
impact of the doubling of fertiliser prices in 2008 on the farmer’s management decision (this 
would be equivalent to imposing additional tax on fertiliser input). Survey 3 was undertaken as 
a person to person interview rather than the planned group demonstration and discussion. The 
responses are presented in Tables 6.8 and 6.9.  
 
In summary, from Table 6.8, six landholders were recommended to raise their phosphorus 
amount applied levels. Of these, two recommendations were to raise the amount applied to 
crops, four to raise application amounts on prime lamb pastures and three to raise the 
application amounts on wool pastures.  
 
Four landholders were recommended to lower the amount of phosphorus applied. Of these, two 
were to lower the amount applied to crops, five to lower application amounts on prime lamb 
pastures and four to lower the application amounts on wool pastures. 
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Farm Does high river P 
levels alter  your 
decision making 
Current 
use 
Pareto 
Recom-
mendation 
Predicted Production Response Would you follow  the suggested 
recommendation 
2 I will review placement 
of P.  
Creeks already fenced. 
13.9 11.21 (w) 
12.8 (pl) 
14.38 (c) 
Increased if raised, reduced if 
lowered. 
Cropping would be fine, not likely to reduce P 
on pastures due to decrease in soil P and 
production over time.  
17 Possibly. Current soil P 
levels at 9-10 would 
like to increase them. 
15.11(g) 13.0 (w) 
14.85 (pl) 
I would not reach my target soil P 
levels for a long time. 
Price of P will already reduce P amount put out. 
I will look at alternatives. 
18 No 7.76 13  No- because the native pasture would be 
destroyed. 
19 No- creeks are already 
fenced 
18.96 14.85 Would go backwards in production. Already reduced due to price. 
20 Possibly 18.2 13 (w) 
14.85 (pl) 
Down over time. Would look at alternative sources of P . 
21 Already putting out 
lower level 
10.7 12.12 (w) 
13.82 (pl) 
Raising P may increase production. We put out according to soil tests and DPI 
recommendation. Sandy soils need P each year. 
22 Possibly – but creeks 
already fenced at 100m 
13.65 12.11 Down due to rundown in base soil P. No- we feel more comfortable using soil tests to 
calculate the P input. 
23 Possibly 18.2(g) 
21.0(c) 
13.82 (pl) 
15.51 (c) 
Depends on other limiting factors. Have reduced P input as crops were not yielding 
as predicted- not limiting factor. 
24 Not answered 13.65(g) 
 
27.38 (c) 
12.11 (w) 
13.82 (pl) 
15.51 (c) 
Probably drop back after a few years. Maintain Crop and lamb because prices are good 
for these commodities. May change commodity 
mix. 
25 Not answered 10(g) 12.11 (w) Production should go up, depends on 
other limiting factors. 
Better to put out some every year than putting 
out a lot in one year only. 
28 Already putting on a 
low amount. 
7.55(g) 
 
12.29(c) 
12.29 (w) 
14.03 (pl) 
15.66 (c) 
Increased if all other nutrients OK. Only if budget would allow.  
c – crop; w  – wool; pl  – prime lamb; g – grazing 
Table 6.8 Response of Landholders to the Pareto Optimum Recommendations 
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Farm Impact of fertiliser hike? Alter timing of 
fertiliser 
application 
Alter amount of 
fertiliser applied 
Alter the mix of 
enterprises 
Alter the mix of crops to be 
grown 
2 Nil No Not on crops No No –in rotation 
17 Cut back to $ amount ~ 
13kg P/ha applied 
No 2/3 P amount compared 
with normal 
No N/A 
19 Reduced fertiliser this year 
to same $ amount 
2 weeks later 2/3 of amount Put in extra paddock of 
crop 
No 
18 Nil No No No N/A 
20 Reduced amount. More soil 
testing 
No Amount reduced by 1/3 
but soil tests indicate 
that it is OK. 
Yes - some red wheat 
planted in 1 of 10 
paddocks 
Yes – but on regular annual basis 
21 It was a shock, but it is 
necessary for production 
No No – we use soil tests No  N/A 
22 Use of guano instead of  
super-phosphate 
Ordered early to 
reduce impact as 
much as possible 
No 
Not  kg P /ha Yes –stud only 
retained, rest leased out 
for cropping 
Canola’s potential income will be 
higher than other crops 
23 Huge impact on budget Will reduce 
amount until 
impact felt. 
Already decided to 
reduce it 
No No. Regular rotation undertaken 
24 Purchased early. Used more 
single super and less MAP 
on crop 
Ordered early so 
price rise not too 
bad 
More single super, less 
MAP 
Yes- slightly more 
crop, and prime lambs 
No 
25 Put out potash/super 4:1- 
slightly reduced P 
Ordered early so 
price rise not too 
bad 
2 months earlier due to 
availability 
No No 
28 Same $ but less P in kg/ha No Crop - changed to 
single super and 
reduced MAP 
More crops and prime 
lamb  
No. Rotation system on cropping 
  
Table 6.9 Response of Landholders to the Sudden Increase in Fertiliser Costs
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When asked to predict the production response if phosphorus input was raised, the landholders 
replies were as expected, ie production would increase. Conversely landholders anticipated that 
production would eventually decline if the phosphorus application was lowered, the speed of it 
depending on the soil type. The DPI extension information on the effect of phosphorus on 
production had been disseminated widely to these groups of landholders. This will be discussed 
in more detail in Section 8.3.3. The response to knowing that the river levels of phosphorus 
were high was generally in terms of fencing out waterways to reduce the problem, although one 
landholder did suggest that he would review the placement of the fertiliser more carefully. The 
planned actions were based in the extension work undertaken by the DPI and CMA over the 
past decade. 
 
The responses of landholders to the recommendations can be summarized as follows: 
• Landholders recommended to raise the amount of phosphorus applied to crops could 
see the benefit of doing so but felt that they may be limited by their budget. 
• Landholders recommended to raise the amount of phosphorus applied to their prime 
lamb pastures could see the benefit of doing so if the budget allowed. One producer 
however has native pastures which do not respond in the same way as improved pasture 
and he would not be increasing phosphorus levels. 
• Landholders recommended to raise the amount of phosphorus applied to wool pastures 
could see the benefit of doing so if other nutrients were not limiting in the system and if 
their budgets allowed it.  
• Landholders recommended to lower the amount of phosphorus applied to crops felt that 
while crop prices were good, they should continue to apply the same levels of 
phosphorus in order to maintain production levels, budgets permitting. As the 
information from Survey 1 reveals, many landholders had not calculated the financial 
benefit of fertiliser on a per kg basis and still held the belief that more fertiliser equals 
more production.  
 
Table 6.9 summarises the responses to questions regarding rising costs of fertiliser. The rising 
cost of fertiliser, particularly MAP and DAP, encouraged some landholders to look at 
alternatives i.e. using single super in autumn followed up with reduced amounts of MAP or 
DAP at sowing time and using of guano instead of super. One crop producer indicated that they 
had already lowered P input as they were not getting production at predicted levels and 
considered there may be other limiting factors (such as declining rainfall or other nutrients). The 
landholder indicated that they would be examining the possibility of alternatives and 
undertaking more soil testing and strip tests for potassium and trace elements. 
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Landholders recommended to lower the amount of phosphorus applied to prime lamb pastures 
had similar responses. The rise in phosphorus prices in the past year has reduced the ability to 
apply high phosphorus amounts and has inspired some producers to seek alternatives. 
Landholders recommended to lower the amount of phosphorus applied to wool pastures 
indicated that they are seeking alternatives and may reduce the size of the wool enterprise until 
the commodity shows an increase in profitability.  
 
Due to the large increase in the cost of fertiliser, landholders are looking more closely at their 
operations with several seeking alternative sources of phosphorus or adjusting management 
practices to try to minimise the impact. Landholders who are cropping are hoping that grain 
prices will be maintained at high levels so they can recover the additional input cost. Many were 
caught with forward sold grain during the drought year (2006) and made large financial losses 
so they are nervous of forward selling too much of their crop the following year as rain patterns 
continue to be difficult. Prime lamb prices are considered higher than during the first year of the 
project and several landholders have increased this enterprise in relation to wool sheep. A 
number of landholders have reduced their fertiliser input this year in the hope that the cost of 
fertiliser will return to a more normal level soon and they can continue applying fertiliser to 
replace nutrients which leave the farm in product. The landholders implied that they would 
assess the situation as the year progresses. Australian farmers, being price takers, are not able to 
pass costs on to the consumer and are therefore more likely to adjust their enterprise mix 
slightly, to take advantage of commodities that are performing better than others. Fertiliser is 
one of the last cost inputs to be reduced by high producing farmers as it is recognised that to 
maintain production, fertiliser is necessary to replace nutrients. 
6.4.1 Survey 3: Discussion 
 
The time between the initial survey and the final survey had been extended due to delays in the 
return of the calculations so it was decided to interview only 10 to 15 participants to gauge their 
response to the recommendations of fertiliser amounts, as calculated by the Game Theory 
model. The cost of fertiliser had increased considerably within this time and the drought had 
had a severe impact on the region and on people’s budgets. The delay may also have had an 
effect on the confidence of the participants in the information presented to them. Trust is a 
major factor in research and extension acceptance as described in Melland et al, (2005) and 
Petheram et al, (2000). 
 
The reaction of landholders was cautious because the model had only been calculated with one 
parameter, the amount of P being varied. The landholders appreciated the economic sense in 
reducing phosphorus input based on cost to the environment but feel that over the long term 
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there would be a reduction to soil P levels and ultimately a reduction in production. Their 
understanding of soil P levels and the need for maintenance amounts of phosphorus being 
applied annually to preserve productivity was reflected in the answers to the predicted 
production response over time, ie to raising or lowering phosphorus application amounts.  
 
Haygarth and Jarvis (2002) have indicated that phosphorus input should not be taken in 
isolation when attempting to reduce nutrient pollution. 
 
 The popular wisdom has been that reducing the inputs to a farm will reduce water 
problems…… In the practical sense, it is easy to understand why reducing fertilisers inputs 
is thought to be a more effective mitigation strategy than, for example, controlling irrigation 
water flow on to and over the soil.  However while this may be appropriate for some issues 
(N for example) a concern is that in other instances, such source control wisdom may exist 
because it is convenient, rather than because of any objective scientific evaluation. A large 
source may not necessarily equate to a high impact, especially if issues of scale and 
connectivity are taken into consideration (Haygarth and Jarvis, 2002). 
 
Questions were added regarding the response to the high increase in fertiliser costs in the past 
year, in order to gauge the response of landholders to an increase in costs as if a tax had been 
imposed on fertiliser costs. Cochard et al (2005) and Romstad (2003) discussed the use of input 
tax and ambient tax on regulating pollution and found that both are very effective at reducing 
pollution outputs. However, Romstad (2003) suggested that it does not show up in reduced NPS 
pollution immediately.  The response of the landholders was in keeping with these findings, ie 
to reduce the amount of fertiliser (30% of landholders chose this), monitor more closely the 
amount and application of fertilisers (20%), monitor the enterprise mix for more efficient use of 
fertiliser inputs (50%) and to look at alternative sources of fertilisers (20%). The efficiency of 
the enterprise management will impact on the gross margins and the ultimate sustainability of 
the farming operation. 
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Chapter 7: Game Theory Model Design 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Game theory, which is used extensively in such diverse areas asnatural science, economics and 
social/political sciences, was developed early in the last century to provide models of how 
groups of human beings/organisations interact and make decisions in a risky competitive 
environment. 
 
As described in Chapter 3, games are broadly divided into three classes: 
• Non-cooperative: players are antagonistic. The main objective is to find the most 
favourable strategies which players can use to optimise one or more utility functions. 
• Cooperative: players are able to form coalitions and utilities are transferable between 
the members. The main objective here is to understand how cooperation could lead to 
better distribution of benefits to all players. 
• A mixed motive games (variable sum games): the players objectives are partly opposed 
and partly in agreement and the sum of the payoffs differs from strategy to strategy.  
 
This research project can best be described by the prisoner’s dilemma game, explained in 
Section 3.7, where the cooperative Pareto position is taken in a non-cooperative game. The 
problem will be considered from both the non-cooperative and cooperative perspective drawing 
a comparison from the different recommendations of phosphorus amounts calculated for the 
farmers to apply. Collaboration between the players can lead to greater payoffs for each agent. 
 
The focus of the study is NPS pollution of waterways created from application of phosphorus in 
agricultural production. Xepapadeas (1999) and Cochard et al, (2005) suggested that the chief 
characteristic of NPS pollution is the inability of regulators to observe emissions by individual 
dischargers, leading to games where there is an asymmetric pattern of information. The 
regulators can only observe the ambient concentration of the pollutants without being able to 
detect the sources of these emissions with full certainty. The aggregate pollution will also affect 
the polluters themselves, directly or indirectly, so it is important that some measure of 
cooperation is achieved between the dischargers of the pollutant. 
 
By using actual farmer data this research effectively enables the calculation of a cost benefit 
analysis of agricultural production for three different enterprises, when the economic cost to the 
environment is taken into account. 
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Figure 7.1 Schematic Representation of the Research Game Undertaken in the  
 Hopkins Catchment 
 
Figure 7.1 gives a schematic representation of the research game. Box a describes the Nash 
Equilibrium where each player maximises his own payoff but the effect on the environment is 
detrimental. Box d gives the cooperative Pareto Optimum which modifies the effect on the 
environment but still enables the player to make a profit. Boxes b and c give the Pareto 
positions where one player does the right thing by the environment but the other player 
maximises his profit with no regard for the environment (a freeloader situation). 
 
The initial survey described fertiliser application data of several groups of farmers in the 
Hopkins catchment. The farmers were clustered according to production enterprise. Production 
costs and income were available through the SWFMP for several separate enterprises (wool, 
prime lamb, beef, canola, wheat and oats) although an average for the grain crops was chosen as 
there was no information on breakdown of crop enterprises for the individual farmers involved. 
Due to the low numbers of beef and dairy enterprises, they were not considered in this work. 
 
 Strategy  1 
High Fert 
Strategy  2 
Mod Fert 
Strategy  1 
High Fert 
 
$A, $A 
 
$A, $B 
Strategy  2 
Mod Fert 
 
$B, $A 
 
$B, $B 
 Strategy  1 
High Fert 
Strategy  2 
Mod Fert 
Strategy  1 
High Fert 
 
-$C, -$C 
 
-$C, -$D 
Strategy  2 
Mod Fert 
 
-$D, -$C 
 
-$D, -$D 
  Strategy  1 
High Fert 
Strategy  2 
Mod Fert 
Strategy  1 
High Fert 
a 
$A-C, $A-C 
b 
$A-C, $B-D 
Strategy  2 
Mod Fert 
c 
$B-D, $A-C 
d 
$B-D, $B-D 
Production Profit Cost to Environment 
Production and Cost to Environment 
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7.2 Model Description Game Theory  
 
Formulation of the Game Theory model was undertaken by Prof Panlop Zephongsekul, Dr 
Sergei Schreider and Matthew Fernandes from RMIT University.  A full description of the 
model is given in Appendix 4. Effectively the model depicts a cost benefit analysis of a farming 
system (with single or multiple enterprises) including the parameters found to affect  the impact 
of phosphorus on the environment. 
 
The model was designed to explore the strategies of varying the ‘amount’ and the ‘timing’ of 
phosphorus application. Initially, three types of ‘crops’ were accounted for:  prime lambs, wool 
sheep and cereal crops, though in the future other enterprises could be studied. Data was 
collected for dairy and beef in this catchment, however the data sets were very small and  
inadequate to represent the enterprises as a whole. 
 
In Chapter 3 the current research was described by the ‘prisoner’s dilemma game’ which in the 
taxonomy chart falls into the category of multi player, mixed motive (where both player’s 
objectives are partly opposed and partly in agreement), no optimal equilibrium point (the Nash 
strategy is dominant at the one and only equilibrium point (NEP)) but this payoff is worse for 
both players than the alternative strategy (martyrdom).  
 
Kelly (2003) has shown that a mixed motive multi-person games, with n players, is a game such 
that  
- Each player iP  has a finite set of strategies iS   
- Each player iP  has a payoff utility function u 
- Each player chooses a strategy S and receives a payoff  u 
 
In order to describe a game, the various sets of strategies 321 SSS … nS  need to be known, as do 
the pay-off functions nuuuu ...321 . Each player’s payoff is a function of all n strategies and not 
just the player’s own. 
 
In the model currently developed, the system was defined initially as a ‘static, multi player, non-
cooperative game’. The cooperative Pareto Optimum was then considered. Appendix 4 contains 
details of this.  
 
The Players: 
 
In the Hopkins project, each farmer household is represented as a player. iP  
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The Strategies: 
 
The strategy set iS ,i=1,2,…,n, available to each player is made up of tuples: 
  iS ),....,,,...,( 212,1 RiiiRiii tttααα=  
R is the number of the enterprises and 
  =
r
iα  Amount of phosphorus used by P i  for crop r per unit of area 
  =
r
it  Scheduling of the application of phosphorus by P i for crop r  
    
 R = 1 = Wool R = 2 = Prime Lamb  R = 3 = Cereal crop. 
 
In the initial calculation of the model ‘time scheduling’ was not considered, therefore only the 
amount of phosphorus applied was calculated with resulting recommendations for optimisation 
according to Nash Equilibrium or Pareto Optimisations.  

The Payoff Function 
 
The payoff function will be measured by a profit function which has as its components the profit 
obtained from the farm production and the negative impact of environmental degradation 
calculated as an economic cost.  
 
The payoff function accrued by player iP if all players adopted the strategy profile 
    
  s i  =(( α 1 ,t1 ),( α 2 ,t 2 ),……( α n ,t n )) 
 
Can be expressed by 
  [ [ ] ririririiririririririrR
r
ri FAtWtqAtQpsu αααα −+= Υ−
Υ
=
∑
10
1
)(),()()(           (1) 
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j
r
j
r
j
r
j
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j
ij >−−−−∑
=
ααααβ  
      
Where 0≤ ijβ ≤ 1 are constants and I(A) refers to the indicator of the set A, i.e. I(A) = 1 if the 
event A has occurred, and equals to 0 otherwise. 
 
 
For each strategy ( iii St ∈),(α executed by iP , let: 
 
γ   = Cobb-Douglas constant 
),( ririri tq α  = proportion of phosphorus that is released into farmland devoted to crop r 
 1- ),( ririri tq α   = proportion of phosphorus that flow into the river system as a consequence 
   thereof 
 )( ritE     = (negative) environmental impact manifested as cost per unit application 
   of phosphorus  
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r
iA     = total quantity of land devoted to crop r by iP  
)( riri tW  = amount of water available at time rit  
)( rir tQ  = quantity of crop r produced per unit area per unit phosphorus Υ  per  
   unit of  water Υ−1  
rp      = price (revenue) obtained per unit of crop r sold 
0
iα              = base quantity of phosphorus in soil of user I per unit area 
F  = price per unit of phosphorus 
ijβ     = environmental influence indirectly induced by iP  by jP  
 L     = toxicity threshold level i.e. the amount of phosphorus in the river  
   systems above which there will be a negative environmental impact 

 
The Cobb-Douglas constant (γ) is a mathematical constant based on: 
 
 Output (γ) = ΥK  x   Υ−1L  x  A        (2) 
 
 Where K equals Capital; L equals Labour and A equals the Total Factor Productivity 
 
Υ
 and Υ−1  are output elasticity’s. 
 
Therefore it is an expression which describes the production output based on inputs and 
productivity. 
 
In the model γ was valued at 0.115 calibrated on DPI figures for production of wool (kg/ha/100 
mm rainfall), prime lamb (kg/ha/100 mm rainfall) and wheat/oats crop in (kg/ha/100 mm 
rainfall) (Schreider et al, 2008a). Figure 4.7 demonstrates the results of DPI research into gross 
margins of sheep production in relation to phosphorus application. 
 
Optimal Strategies 
 
Nash Equilibrium  
The Hopkins project as outlined above is an example of a non-zero sum, n-person game. 
Therefore, the competitive optimal solutions, if they exist, can be expressed as Nash 
Equilibrium Profiles (NEPs). A detailed description of this is provided in Appendix 4. 
 
Pareto Optimum 
 
The derivation of a Pareto optimum falls into the class of multi-objective decision problems 
where a vector valued function is optimised according to some vector optimisation criterion.  A 
Pareto optimum is obtainable only if players enter into a binding cooperative agreement. 






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7.2.1 Information Required for the Game Theory Model 
Information required for calculating the ‘Payoff Function’ includes: 
Production output and value 
- Area under production    -    Type of ‘crop’  
- Phosphorus kg/ha input  for each ‘crop’ -    Quantity of ‘crop’ produced  
- Amount of water available (rainfall)  -    Revenue per unit of crop  
- Base soil phosphorus    -    Price of phosphorus 
- %  phosphorus absorbed by the crop   -     % runoff 
Cost factors 
- Phosphorus kg/ha input    -    Price of phosphorus 
- Cost per unit of application of P  -    Cost to the environment/unit of P 
- % phosphorus not absorbed by the crop (runoff)  
- Toxicity threshold of phosphorus in waterways 
Other constants 
- β Impact of external properties on the player’s property and vice versa  
- γ Cobb - Douglas constant 
7.2.2 Parameters of Game Theory Model 
The key requirement of the model developed is that all parameters included in the model should 
be measurable, thereby allowing appropriate data to be collected. Unfortunately, this 
requirement was not satisfied for all parameters and some of their values were estimated by trial 
and error or taken from external sources. 
 
Some important parameters of the model were assigned to their numerical values based on the 
analysis of the literature review of research works implemented in the region, the value of the 
environmental impact constant (E), and outside the region (absorption constants q). Some of the 
parameters were immeasurable and were treated as free parameters of the model (for instance, 
the value of β and γ, characterising the spatial proximity of the players and the Cobb-Douglas 
constant respectively). These parameters were treated as values to be calibrated as discussed in 
Section 7.2 and Appendix 4. 
 
The initial survey collected data in August/September 2006 with a second survey in June 2007. 
A group of dairy farmers was surveyed at the same time with a combination of the questions. 
Data was based on phosphorus application in 2006. The data collected from the survey and used 
in the game theory model included fertiliser amount (α), crop type (r), area ( )riA , rainfall 
( )riW   and application timing (t). 
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Mapping data provided back-up data on soil type, rainfall, elevation and proximity of properties 
to each other. Toxicity threshold, L, was to be taken from the EPA target level for the region 
(0.325mg/L), but it was adjusted to zero because it was felt that any ‘runoff’ was considered 
undesirable due to the current poor state of the rivers. 
 
The proportion of phosphorus that is released into farmland devoted to crop r: ),( ririri tq α  and 
the percentage  runoff ( ),(1 ririri tq α− ) was initially calculated from previous research 
indicating expected phosphorus runoff from different soil and land use types and gave a value of  
q = 0.971(collaborated data in Schreider et al, (2008a). An alternative percentage runoff was 
calculated based on Read et al (1999). This gave a value of q = 0.985.  
 
The cost to the environment E( )rit is calculated as the negative impact on economic production 
using figures obtained from Read et al, (1999).  Schreider et al, (2008a) used the cost to the 
whole of the Glenelg Hopkins catchment divided by the phosphorus load in the regional 
catchment rivers to give a cost /kg, given as  
  
   E = $1,820,807 per an =$6.87/kg    (3) 
              265,194 kg per an      
 
The base quantity of phosphorus in the soil )( 0iα  has been initially set at zero. 
 
The economic data for cost of inputs and outputs for production of the enterprises undertaken 
within the catchment were calculated from the data collected annually by the SWFMP, in the 
same financial year (See Section 4.3.2.1). The three crops initially calculated in the model are 
wool (r = 1), prime lamb (r = 2) and cereal cropping (r = 3). Prices used for these commodities 
were: 
• p = $7.78/kg wool; 
•  p = $3.03/kg carcass weight prime lamb; 
•  p = $0.16/kg grain. 
 
The price of phosphorus, F = $4.20/kg was also calculated from the SWFMP report based on an 
average annual cost of $42/ha for fertiliser inputs and an average application rate of 10kg P/ha 
(Department of Primary Industries, 2006b).  
 
The data collected from the farmers in this survey can be compared to the South West Farm 
Monitor Project data for verification, to determine the ‘benefit to cost’ for each enterprise 
without taking the environment into account, and to determine where in the commodity cycle 
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each commodity lies. This will have some impact on theresults from the game theory 
calculations and may explain why the use of phosphorus on one particular enterprise is seen as 
more beneficial for this given year. 
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Chapter 8: Game Theory Model Results 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In this Chapter the results and interpretation of an initial calculation of the Game Theory model 
of phosphorus fertiliser use in the Hopkins River catchment are given. The model has been 
developed using actual data from the survey undertaken in 2006 and represents figures from 
only one year however, the modelling demonstrates that the cooperative Pareto Optimum values 
(i.e. those produced when players choose to cooperate in their strategy of P fertiliser 
application) produce a savings in comparison to the Nash Equilibrium (NEP) values, supporting 
the choice of this model.  
 
Two sets of result data have been presented, one based on runoff expectations from past 
research data calculated on soil types ie adsorption of 0.971 implying runoff of 2.9 % and the 
other based on data from the Glenelg Hopkins catchments that Read et al. used in their report of 
1999. This was calculated from the actual amount of phosphorus that was found in the river 
systems and the hectares in the catchment. This was equivalent to 1.5% runoff. 
 
Table 8.1 gives the Nash and Pareto values for production profit and cost to the environment. 
The total revenues of the landholders are always larger in the case of the competitive Nash 
solutions than in the Pareto optimums.  The model used is described in Chapter 7 and  
Appendix 4. 
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8.2 Game Theory Model Results  
   
Table 8.1 Values of Production and Environmental Costs for Nash and Pareto Optimum 
   
The ‘production’ outcome minus the ‘environmental cost’ outcome from the Nash Equilibrium 
equation gives the total (Nash) utility as shown in Table 8.2. Likewise, the production outcome 
minus the environmental cost outcome from the Pareto Optimum equation gives the total 
(Pareto) utility. Expressed in another way, the utility is the ‘payoff’ to the player for undertaking 
the strategy. 
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125541.48 125525.43 1170.45 1134.6  125777.69 125773.23 701.83 690.71 
1096136.64 1096111.42 2844.71 2814.11  1096687.01 1096675.18 2122.09 2109.21 
470463.99 470457.72 1727.21 1720.17  470868.58 470866.2 1166.64 1164.01 
330437.28 330432.42 1658.85 1653.48  330936.69 330935.2 962.99 961.32 
435370.28 435367.6 1665.66 1662.66  435774.8 435773.81 1107.06 1105.97 
577271.65 557264.8 2332.92 2325.5  577883.45 577881.05 1491.28 1488.69 
164504.09 164502.05 659.99 656.91  164619.54 164618.69 461.28 460.1 
204191.05 204190.48 512.9 509.49  204191.05 204190.48 469.03 467.51 
568686.93 568681.32 1811.37 1804.6  569017.42 569014.92 1333.33 1330.47 
196094.92 196094.322 665.02 664.04  196214.37 196214.06 487.64 487.24 
479241.54 479237.15 1797.7 1792.91  479670.87 479669.22 1203.01 1201.23 
285232.05 285230.22 919.5 916.94  285384.18 285383.34 690.58 689.5 
505174.54 505172.64 1662.63 1660.22  505497.87 505497.05 1211.4 1210.41 
444043.84 440034.34 1932.94 1922.86  440585.41 440582.28 1192.31 1188.96 
39176.78 39176.45 234.28 232.02  39198.17 39198.01 165.03 164.24 
45555.15 45551.94 625.08 613.53  45642.76 45641.86 343.9 340.5 
586762.37 586728.22 2817.95 2782.6  587852.28 587842.61 1515.52 1505.41 
1118133.82 118119.28 911.67 885.17  118356.49 118352.45 505.04 497.27 
99376.59 99362.29 906.7 880.07  99562.4 99558.44 502.22 494.42 
113894.4 113879.85 888.24 862.12  114108.7 114104.66 492.54 484.88 
404180.98 404119.49 1504.99 1450.42  404934.27 404917.25 886.38 869.25 
130452.63 130441.86 1047.83 1025.26  130702.37 130699.37 611.42 604.2 
986512.16 986464.17 2203.55 2150.67  987082.15 987061.18 1503.99 1483.85 
374517.01 374479.5 1737.89 1692.97  374991.35 374979.42 1136.58 1120.54 
170601.5 170577.82 1270.91 1226.27  170921.12 170914.56 736.66 723.06 
242113.3 242086.93 1112.32 1078.18  242412.02 242403.59 632.23 622.17 
165067.95 165043.25 1724.95 1660.92  165375.89 165369.06 1007.39 987.61 
165309.97 165294.34 1048.2 1014.49  165543.54 165538.75 612.58 602.17 
503763.91 503722.71 1571.77 1512.62  504208.11 504193.08 890.75 873.12 
83452.31 83442.66 1148.68 1116.26  83610.06 83607.38 692.38 681.91 
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q=0.971 
    
q=0.982 
  
  
Nash 
Utility 
Pareto 
Utility 
Pareto-
Nash 1-βii  
Nash 
Utility 
Pareto 
Utility 
Pareto-
Nash 
1 124371.03 124390.84 19.81 0.59  125075.86 125082.51 6.66 
2 1093291 1093297.31 5.38 0.24  1094564.9 1094565.97 1.04 
3 468736.78 468737.54 0.76 0.09  469701.94 469702.18 0.25 
4 328778.42 328778.95 0.52 0.06  329973.7 329973.88 0.18 
5 433704.61 443704.93 0.32 0.04  434667.74 434667.85 0.11 
6 574938.73 574939.3 0.58 0.07  576392.17 576392.35 0.19 
7 163844.1 163845.14 1.04 0.1  164158.25 164158.59 0.34 
8 203678.15 203680.98 2.83 0.08  203722.03 203722.97 0.94 
9 566875.56 566876.72 1.16 0.09  567684.09 567684.44 0.36 
10 195429.9 195430.19 0.29 0.03  195726.73 195726.82 0.1 
11 477443.84 477444.24 0.4 0.06  478467.86 478467.99 0.13 
12 284312.54 284313.28 0.73 0.06  284693.6 284693.84 0.24 
13 503511.92 503512.42 0.5 0.03  504286.47 504286.63 0.16 
14 438110.9 438111.48 0.58 0.11  439393.1 439393.32 0.22 
15 38942.5 38944.43 1.93 0.08  39033.13 39033.77 0.64 
16 44930.07 44938.41 8.34 0.27  45298.86 45301.36 2.5 
17 583944.43 583945.61 1.19 0.22  586336.76 586337.2 0.44 
18 117222.15 117234.11 11.96 0.56  117851.45 117855.18 3.73 
19 98469.89 98482.21 13.32 0.74  99060.18 99064.02 3.84 
20 113006.16 113017.73 11.57 0.59  113616.16 113619.78 3.62 
21 402675.99 402669.07 -6.92 0.88  404047.91 404048 0.09 
22 129404.81 129416.61 11.8 0.32  130090.95 130095.16 4.21 
23 984308.61 984313.5 4.89 0.56  985578.16 985577.33 -0.82 
24 372779.12 372786.54 7.42 0.7  373854.76 373858.89 4.12 
25 169330.6 169351.55 20.95 0.69  170184.47 170191.5 7.03 
26 241000.98 241008.75 7.77 0.98  241779.79 241781.43 1.64 
27 163342.99 163382.33 39.34 0.82  164368.51 164381.45 12.94 
28 164261.76 164279.85 18.09 0.54  164930.96 164936.58 5.62 
29 502192.14 502210.09 17.94 0.87  503317.36 503319.96 2.61 
30 82303.63 82326.4 22.77 0.51  82917.68 82925.47 7.78 
 
Table 8.2 Utilities for Nash and Pareto Optimums and their Differences 
 
Table 8.2 displays the values of the utilities for players given that they adopt either the Nash 
Equilibrium or Pareto Optimum strategy. Twenty-nine out of 30utilities demonstrate that 
changing from competitive to cooperative strategies gives an increase in utility. The largest 
differences in players’ utilities are seen when constants iiβ−1 are closer to 1, which means that 
farmers located closer to each other have a great influence on other farmers and vice versa, thus 
the cooperation strategy will be more pronounced. The increase in utilities is because of an 
increase in the environmental component of the objective function.  
Game Theory Model Results 
128 
   
Table 8.3 Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum Solutions for Wool, Lamb and Cereal Crop 
in kg/ha γ = 0.115; (P retention) q = 0.971 
 
The recommendations for P application amount/ha are given in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 with the 
original phosphorus application amounts for comparison. The estimated P retention rate is 
varied (q) according to (Olness et al, 1980) q=0.971 or (Read et al, 1999) q=0.985.  
Zero in Table 8.3 and 8.4 imply that the enterprise is not undertaken. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 indicate 
that the amount of phosphorus recommended to be applied is consistently larger if the 
landholder were to use the competitive strategy compared with the cooperative strategy for all 
types of land use in the Hopkins catchment. 
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1 17.05 17.05 0 12.15 13.88 0  11.79 13.46 0 
2 13.9 13.9 13.9 11.05 12.62 14.44  10.91 12.46 14.38 
3 9.1 0 21.9 10.17 0 13.36  10.13 0 13.34 
4 10.5 10.5 21.9 10.95 12.5 14.4  10.91 12.46 14.25 
5 0 15.3 18.1 0 12.48 14.4  0 12.46 14.38 
6 13 0 31.28 10.95 0 13.37  10.91 0 14.38 
7 11.37 11.37 27.37 10.18 11.62 15.53  10.13 11.56 14.38 
8 0 0 13.14 0 0 13.36  0 0 13.34 
9 15 0 20 10.17 0 14.39  10.13 0 15.51 
10 5.16 5.16 11.81 10.93 12.48 14.4  10.91 12.46 13.34 
11 17.91 17.91 17.91 10.95 12.5 13.36  10.91 12.46 14.38 
12 0 19.45 19.45 0 11.6 14.3  0 11.56 14.38 
13 14.76 14.76 30.27 10.93 12.48 14.41  10.91 12.46 13.34 
14 13.25 13.25 19.06 10.98 12.53 13.36  10.91 12.46 14.38 
15 4.55 4.55 10.9 10.17 0 13.29  10.13 0 14.38 
16 15.11 15.11 0 12.84 14.65 0  12.66 14.45 0 
17 7.76 0 0 12.81 0 0  12.66 0 0 
18 0 18.96 0 0 14.88 0  0 14.45 0 
19 13.96 13.96 0 13.16 15.02 0  12.66 14.45 0 
20 18.2 18.2 0 13.05 14.9 0  12.66 14.45 0 
21 10.7 10.7 0 12.34 14.09 0  11.79 13.46 0 
22 13.65 0 0 11.98 0 0  11.79 0 0 
23 0 18.2 21 0 13.85 15.67  0 13.46 15.51 
24 13.65 13.65 27.38 12.22 13.95 15.71  11.79 13.46 15.51 
25 10 0 0 12.21 0 0  11.79 0 0 
26 9.1 9.1 21.8 12.41 14.16 15.79  11.79 13.46 15.51 
27 16.22 16.22 0 12.3 14.05 0  11.79 13.46 0 
28 7.55 7.55 20.01 12.12 13.84 15.66  11.79 13.46 15.51 
29 0 70 7 0 14.08 15.76  0 13.46 15.51 
30 11.85 0 0 12.1 0 0  11.79 0 0 
Ave 12.22 16.53 19.69 11.63 13.43 14.47  11.40 13.13 14.51 
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1 17.05 17.05 0 12.3 14.05 0  12.11 13.82 0 
2 13.9 13.9 13.9 11.28 12.88 14.44  11.21 12.8 14.38 
3 9.1 0 21.9 10.43 0 13.36  10.4 0 13.34 
4 10.5 10.5 21.9 11.23 12.82 14.4  11.21 12.8 14.38 
5 0 15.3 18.1 0 12.81 14.39  0 12.8 14.38 
6 13 0 31.28 11.23 0 14.4  11.21 0 14.38 
7 11.37 11.37 27.37a 10.43e 11.91f 13.37b  10.4 11.88 13.34c 
8 0 0 13.14 0 0 15.53d  0 0 15.51 
9 15 0 20 10.43 0 13.36  10.4 0 13.34 
10 5.16 5.16 11.81 11.22 12.81 14.39  11.21 12.8 14.38 
11 17.91 17.91 17.91 11.23 12.82 14.4  11.21 12.8 14.38 
12 0 19.45 19.45 0 11.9 13.36  0 11.88 13.34 
13 14.76 14.76 30.27 11.22 12.81 14.39  11.21 12.8 14.38 
14 13.25 13.25 19.06 11.24 12.84 14.41  11.21 12.8 14.38 
15 4.55 4.55 10.9 10.42 0 13.36  10.4 0 13.34 
16 15.11 15.11 0 13.1 14.95 0  13 14.85 0 
17 7.76 0 0 13.08 0 0  13 0 0 
18 0 18.96 0 0 15.07 0  0 14.85 0 
19 13.96 13.96 0 13.27 15.15 0  13 14.85 0 
20 18.2 18.2 0 13.21 15.09 0  13 14.85 0 
21 10.7 10.7 0 12.4 14.16 0  12.11 13.82 0 
22 13.65 0 0 12.21 0 0  12.11 0 0 
23 0 18.2 21 0 14.03 15.67  0 13.82 15.51 
24 13.65 13.65 27.38 12.34 14.09 15.71  12.11 13.82 15.51 
25 10 0 0 12.34 0 0  12.11 0 0 
26 9.1 9.1 21.8 12.44 14.2 15.79  12.11 13.82 15.51 
27 16.22 16.22 0 12.38 14.14 0  12.11 13.82 0 
28 7.55 7.55 20.01 12.29 14.03 15.66  12.11 13.82 15.51 
29 0 7 7 0 14.15 15.76  0 13.82 15.51 
30 11.85 0 0 12.27 0 0  12.11 0 0 
Ave 12.22 13.53 19.69 11.83 13.65 14.53  11.71 13.49 14.46 
 
Table 8.4 Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum Solutions for Wool, Lamb and Cereal Crop 
in kg/ha γ = 0.115, q = 0.985 
 
In Table 8.4 the differences between a and b takes the gross margin for the commodity and cost 
to the environment into account. The differences between b and c are due to differences in 
competition versus cooperation modelling, and the differences between b and d are due to water 
input (rainfall). The difference between e and f recommendations, given that the current 
application was the same reflects the better gross margin of prime lamb compared with wool in 
this year (the gross margin for each commodity will vary with the economic cycles). 
Game Theory Model Results 
130 
 
In the Tables, some recommendations go up and some go down. This is due to the impact of 
water inputs (rainfall), commodity and position of the farm in relation to other players. Many 
cooperative Pareto Optimal solutions are similar whilst Nash Equilibrium solutions are not 
because of the independence in the Pareto model of the constants γ and β.  
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Figure 8.1: Comparative levels of P Recommendations for Crop Enterprise 
 (current – yellow, Nash – red, Pareto – blue) 
 
Figures 8.1 to 8.4 give a visual presentation of the information in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. In each 
figure the current fertiliser amount used is indicated with the Nash and Pareto recommendations 
beside it. It is possible for each farmer to observe quickly the need to reduce or increase the 
amount and by what proportion. 
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Figure 8.2. Comparative levels of P Recommendations for Prime Lamb Enterprise 
 (current – blue, Nash – pink, Pareto – yellow) 
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Figure 8.3 Comparative Levels of P Recommendations for Wool Enterprise: 
 (current - green, Nash - red, Pareto - yellow) 
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Nash 
Wool 
Nash 
PL 
Nash 
Crop 
Pareto 
Wool 
Pareto 
PL 
Pareto 
Crop 
1 4.9 3.17 0 5.26 3.59 0 
2 2.85 1.28 -0.54 2.99 1.44 -0.48 
3 -1.07 0 8.54 -1.03 0 8.56 
4 -0.45 -2 7.5 -0.41 -1.96 7.52 
5 0 2.82 3.71 0 2.84 3.72 
6 2.05 0 16.88 2.09 0 16.9 
7 1.2 -0.25 14.01 1.25 -0.19 14.03 
8 0 0 -2.39 0 0 -2.37 
9 4.83 0 6.64 4.87 0 6.66 
10 -5.77 -7.32 -2.46 -5.75 -7.3 -2.45 
11 6.96 5.41 3.51 7 5.45 3.53 
12 0 -11.6 6.09 0 -11.56 6.11 
13 3.83 2.28 15.88 3.85 2.3 15.89 
14 2.27 0.72 4.65 2.34 0.79 4.68 
15 -5.62 0 -2.46 -5.58 0 -2.44 
16 2.27 0.46 0 2.45 0.66 0 
17 -5.05 0 -16.73 -4.9 0 -16.66 
18 0 4.08 0 0 4.51 0 
19 0.8 -1.06 0 1.3 -0.49 0 
20 5.15 3.3 0 5.54 3.75 0 
21 -1.64 -3.39 0 -1.09 -2.76 0 
22 1.67 0 0 1.86 0 0 
23 0 4.35 5.33 0 4.74 5.49 
24 1.43 -0.3 11.67 1.86 0.19 11.87 
25 -2.21 0 0 -1.79 0 0 
26 -3.31 -5.06 6.01 -2.69 -4.36 6.29 
27 3.92 2.17 0 4.43 2.76 0 
28 -4.37 -6.09 4.35 -4.04 5.71 4.5 
29 0 -7.08 -8.76 0 -6.46 -8.51 
30 -0.25 0 0 0.06 0 0 
Excess P (kg/30 
farms) 2649 -1478 48073 4530 -101 48743 
Sum of excess P 
    49244     53163 
 
Table 8.5 Differences in Applied P, Nash and Pareto Solutions (kg/ha)  γ = 0.115 q=0.971 
 
While Tables 8.3 and 8.4 gave the recommended amounts of P for each individual landholder to 
apply per hectare, Tables 8.5 and 8.6 give the differences between the recommended application 
rates for Nash and Pareto solutions. Again the runoff value, q, is varied. This enabled the 
amount in kg/ha potentially saved and amount per farm when multiplied by the landholder’s 
area to be calculated. We are then able to calculate the potential saving of P fertiliser used by 
the 30 farmers if they were to follow the cooperative Pareto strategy can then be calculated. 
Positive values indicate too much fertiliser and negative values indicate too little fertiliser.  
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Nash 
Wool 
Nash 
PL 
Nash 
Crop 
Pareto 
Wool 
Pareto 
PL 
Pareto 
Crop 
1 4.75 3 0 4.94 3.23 0 
2 2.62 1.02 -0.54 2.69 1.1 -0.48 
3 -1.33 0 8.54 -1.3 0 8.56 
4 -0.73 -2.32 7.5 -0.71 -2.3 7.52 
5 0 2.49 3.71 0 2.5 3.72 
6 1.77 0 16.88 1.79 0 16.9 
7 0.94 -0.53 14.01 0.97 -0.5 14.03 
8 0 0 -2.39 0 0 -2.37 
9 4.57 0 6.64 4.6 0 6.66 
10 -6.06 -7.65 -2.46 -6.05 -7.46 -2.45 
11 6.68 5.09 3.51 6.7 5.11 3.53 
12 0 11.9 6.09 0 -11.88 6.11 
13 3.54 1.95 15.88 3.55 1.96 15.89 
14 2.01 0.41 4.65 2.04 0.45 4.68 
15 -5.87 0 -2.46 -5.85 0 -2.44 
16 2.01 0.16 0 2.11 0.26 0 
17 -5.32 0 -16.73 -5.24 0 -16.66 
18 0 3.89 0 0 4.11 0 
19 0.69 -1.19 0 0.96 -0.89 0 
20 4.99 3.11 0 5.2 3.35 0 
21 -1.7 -3.46 0 -1.41 -3.12 0 
22 1.44 0 0 1.54 0 0 
23 0 4.17 5.33 0 4.38 5.49 
24 1.31 -0.44 11.67 1.54 -0.17 11.87 
25 -2.34 0 0 -2.11 0 0 
26 -3.34 -5.1 6.01 -3.01 -4.72 6.29 
27 3.84 2.08 0 4.11 2.4 0 
28 -4.54 -6.28 4.35 -4.36 -6.07 4.5 
29 0 -7.15 -8.76 0 -6.82 -8.51 
30 -0.42 0 0 -0.26 0 0 
Excess P 
(kg) 813 -2442 48073 1820 -1705 48734 
Sum excess 
P 
    46444     48849 
 
Table 8.6 Differences in Applied P, Nash and Pareto Solutions (kg/ha) γ = 0.115  q = 0.985 
 
 Using Table 8.5, the model indicates that more fertiliser could have been spread on a third of 
all of the properties but according to the same basis too much was spread on the rest.  The 
cumulative value for each enterprise group is given under each column and the overall 
calculation is an excess of 49,244 kg P if the competitive strategy (Nash) is followed or 53,163 
kg P if the cooperative strategy (Pareto) is followed. The difference is a saving of 3,919 kg P. 
This means that the advantage of cooperation would save approximately 4 tons of P or 35.27 
tons of superphosphate for the 30 properties, an average of 1.175tons/property. Across1540 
properties this would equate to 1809.5 tons of superphosphate at a value of $844,200 (using the 
cost of superphosphate from the model). While this is only a small amount per property, it  
demonstrates that utilizing the model would achieve a significant reduction in phosphate costs.  
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The greatest saving would be to the farms with cropping enterprises. In this year the prime lamb 
pastures could have had more P applied. There appears to be no correlation between too little or 
too much fertiliser applied and the size of the property or the proportion of the enterprise. Table 
8.6 tells a similar story albeit with slightly smaller numbers due to a predicted smaller runoff 
percentage. 
 
Figures 8.4 (a) to (f) give a visual representation of the difference tables for Pareto and Nash 
solutions for each of the three enterprises. The larger the dot, the greater the variation from the 
recommended amount, the dark dots (negative) indicate under-fertiliser use and the pale dots 
(positive) indicate over-use of fertiliser. The amounts are measured in kg/ha. 
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Figure 8.4(a) Pareto Difference for Wool Enterprises (kg/ha) 
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Figure 8.4(b) Pareto Difference for Prime Lamb Enterprises (kg/ha) 
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Figure 8.4(c) Pareto Difference for Crop Enterprises (kg/ha) 
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Figure 8.4(d) Nash Difference for Prime Lamb Enterprises (kg/ha) 
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Figure 8.4(e) Nash Difference for Wool Enterprises (kg/ha) 
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Figure 8.4(f) Nash Difference for Crop Enterprises (kg/ha) 
8.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is carried out to determine how changes in the model parameters will affect 
the modelling and how sensitive the solution will be to these changes, ie how great the change 
will be. The analysis in this case generally shows only slight change in sensitivity in the 
solutions when there is change to the model parameter, with the exception of the Cobb-Douglas 
constant γ, which displays a much greater percentage change to the consequence than the 
increase in the parameter. 
• A 25% increase and decrease in γ resulted in a 46.0% increase and a 33.4% decrease 
respectively in the average difference in solutions. 
• A 25% increase and decrease in the environmental constant E resulted in a 23.1% 
increase and a 23.9% decrease respectively in the average difference.  
• A 25% increase and decrease in the ‘crop’ price vector p resulted in a 29.8% increase 
and a 27.8% decrease respectively in the average difference. 
• A 25% increase and decrease in the factor β gave a 27% increase and a 26% decrease 
respectively in the average difference. 
The sensitivity analysis is demonstrated in Figure 8.5. The difference in Nash and Pareto 
equilibrium solutions is linear with respect to percentage change in the parameters tested in the 
vicinities analyzed (+/- 50%) with the exception of γ. 
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Figure 8.5 Sensitivity Analysis of the Average Difference in Nash and Pareto Equilibrium 
Solutions 
 
In Section 7.2, a description was given of the calculation of the factor γ. This was based on the 
DPI research undertaken into gross margins for sheep enterprises in relation to phosphorus 
input. As γ is dependent on a production factor itself it is reasonable to assume that a doubling 
of the cost of an input will have a significant effect on the gross margin considering that the 
producers estimated that fertiliser is >10% of their input costs. For this reason it was decided to 
undertake an analysis of changes to average application solutions versus fertiliser costs for the 
three enterprises. Figure 8.6 presents the results of this analysis and while not linear they would 
indicate a solution that almost halves the amount of fertiliser recommended by the model if the 
price doubles. This supports the graph in Figure 4.7, ie that gross margin and fertiliser use is 
closely related. 
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Figure 8.6 Sensitivity of Nash and Pareto Equilibrium Solutions Subject to Fertiliser Costs 
 
The doubling of superphosphate and MAP prices did occur in 2008, with DAP tripling (DAP 
went from US $400-450 to $1200) (Troth J, 2008).  The answers given to the third survey 
indicate that some landholders do respond to such increase by cutting fertiliser inputs, in this 
case by a third rather than a half. These landholders are hoping that it will only be temporary 
and they will assess what happens with the commodity markets in the coming year. 
8.3 Discussion 
8.3.1 Justification of the Selected Approach  
 
A range of optimum techniques, especially linear programming, are used in environmental 
economics for the calculation of objective functions.  There is an assumption of revenue 
maximization (or cost minimization) as the motivation for all agents to participate in the 
business. Environmental parameters can also be incorporated in these objective functions after 
being expressed in some monetary equivalent (Schreider et al., 2008b).  
 
Game Theory Modelling suits solving natural resource problems which have an economic 
impact beyond the agent’s own property.  
 
Since the problems of natural resource use are situations in which externalities cross 
frontiers so that the impacts of the externality are not confined to the agent of origin, one 
agent’s choice depends on the choice of the others. From this perspective it is impossible 
not to think in terms of game theory to model natural resource conflicts, even if one 
avoids the phrase itself (Pham Do, 2003). 
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The objective of revenue maximization places the players (in this case the farmers) in a 
competitive situation as described in a non-cooperative game. When there are more than two 
parties involved in the negotiation, similar to the research project, it is possible that a variety of 
coalitions could form and these may do so under the guidance of scenarios represented by the 
game theory models. In this situation most landholders will also be potentially impacted upon 
by the nutrient pollution. They also share the same environmental concerns reguarding water 
quality and loss of biodiversity, so the reasons for collaboration are relatively strong. 
  
Generally, in modelling natural resource predicaments the cooperative Pareto optimum is 
adopted from a non-cooperative game rather than initially modelling from a cooperative game 
perspective because the element of ‘externality’ exists with the problem, ie the pollution affects 
not only the agent but also outsiders. This is the outcome that maximises the sum of the 
individual player’s net benefits, internalising the adverse effects of its strategy on its own 
welfare and on the welfare of all other agents in the system (Pham Do, 2003). The difference 
between the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes is the gain to be had from collaborating.   
 
Such a game was used to model the NPS phosphorus pollution in the Hopkins catchment. The 
players' optimal strategies in case of competition are given by the set of NEPs as described in 
Appendix 4. The cooperative Pareto optimum is then calculated to characterise collaboration 
between the agents.  
 
Game Theory has been used both for analyzing environmental problems and for modelling 
possible situations and solutions. It provides parties on opposite sides of the negotiating table 
with the benefit of models which will potentially give the best case scenario, with an outcome 
beneficial to all parties.   
8.3.2 Use of GIS in Mapping Natural Resource Issues and Modelling 
 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) were used to assist the research undertaken and have 
provided a visual presentation of results, which has been of assistance when explaining the 
Game Theory model to the farmers. Data, modelling and scenarios are often easier for people to 
understand in a short time frame when presented as visual data.  GIS consist of a computer 
mapping program with layers that can be switched on or off to enable variation in expression. 
The layers carry a database of features attributable to the area shown on the map, generally 
regarding location and topography, but layers can also offer spatial analysis of these objects 
(Tsihrintzis et al., 1997). Information can be added to separate layers about the features within a 
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map and overlaid on the original metadata for analysis. In this way, modelling of scenarios can 
be presented and a temporal picture built up. 
 
In the past two decades appropriate techniques, computational resources, and data of suitable 
quality have become widely available, so that the gap between the desirable and feasible in 
environmental modelling keeps decreasing. At the same time GIS, with their power to integrate 
diverse databases, undoubtedly have played a key role in this development and have become a 
core technology of environmental research (Alizadeh Shabani et al, 2006). GIS have contributed 
to research in many environmental problem areas: water resource management, nutrient 
pollution, loss of natural resources, forestry management, land use changes and modelling soil 
erosion risk.  
 
GIS are also used to create models which show the physical impact of management on the 
environment. This is somewhat different to the economic modelling undertaken during this 
research where a visual expression of the change in management has been shown, rather than 
the impact on the ecosystem. In this study data obtained from the GIS meta-databases was used 
to create maps and to provide a visual presentation of the current phosphorus management 
situation in the catchment in relation to levels of phosphorus application and the use of 
contractors. The differences between the Game Theory models of Nash Equilibrium and the 
cooperative Pareto Optima have been presented to support the tabulated data. 
8.3.3 Limitations of the Model 
8.3.3.1 Potential Bias Problems Associated with Using Groups 
 
One possible dilemma associated with using established groups rather than doing a mass 
mailout of surveys to individual landholders, is that the data is skewed to the ‘more progressive’ 
farmers. Study of the adoption of new production practices uptake by Trompf, (2000) has 
shown that farmers who participate in groups have a greater uptake of ideas and technology. 
This means that the farmers participating in the research may not represent the whole farmer 
population. This is a common problem faced by researchers, facilitators and extension staff that 
needs to be acknowledged.  
 
The farmers in the South Eckland dairy discussion group chose not to participate and at the 
meeting there was an air of defensiveness and suspicion. This group is outside the local region 
in which the researcher is known and the farmers indicated concern that the topic may lead to 
targeting of the group for over-use of fertilisers and resultant nutrient run-off, hence a nil return 
of surveys was not unexpected, as indicated by observation of the need to build trust for 
acceptance of Decision Support Tools (Melland et al, 2005). The second group of dairy farmers 
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was approached through the EBMP project facilitator, whom they knew well and 50% 
responded to the survey. The fact that the landholders were undertaking a program such as 
EBMP indicates an interest in environmental issues and introduces a bias. As there were only 
five dairy participants, the calculations were not pursued. 
8.3.3.2 Limitations of the input data 
 
The lack of data regarding accurate dates of fertiliser application, due to the realities of flexible 
management required on a farm meant that the model did not incorporate a time parameter. The 
important factor is the time of application of P fertiliser in relation to the likelihood of rainfall 
within four days (the half life of P fertiliser). This would vary for each property and for each 
year (ie it is relatively random and unpredictable). 
  
The report by Read et al (1999) provides an economic assessment of the ‘potential’ impact of 
algae outbreaks in the catchment. It is not based on actual figures of past costs, because these 
are not known. In addition, it only presents part of ‘the story’ and the calculation of the true cost 
would include cost to the environment through loss of biodiversity and cost of restoring habitat, 
hence the true figure of E (negative environmental impact) maybe double or more of that used. 
Read et al (1999) state ‘This represents an under-estimate of the total economic impacts of 
nutrient management’ and they advise that further research needs to be done in this area. The 
sensitivity analysis indicates that the environmental cost, E, figure resulted in linear change 
showing a 23.1% change in the Nash minus Pareto solutions for a 25% increase in cost to the 
environment, thus indicating that the impact is linear. 
 
In this initial model the proximity factor, β, was calculated on distance between landholders 
properties, however a more accurate figure would need to be based on proximity, elevation, 
slope and water flow direction. Because, proximity does not indicate impact of one property on 
another, particularly as the region is recognised for its wetlands and water may stay on the one 
property.  Similarly, the total average rainfall was used as the parameter for available water. In a 
more detailed calculation of the game theory model rainfall, rainfall intensity and duration, and 
timing of rainfall with respect to timing of application should be included. The soil base P level 
)( 0iα  was taken as zero in this first calculation. For greater accuracy a figure of 2 to 4 mg P/kg 
should be used in future calculations (Nash, 2007).  
 
In the research project production data from the South West Farm Monitor Project was used, 
however as described earlier the landholders may have been above average in production 
techniques and their actual gross margins may be higher than those calculated. A comparison of 
data to the SWFMP is described in Section 8.3.3.  Haygarth and Jarvis (2002) point out there is 
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a danger in taking fertiliser amount as the single physical parameter for change in an 
agricultural production system to correct environmental pollution because production will 
ultimately suffer. Section 8.3.4 will expand on this. Finally, the Game Theory model brings the 
calculations down to common denominator of an economic computation of impact on the 
players and the environment. As such, it runs the risk of unsubstantiated calculations of costs 
and being taken out of context. The model was calculated using one year of data only and has 
not yet been verified by further testing.  
8.3.4 Comparison with the South West Farm Monitor Project 
 
Section 6.2.4 provided a comparison of the amounts of P applied to the enterprises in the project 
and the difference to the results obtained by the SWMFP. The wool, lamb and cropping 
producers in this project applied 138%, 131.4% and 124.2% respectively more than the 
producers in the SWMFP. This put them well above the average for farmers in the south west 
and the production output figures that were used do not reflect this. Greater accuracy would be 
possible if the farmer’s actual individual production figures were used in the model. 
 
The data from the SWFMP has been collected for 36 years and therefore it can be used to 
determine where in the commodity cycle each commodity lies. This will have some impact on 
theresults from the Game Theory calculations and may explain why the use of phosphorus on 
particular enterprise in any one year is seen as more beneficial. According to the South West 
Farm Monitor report of 2006 the commodities of wool, prime lamb and beef were all down in 
value: 
• Real $ gross margin for wool decreased by 56% compared with the 36-year average 
• Real $ gross margin for prime lambs decreased by 28% compared with the 36-year 
average 
• Real $ gross margin for beef decreased by 6% compared with the 36-year 
average (Department of Primary Industries, 2006b) 
•  David McInnes, a farmer participant, stated that cropping was also down further than 
prime lambs in that year but did not give a proportion. (Personal communication) 
 
Since most commodities were at the low end of their economic cycles, some more than others, 
and the absence of accurate rate figures for comparison with cropping data, accurate 
recommendations can not be made.  
 
The sensitivity graph of the price received for the commodity gave a linear change in the 
solutions (refer to Figure 8.6) so it is to be expected that if prices for commodities rise there will 
be a rise in gross margin. For example, wool gross margin was down 56%, this will affect 
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rp which due to the linear sensitivity in an average year would be 59.6% higher. Prime lamb 
was down by 28% therefore in an average year the rp  may be 35% higher. This highlights the 
importance of verifying the results over several years rather than just one. There is an absence 
of figures for comparing cropping gross margins over the past 36 years therefore, an average 
year can not be accurately determined. Unfortunately there is often a mismatch with a rise in 
costs earlier than the rise in price received for the commodities. The choice of financial period 
from which the production figures are taken needs to reflect the inputs and outputs which 
impact on each other so the growing year (February to January) could be used rather than the 
financial year (July to June).   
 
It has however been established that the model works and that the cooperative Pareto optimum 
provides greater savings to most parties than the Nash equilibrium.  
8.3.5 Implications of Recommended P Application Levels on 
Production 
 
Haygarth and Jarvis (2002) discussed the problems that arise if the amount of fertiliser is taken 
as the only parameter to be adjusted when Modelling changes to fertiliser application within a 
production system for the benefit of reducing environmental pollution. Following is an example 
of the expected changes that would occur on one of the properties. As recorded earlier, the DPI 
has produced tables of the expected changes to soil P levels according to annual phosphorus 
fertiliser application. These are given in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 for different soil types and shown in 
Figure 8.7 for a basalt soil. The tables are used to calculate the maintenance phosphorus input 
required to keep the soil P levels stable. For example, if the soil P level is currently 15mg P/kg 
then the amount required to maintain this level is 20kg P/ha. It is therefore possible to calculate 
the reduction in soil P that would occur with a reduction in application amount. Using Table 4.3 
which gives the predicted kg P/dse for maximum profit, it is possible then to calculate the 
predicted stocking rate that a reduction in amount of P applied/ha would affect.  
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Figure 8.7 Basalt Soils  Predicted Olsen P for Given Amounts of Applied P Showing Affect on 
Soil P mg/kg for Applied P kg/ha  
 
An example of this would be: 
 
PLAYER 22  320 Ha  Wool Producer      Current application: 13.65kg P/ha 
  
 Production calculated from Nash Equilibrium    $130,702.37 
 Production calculated from Pareto Optimum    $130,699.37 
 Cost to environment calculated from Nash Equilibrium   $611.42 
 Cost to environment calculated from Pareto Optimum   $604.20 
 
 Nash Utility $130,090.95    (Nash Production minus Nash Environment) 
 Pareto Utility $130,095.16    (Pareto Production minus Pareto Environment) 
 Pareto minus Nash Utility   $ 4.21 (Savings accrued to the farmer by cooperating compared 
with Nash) 
 
The recommended fertiliser application from the Nash Equilibrium Modelling would be 
12.21 kg P /ha (a saving of 1.44kg P /ha) 
The recommended fertiliser application from the Pareto Optimum Modelling would be  
12.11 kg P/ha (a saving of 1.54kg P/ha). This equates to 19.25 kg superphosphate/ha at $0.42/kg 
= $8.09/ha compared with current application. 
 
Using the graph in Figure 8.7, a reduction from 13.65 kg P/ha to 12.11 kg/ha would give a 
predicted annual reduction in soil P of -0.2 to -1.0 mg/kg/an for a basalt soil type. 
 
The impact on wool production based on DPI Figures for production forecasts: 
At the current application rate of 13.65 kg P/ha 
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• Current potential  stocking for the property with a 600ml rainfall, improved pasture 
and medium soil loss factor  would be 15.51 dse/ha 
 
At an application rate of 12.21 kg/ha (as recommended by the Game Theory equation) 
• Predicted stocking rate (0.88kgP/DSE) will equal 13.875 dse/ha 
•  15.51-13.875 = 1.635 d.s.e/ha difference approximately 1 sheep/ha 
• Wool cut/head=5.0 to 7.5 kg (this depends on the size and wool cut of the sheep) 
• Predicted reduction in wool cut approximately 5.0 to 7.5 kg/ha 
•  5.0 to 7.5kg @ $ 7.78/kg = potential reduction in income of $38.90 to $58.35/ha in 
the following year, dependent on the commodity cycle. 
 
Taking the sensitivity results for the price of P, estimating the amount that should be applied 
from the model when the price of P input doubles, thus halving the amount of P applied to 
6.06kg P/ha, and then running a production estimation similar to above, it may be concluded 
that production would spiral down unless prices received for the commodities rises, or the size 
of farms needs to be much larger to run the same amount of animals (therefore altering the costs 
and the gross margins).  
 
At the farm level on a cash-crop farm, anything that improves the efficiency of nutrient 
utilisation and thus minimises losses should increase the economic returns to the farm. Thus 
there is a strong incentive for good nutrient management consistent with water quality 
protection. On an animal production farm, neither crop production nor fertiliser use is 
directly connected to the output of such farms. Farm performance depends on the animal 
husbandry skills of the farmer… (Beegle et al, 2002). 
 
The game theory model recommendations do not take into account decisions made by certain 
farmers as to the type of pasture being fertilised (native or introduced). The farmer that is 
retaining native pasture to graze stock on is doing so for reasons other than maximising 
production (such as minimising inputs, retaining native grasses for drought or conservation 
reasons or a desire to grow very fine wool in a traditional manner). This puts him outside the 
Game Theory model, which previously stated 
 
Assumes two or more rational players, the basic assumption of the ‘game’ is that each has 
an understanding of the expected rational behaviour of the other and will act accordingly in 
pursuit of their own goal.  
 
Rational behaviour in this case implies ‘maximising profit’. 
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8.3.6 Benefit of the Research Outcomes 
 
This research has demonstrated that optimal solutions from a Game Theory model can be used 
to recommend fertiliser amounts for application on mixed enterprise properties within a region, 
based on the economics of production which includes a cost to the environment.  If farmers are 
willing to take up cooperative Pareto strategies, then there would be an overall reduction in 
fertiliser use within the catchment and in the long run a reduction in nutrient pollution of the 
catchment waterways. 
 
The overall model calculations gave an excess of 49,244 kg P if the competitive strategy (Nash) 
is followed or 53,163 kg P if the cooperative strategy (Pareto) is followed. The difference is a 
saving of 3,919 kg P or 35.27 tons of superphosphate for the 30 properties (an average of 1.175 
tons/property). Over the estimated 1540 properties which occur in the Hopkins catchment this 
equates to 1809.5 tons of superphosphate at a value of approximately $844,200 (applyingthe 
cost of superphosphate used in the model). While this is only a small amount per property, it  
demonstrates that the model would achieve a significant reduction in phosphate costs.  
 
Cropping enterprise farms in particular could benefit from the use of the model as the 
calculations suggest that there is greater overuse of fertiliser on cropping than on other 
enterprises. Based on the data from 2006, the economic calculations suggest that the production 
income does not justify the fertiliser amounts being applied. Unfortunately, the farmers incur 
the cost before reaping the income and as they are price takers it is not possible for them to 
know in advance the cost benefit of the phosphorus input. 
 
The fact that one of the research team was resident in the region was important in obtaining data 
for the Game Theory model and in building trust in the initial contact between researchers and 
landholders. The suggestion by Lund and Palmer (1997) for a shared vision model could arise 
by development of further collaboration. The use of Game Theory to identify optimal outcomes 
for participants is a useful tool in the process of planning and goal setting in a region interested 
in improving environmental end results. It would also be possible to transfer this model for use 
in other catchment regions where similar enterprises are undertaken. Furthermore, the model 
could be trialled on dairy, beef and horticultural properties. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
9.1 Conclusion 
 
Waterways are amongst Australia’s most valuable assets. Without good quality water we would 
not be able to undertake the agricultural, economic and cultural activities that the community 
requires for healthy living. Healthy waterways with high biodiversity can only exist when 
nutrients are kept in a balance. When excessive amounts of nutrients enter the waterways, weed 
plants take over and algal blooms can occur, leading to a reduction in habitat and available 
oxygen for aquatic life, odours and possibly toxins that are dangerous to animals and humans. 
This has an impact on the whole catchment to the estuary and out into the sea. 
 
In this project the use of phosphorus fertilisers by farmers with mixed grazing and cropping 
enterprises within a catchment was examined. The information was applied using in Game 
Theory modelling to determine and recommend the optimal amounts of fertilisers that each 
individual landholder should use according to a strategy of cooperation between landholders.  
 
9.1.1 Conclusions from the Survey Data 
 
The survey indicated that the farmers in the project were well aware of the DPI 
recommendations regarding amounts of P fertiliser for given soils, rainfall regions and stock 
levels. These farmers aimd to achieve soil P levels within the DPI recommended range, to give 
them optimum chance of achieving maximum production output. However, one-third of the 
farmers in the groups were using below the DPI recommended rates of fertiliser use. 
 
The timing of fertiliser application by the landholder is dependent on budget, climate and the 
availability of the contractor, with only slight variation from year to year. Split applications of 
phosphorus are one option to minimise the risk of application within four days of heavy rain 
which is the danger period for runoff. 
  
The landholders’ knowledge of the condition of the major waterways was limited, however their 
understanding of the causes of nutrient pollution was sound and they had a positive attitude to 
minimising runoff.  Fifty percent of the nutrient runoff impacts on their own properties so it is 
in their own interests to fence off water points and control fertiliser application as part of a 
strategy to improve water quality while also benefiting their crops or pasture. Over 80% of these 
landholders are using soil testing regularly to aid in their fertiliser management decisions. 
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The CMA and DPI programs fund fencing and the revegetation of river and creek banks. These 
two organisations also support the EBMP and DairySAT programs which raise awareness of 
nutrient runoff and management on farms. The dairy industry’s Codes of Practice also provides 
information to improve dairy effluent management, and the use of soil and tissue testing. 
Extension services could also be expanded to educate landholders on the state of the rivers. 
 
Using a straight economic analysis to demonstrate savings to each farmer (equivalent to 
$1.1/ha) is not likely to persuade them to reduce fertiliser use. Economic figures only tell part of 
the story as there may be specific reasons that a farmer is currently using a low rate of fertiliser, 
for example, pastures are native species and require low soil P levels. Alternatively a farmer 
may currently be using a high rate of fertiliser because the landholder is catching up after a 
period of low fertiliser use. 
 
Aside from whether the landholder will adjust their applicatipon rates if there is increased 
knowledge, the current increase in fertiliser costs will impact on the amount of fertiliser being 
used. High costs will encourage the exploration of alternative sources, improved management 
techniques and consequently more efficient use of fertilisers. 
9.1.2 Conclusions from the Game Theory Model 
  
This research has demonstrated that game theory can be used to calculate optimal 
recommendations for an input (such as the amount of fertiliser) to a farm business ahentaking 
into account not only the income and costs to the landholderbut also an estimated cost to the 
environment. If the cooperative Pareto strategies are agreed to, then an overall reduction in 
recommended fertiliser rates could be demonstrated for the 30 farms, in comparison to either the 
Nash Equilibrium recommendations, or the current use of fertiliser on the farms. In the long 
term, the choice of the cooperative Pareto strategy would lead to a reduction in base soil P 
levels and potentially the NPS nutrient pollution in the streams of the region, although a direct 
reduction would be hard to measure particularly in the short term. A cooperative strategy could 
be implemented through the system of farmer community groups that already exists. These 
groups are influential in the region and supported thisproject from the initial stages of its 
implementation. 
 
Two types of animal enterprises and a cropping enterprise, on single or mixed enterprise farms, 
were part of the study and the model could be transferred to other regions with similar structures 
of business. The overall model calculations gave an excess of 49,244 kg P if the competitive 
strategy (Nash) is followed or 53,163 kg P if the cooperative strategy (Pareto) is followed. The 
difference is a saving of 3,919 kg P or 35.27 tons of superphosphate for the 30 properties (an 
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average of 1.175tons/property). If the q is taken as 0.985 then the corresponding figures are 
2405kg P over the 30 properties or 21.6 tons of superphosphate (average of 0.72 tons P/ 
property). Across1540 properties this would equate to 1,109 - 1,809.5 tons of superphosphate at 
a value of $517,810 - $844,200.  However, as this is an initial trial, further studies incorporating 
data from several years (to account for cycles in the commodities) and the use of more 
accurately reckoned parameters or factors need to be done before recommendations and 
comparisons are made between enterprises.  
 
In the final year of the project the price of phosphorus fertiliser rose by over 100% motivating 
farmers to examine closely the amount of phosphorus they were applying and what strategies 
were available to increase its efficiency of use. While prices for commodities had also risen 
during the period, due to drought, low world food stores and competition for producing crops to 
meet energy demands, there was no reason to indicate that prices they would remain high, hence 
creating a great deal of uncertainty. The increase in fertiliser prices effectively worked like a tax 
applied to the input cost and instigated changes in management practice on the farms. 
9.2 Future Directions 
 
9.2.1 Future Directions for this Study 
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, there were limitations to the model that was formulated. Further 
research could modify the model to reduce or remove these limitations. The most pressing issue 
is the need to verify the results with replication using data over several years, if possible with 
production data from farmers’ own systems. To achieve this, the model would need to be 
accessible for afarmer to input his own data to preserve the privacy of his figures.  
 
It is also suggested that a better estimation of the environmental cost parameter (E) could be 
undertaken. Some research has been done in the Murray Darling catchment on the costs of a 
BGA outbreak but more research needs to be done on the costs to a smaller, more intensively 
farmed catchment.  
 
The proximity factor, β, should be re-calculated with placement of the property in relation to the 
direction of water flow and elevation. The soil basis level )( 0iα could to be adjusted to 2 - 4 mg/l 
however, as Nash, (2007) explained this is above the EPA toxicity target used in the model and 
the use of zero may be preferable. This would give greater accuracy to these factors. Lastly, the 
model could be calculated with a timing parameter, which reflects the application of fertiliser on 
grazing properties in relation to rainfall. 
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It was envisaged that a decision support tool maybe designed to help farmers choose the level 
and timing of application of phosphate fertiliser on farms, which reflected not only the  
economic impacts on production but also incorporated the economic impact of the cost to the 
environment. As discussed above, the tool could then be trialled with actual production data 
from individual farmers. This is an area for further development. 
9.2.2 Future uses of Game Theory in Natural Resource Management  
 
From an agricultural scientist’s perspective, the current areas of ‘conflict’ at the agriculture/ 
natural resource managment interface, which have an economic component, and where it is 
possible for Game Theory modelling to be used are: 
• competition of land use for ‘energy crops’ and ‘food crops’ 
• competition of land use for ‘carbon’ and food production  
• competition between the use of water for people, agriculture and the environment 
• nutrient pollution of the waterways specifically the management of Nitrogen on 
farms. 
The changing global climate has had a large impact on the world food stores with rising costs of 
food in developing countries becoming critical for the poor. At the same time, the energy crisis 
has driven up the cost of fuel thus making the growing of crops for fuel an attractive option for 
farmers who have felt the price cost squeeze reducing their family incomes. The conflicting 
dilemma for countries, regions and farmers is ‘how much of their land should they put into 
energy crops and how much into food crops’. The logical answer for farmers is to chase the 
maximum profit but from the nation’s perspective it is important to continue to grow food for its 
citizens at a ‘reasonable’ price and sustainably (environmentally, economically and socially).  
Game Theory Modelling could be directed at this problem to assist in the evaluation of the 
potential balance and negotiation in policy making. 
 
Climate change and the signing of the Kyoto protocol by Australia recently has brought the 
need for producing and protecting carbon stores on farms to the forefront of farmer’s minds as 
they face the prospect of being subject to accusations and taxes for producing greenhouse gasses 
as a result of their food or material production. A side issue of the carbon storage is the 
preservation and replanting of the indigenous vegetation and preserving biodiversity on farms. 
Similarly, there will be conflict over the use of land for carbon production versus food 
production. A balance needs to be found which enables farms to continue to produce food at a 
cost suitable for the population but balancing the greenhouse gas emissions produced through 
animal and crop production.. 
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Water sharing arrangements have been, and will continue to be an area for the use of Game 
Theory Modelling as will shared food resources. This has been discussed in the literature 
research. The overuse of nutrients other than phosphorus, such as nitrogen, which lead to 
pollution of waterways, could also be explored using a similar method to the model developed 
in this project. 
 
In conclusion Game Theory can be used to model multiple scenarios and enable calculation of 
equitable sharing arrangements for agricultural production and societal needs. Negotiation 
between different agents would benefit from the insights gained from the simulation and 
effective coalitions could be formed to enable sustainable and cost effective solutions to be 
developed. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Survey 1 Questions  
Name: 
Address: 
Phone No:     Fax No: 
CFA Map Ref: 
Farm Type: 
a) Grazing  Wool    % 
b) Grazing  Prime Lambs   % 
c) Grazing Beef    % 
d) Cropping  conventional   % 
e) Raised bed cropping   % 
f) Controlled traffic cropping  % 
g) Forage crops    % 
h) Dairy     % 
 
Farm Size: 
 
Soil Types: 
 
Average annual rainfall: 
 
Pasture Types:  
Native  % 
Introduced  % 
 
Annual  % 
Perennial  % 
Do you have wetlands, creeks or rivers on your property? 
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Fertiliser Application Questions 
 
1) What type of fertilisers do you use on your farm?  
2) Specify what they are used on: 
a) grain crops 
b) pasture  
c) hay crops 
d) other 
3)  How often do you use fertilisers? Please specify for each type. 
4) Do you normally use fertilisers during a particular season? Please discuss if 
 needed. 
5) What amount of fertiliser do you use? 
6) Do you decide the amount according to family tradition, as advised by an 
 agronomist or as recommended by the Department of Primary Industry. 
7) How does your fertiliser use vary year to year?  
8) Are you planning to change the type of fertiliser that you currently use? Please 
 specify. 
9) Do you use a contractor to spread the fertiliser or do the spreading yourself? 
10)    Do you use granular fertilisers, liquid fertiliser or foliar sprays?   
11) Do you follow the recommendations of the ‘Codes of practice’ for the fertiliser 
 industry? 
12) Do you use soil tests or tissue tests to determine how much fertiliser to spread 
on pastures or crops? Please specify. 
13) If a heavy rain occurs right after fertilizing the farm, do you re-apply fertilisers? 
14) What margin would you put on the benefit you get by applying fertiliser? E.g. 
for each $ spent on fertiliser you gain $3 in income. 
15) What is the cost of fertiliser expressed as a percentage of your annual farm 
costs? Eg If your annual farm costs are $100,000 and the fertiliser costs 
$15,000, equates to 15% of the overall costs. 
 
Nutrient Pollution Questions 
 
16) What is your understanding of nutrient pollution of waterways?  
17) How does this affect you and your region? 
18) Are you concerned with the long term effect of nutrient pollution on the wider 
 catchment? 
19) What monetary value do you place on the benefits of a healthy catchment?  
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20) Do you recognise that there is a problem of nutrient pollution associated with 
 agricultural activities? What activities? – please specify. 
21) What % of your waterways and wetlands have been fenced and revegetated to 
at least 10m from the edge of the water? 
22) Is it possible for you to contribute to solving the problem of excess nutrient 
 pollution in waterways? 
23) What frustrates you most in discussions of environmental issues and 
agriculture? Why? 
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Appendix 2 
Survey 2 Questions  
 
Name: 
Questions clarifying answers from first survey and seeking additional information 
  
1) What is your soil P target? 
2) What percentage of your production areas are at or near this target?  
 
From Questions 5 and 12  
The amount you indicated that you applied was………kg/ha 
 
3)  Does this reflect where you are aiming for in soil P target? 
4)  Was the amount indicative of what was applied over the whole farm?  
5)  Was it specific to certain paddocks with the aim of raising soil P?  
 If so 
6)  What percentage of the farm was this? 
7)  Please indicate below in which month/s you apply Phosphorus fertiliser. C-Crop & 
P- Pasture 
 
From Question 21 
 You indicated that you have fenced------------- % of your waterways and wetlands 
  
8)  At what distance from the waterway are the fences? 
9)  Have you observed an improvement in water quality?  
10)  What are the local attitudes on fencing waterways and wetlands? 
11)  Would you allow me to map this on a GIS for the purposes of the project? 
12)  Do you use land class fencing to manage low lying areas of your farm? 
13)  Are you an active member of a Landcare group? 
 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
 
Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
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Appendix 3 
Survey 3 Response to Game Theory Calculations for 
Phosphorus Fertiliser Application 
Name: 
The result of the calculations suggests that a) if you were taking only the ‘cost of 
production’ and the ‘cost to the environment’ into account you should raise/lower the 
amount of Phosphorus applied from ___________ to ___________. 
 
The result of the calculations suggests that if you were taking a community wide 
cooperative approach to P fertiliser application, you should raise/lower the amount of 
phosphorus applied from ___________ to ___________. 
 
1) How do you respond to this suggestion?  
2) Knowing that there is a problem with rising Phosphorus levels in the Hopkins 
River, does this alter your decision making with regard to Phosphorus fertiliser 
application? How? 
3) If you raised/ lowered the amount of P (kg/ha) what do you predict would be the 
production response in 3-5 years? 
 
Impact of fertiliser cost increases on short term fertiliser application decision making.  
 
4) What impact has the doubling in cost of fertiliser had on your decision making this 
year? 
5) Has this altered the timing of fertiliser application? 
6) Has this altered the amount of fertiliser applied? 
7) Has this altered the mix of enterprises that you are planning to produce? 
8)  If you grow grain crops:  
 Has this altered the mix of crops that you are planting this year?  How? 
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Appendix 4  
Game Theory Formulation to Phosphorus Pollution of Waterways  
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4.5.3 The Pay-off Function 
 
 
Appendices 
166 
 
Appendices 
167 
 
Appendices 
168 
 
Appendices 
169 
 
Appendices 
170 
 
Appendices 
171 
 
Appendices 
172 
 
Appendices 
173 
 
Appendices 
174 
 
 
 
